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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores policy variation in local government. 'Me main purpose of 
the research is twofold; to examine the methodological issues in the analysis of policy 
variation in local government; and to further our understanding of Korean local 
government, which has been undergoing sweeping changes in recent years. 
In the first half of this thesis the distinction between output and process 
approaches is exan-dned and reformulated in theoretical and methodological terms. 
Output studies are reclassified into four modes of explanation: socioeconomic analysis, 
political studies, urban hierarchy theory and incrementalism. A general model based on 
British literature is established for a process approach consisting of three dimensions: 
political leadership, adn-dnistrative process and social inputs. 
The second half of the study examines local social policy-making in Korea with 
the aim of assessing the working of the newly-launched Korean local government 
system. A two-stage method is developed in the research design. In the first stage, an 
output analysis is carried out in order to identify how the outputs of local social policies 
vary and to what extent this variation is related to policy environments. In the second 
stage, the dynamics of the policy process are explored using a case study approach. 
This shows HOW political factors are associated with policy variation in local 
government. 
This study indicates in theory how the research question itself has predetermined 
not only the methods but also the findings of empirical studies. In the methodological 
dimension, six differences are noted between the output and process approaches. This 
study concludes by calling for more attention to innovation in the management side of 
Korean local government. 
KEY WORDS: local government, policy variation, expenditure decisions 
Korean local government. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Policy studies deal with the direct or indirect deten-ninants of policy-making 
(Dearlove, 1973,1). The origin of variations in governmental policies has been of 
interest to writers from a wide range of disciplines. The reasons why different 
governments adopt different policies have been widely analysed in the U. K. for over 20 
years (Boyne, 1985b, 22). 
Traditionally, political scientists have tended to assume that the primary source 
of variations in governmental policy-making came from the political sphere. The 
interactions between political factors are described as exercising a decisive influence on 
governmental service distribution. However, notable challenges have consistently been 
made against assuming the primacy of political factors. Those who analyse the outputs 
of governmental policies argue for the relative importance of socioeconomic constraints 
on political choice. This distinction between socioeconomic and political variables has 
been pervasive in the study of policy variation. Many empirical studies, in fact, show 
that socioeconon-dc environments outweigh political variables albeit with varying 
degrees. A sceptical question is often asked in this dispute: 'Does politics matterT 
(Sharpe and Newton, 1984) or 'Do processes matterT (Hoggart, 1989). Not 
unexpectedly, there are pros and cons for this research question. Whatever the detailed 
content of both camps is, the question of the relative importance of socioeconornic and 
political variables has become the major subject in the study of governmental policy- 
making (Alt, 1977,83; Lewis-Beck, 1977,559; Boyne, 1985b, 2). 
Chapter One 
Over the last several decades the research question itself has predetermined the 
scope and methods in the study of governmental policies. It dominated the period as an 
'orthodox paradigm', and the period n-dght be characterised as the era of "puzzle- 
solving' in Kuhnian terms (Kuhn, 1970,35). Now this proves to be a false issue 
(Nardulle and Stonecash, 1982,45; Boyne, 1989) and policy analysts are seeking an 
alternative in pursuit of the answer to the problems found in this previous paradigm. 
This study explores a fundamental dimension upon which the study of policy 
variation is based. The methodological basis of the orthodox research question is 
highlighted, and a more appropriate schema is sought by evaluating a wider range of 
researches on local policy variation. The 'orthodox' research question on relative 
importance of socioeconomic and political variables is critically reviewed and, at the 
same time, another important research tradition is examined in a comparative 
perspective. Secondly, an empirical study is conducted of Korean local government in 
an attempt to apply the theoretical discussions to an empirical case. The main questions 
to be examined in this empirical study are: What forces are influential on the policy 
variation in local government? What methods are employed to analyse policy variation 
and what effects have resulted from the use of different methods? Who are the main 
policy actors in the Korean local authorities which were newly constructed in 1991? 
How can each policy actor be characterised in terms of influence level, interest 
mediation and resources? First, this chapter is devoted to outlining the study in general 
terms. 
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1.2. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
Significance of Local Government 
3 
It is a well-known fact that local authorities play a pivotal role in a democratic 
government. Laski (1989,139) makes the point that local government raises exactly the 
same issues as are raised by the general questions of the modern state. 
Both right and left-wing parties place the underlying nature of local government 
at the centre of political debate. Pluralist theorists have conventionally taken local 
government as a mechanism for the diffusion of power. Their rationales for local 
government involve liberty, participation, political education and responsiveness. On 
the contrary, Marxists have shown an indifference to decentralisation. Decentralisation 
was attacked in classical Marxism as rupturing class conflicts and disguising the real 
roots of social problems. 
However, recent developments have witnessed considerable changes in the 
conventional stances towards local government within the state theories. Pluralists are 
often at the forefront of attacking local autonomy on the one hand and some Left- 
wingers struggle for decentralisation on the other. It seems that local government is 
demystified in the sense of political ideologies. Instead, the question of local 
government is more often discussed in relation to the functional roles performed by it. 
This is so especially where the functional allocation of the state comes under hot 
discussion (Batley and Stoker, 1991) under the wave of structural reform in the 1980s. 
Many countries like France are decentralising (Norton, 1991,37) while the U. K., where 
local authorities had enjoyed relatively high levels of autonomy, is now out of step 
(Blair, 1991,56) with this trend. Local authorities have become a subject of 
considerable concern in most countries. 
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Methodological Issues in Analysing Policy Variation 
4 
Local government, in particular, has been recognised as having great potentials 
for the empirical study of variation in governmental policies. The comparison of 
different local authorities seems to offer a way (Hill and Bran-dey, 1986,153) to 
investigate the causes of policy variation. Therefore, the traditional question of the 
relative importance of socioeconomic and political variables has been don-dnant in the 
study of policy variation in local government over the last several decades. This 
paradigm seems to have dictated the rules that limit both the nature of research findings 
and the methods by which they are to be obtained. Now this paradigm is subject to 
serious challenge from various strands and the era of 'puzzle-solving' in Kuhnian terms 
(Kuhn, 1970,35) comes to an end. 
..... the primary issue quickly became the relative don-dnance of politics or 
economics as policy determinants. This question now appears to have been a 
false issue I (Nardulli and Stonecash, 1982,45). 
There is no doubt that some of the early studies which attempted to assess the 
relative impact of the non-political aspects of the polity on policy were 
somewhat crude and lacking in theoretical refinement (Sharpe and Newton, 
1984,1). 
Even 20 years after the publication of Economics, Politics and the Public, the 
'economics versus politics' debate is still unresolved (Hoggart, 1989,2). 
However, despite the history of scepticism over the traditional research question, 
the nature of problems in the study of local policy-making has not been fully 
highlighted. Current studies suffer from a lack of clear understanding of the 
methodological issues in the analysis of policy variation. Also, inadequate attention has 
been given to other developments in the study of policy variation in methodological 
1. Boyne (1985a and 1985b) presents an excellent comparison of policy studies between 
the U. S. and the U. K. In fact, the impact of this false issue has been more serious and 
continuous in the U. S. than in the U. K. A recent example which has suffered from this 
false issue can be found in Buchanan et al. (199 1). 
Chapter One 5 
aspects because of the don-driance of the traditional research question on relative 
importance between socioeconomic and political variables. It is necessary to clarify the 
underlying bases of the existing research traditions in terms of methodology. This 
would be a starting point for the development of a proper analysis in future studies. 
Reform of Korean Local Government in 1991 
Korea has maintained rapid economic growth and this success had been 
achieved through a centralised administration. This centralised administration came to 
be largely reconstructed in 1991 facing the changing environment. As a result of 
economic development a more democratic and responsive government was required by 
the people. A consensus, in fact, was formed among the general public in the 1980s for 
increasing political participation even to the extent of allowing some decrease in the 
economic growth. This consensus, as described in chapter Six, seemed to be closely 
tied to the process of democratisation which gathered its momentum in the mid-1980s. 
In late 1984, the reform of local government was scheduled as a policy measure for 
democratisation. The Fifth Republic agreed to introduce this reform by 1987. After 
four years of delay, sweeping policy measures were taken for decentralisation in 1991, 
and the local government system was largely restructured. Local elections took place 
for basic-tier local authorities in March 1991 and the large-tier election followed in June 
of the same year. 
It is beyond question that the reform of local government will be a litmus test for 
the future of Korean politics. A variety of changes have already resulted from the 
launch of a new local self-government system and many additional reforms are likely to 
take place in the near future. 
It is timely to exan-dne these 'burning issues' with the sweeping changes brought 
by the local government reform. The investigation of the working mechanisms under 
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the new system is of great significance in Korea. In particular, policy researchers are 
expected to turn their attention to such areas as the functional re-allocation between the 
centre and local authorities, inter-local government relationships, decentralisation of 
financial systems and the development of the officer-councillor relationship. 
In short, local government has become one of the most fiercely contested topics 
in Korea today. The development of the newly-launched system will be a milestone for 
the future of Korean politics. A systematic analysis of the restructured system is 
desperately needed in this sense. 
1.3. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The main purpose of this study is twofold: to examine methodological problems 
in the study of policy variation in local government, and to explore the working of the 
new local government system in Korea. Efforts will be made to illuminate how the 
analysis of local policy variation is related to the output and process approaches2 and 
what effects are caused by the adoption of different methods. The diagnosis of 
methodological issues is expected to provide some signpost for future studies. 
Secondly, the working mechanism of Korean local government will be 
exan-dned using the conceptual framework established in the theoretical discussion. 
Changes and continuities will be explored including the politics of decentralisation and 
the working of the restructured system. All these aspects will be illuminated through 
the analysis of local expenditure decisions. Finally, the major findings of this empirical 
research will be related to the theoretical discussion in the final chapter of the study. 
Put differently, this study aims to understand the politics of service variation in Korean 
2. Consideration of this schema is of importance for policy studies in general. 
According to Hill and Bran-dey (1986,153), 'one way of studying the policy process 
which tries to offer an objective approach to identifying influences upon policy is to 
focus upon outputs and, if possible, outcomes, and to try to identify the inputs which 
determine them'. 
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local governments and to further understanding of methodological issues in order to 
make them more useful for future studies. The objectives of the research can be 
summarised as follows: 
- to illuminate a fundamental dimension of traditional research methods in the 
study of policy variation in local government; 
- to establish a theoretical and methodological framework for the analysis of local policy-making; 
- to further an understanding of Korean local government by assessing the 
working mechanisms of the newly adopted system in 1991. 
1.4. RESEARCH METHOD AND SCOPE 
In the study of policy variation, one of the most vital aspects which have been 
taken by policy analysts is the investigation of budgetary policies of local government. 
This study also focuses on the budgetary aspects in governmental policies in analysing 
policy variation between local authorities. The budget is important to policy studies for 
several reasons: 
(1) Almost all policies in the modern state need expenditure (Booth, 1979, xi). 
Therefore it is believed that the allocation of the budget is a window through 
which the distributions of power are observed (Wildavsky, 1986,2). 
(2) Usually it is a legal requirement that the budgetary decisions should be 
published. Ibis fact facilitates a much easier collection of data on a large 
number of cases (Sharpe and Newton, 1984,2). 
(3) Budgetary records are handled by better qualified personnel and published 
officially by public authorities. These factors cause the budgetary records to 
be less vulnerable to the problems of reliability in research. 
(4) Finally, the budgetary records are readily available numerics for statistical 
treatment. Ibis feature is closely linked to the legacy of quantitative analysis 
in the current study on policy-making. 
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In analysing budgetary decisions, this study adopts a two-stage approach3,4. 
The first stage comprises an output analysis aimed at identifying how the outputs of 
local service distributions vary and to what extent this variation is related to policy 
environments. The distribution patterns of the local budget will be analysed from four 
perspectives: financial sources, socioeconomic variables, urban hierarchy theory and 
incrementalism. These four clusters of variables emerge as a result of a refinement of 
the existing approaches in output analysis. The output analysis of this first stage is 
important for several reasons. It will not only provide comparable information on the 
variances of service distribution between local authorities but will also show linkages 
between policy outputs and policy environments. This means the ultimate effects of 
procedural factors on policy outputs will be clarified in this output analysis. Also, in 
this research, this output analysis will be used to choose two local authorities appearing 
as the extreme cases which will go forward into the second stage. In the second stage, 
the processes of policy-making in the two extreme cases will be explored using survey 
methods to see what procedural factors account for the observed variances. Comparison 
of the two extreme cases is expected to sharpen the contrast between the procedural 
features which otherwise might easily be obscured. The results of process approaches 
will show HOW political factors are associated with policy variation in local 
authorities. 
In terms of the scope of the empirical research, this study focuses on the large- 
tier of local government in Korea in the first year after the 1991 reform. Full details for 
the level and unit of analysis will be explained in chapter Five. 
3. This research design is based on the assumption that different methods are required to 
explain different aspects of the policy process. This is to say that different methods 
may be relevant at different stages (Dale et al., 1988,41; Bryman, 1990,146) in the 
research process so that the explanatory power can be maximised by using their 
respective strengths. 
4. It may be possible and desirable to combine different theories to explain local 
expenditure decisions. Dunleavy, for instance, shows a potential advantage of such a 
strategy by combining ideas from neo-Marxist analysis with what he calls a radical 
Weberian approach (Ham and Hill, 1984, ch. 10). Cawson and Saunders' dualist model 
(Cawson and Saunders, 1983, Saunders, 1985,22-48) is another example which shows a 
similar effort. 
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1.5. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The research falls into three parts: first, a critical review of existing theories; 
second, the development of a conceptual framework; and finally, the application of the 
conceptual framework to the empirical analysis of Korean local government. 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. It starts by outlining the research process in 
chapter One. Chapter Two examines the fundamental nature of local government as 
characterised from the viewpoint of theories of the state. In chapter Tliree, the existing 
literature is critically reviewed in an attempt to further understand policy-making in 
local authorities. The review of existing empirical studies leads to a conceptual 
framework in chapter Four. The general problems are narrowed down to specific 
research issues (Berger and Patchner, 1988) and some operational definitions of the 
main concepts are provided throughout these two chapters as well. 
Chapter Five then provides the research design for the empirical study of local 
government in Korea. This describes the development of the research strategy, the 
choice of methodology, and the selection of two localities for case study. A descriptive 
account of Korean local government is provided in chapter Six as a basis for 
understanding the 1991 reforms, what changes have been taking place in Korean local 
government and why. Chapter Seven presents the output analysis of the local service 
distributions in Korea. Two local authorities which appear as extreme cases in this 
output analysis are explored using the case study method in chapters Eight and Nine. 
The process of policy-making in the two local authorities is compared in these chapters. 
The final Chapter is then devoted to drawing together the main findings of the research 
and to linking them to the preliminary discussion in terms of theory, method and 
practice. Some efforts are made, in this final chapter, to provide certain signposts for 
the direction of future studies. 
Chapter One 
1.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
10 
As Poggi (1965,284) argues, a way of seeing is a way of not seeing. Some 
choices should be made under the pay-off relationships between alternative ways 
(Bulmer, 1983,14). Other choices are also inevitable in striking a balance between the 
demands of rigour and methodological adequacy on one hand and of practical feasibility 
on the other (Booth, 1990,21). 
The choices which have been made in this research turn into limitations. First of 
all, the major shortcon-dng is the lack of analysis through time. The necessity for a 
cross-sectional approach leads to the neglect of longitudinal analysis in the empirical 
part of the study. This means that an account of changes in the relevant variables over 
time has been sacrificed The need to explore local policies following the local 
government reforms has, in turn, limited attention to 1992 only. 
Secondly, it may be argued that the focus on the expenditure decisions of local 
government is another limitation. Expenditure is not a true output measure but just a 
measure of the cost of achieving an output (Hill and Bramley, 1986,154). In addition, 
some significant aspects of governmental activities cannot be found in the budgetary 
records. These issues might be better investigated in the analysis on non-budgetary 
aspects such as non-decision-making in locality. 
11 
CHAPTER TWO: 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN STATE THEORIES 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Local government has become an almost universal feature of modern states 
since Jeremy Bentham, the father of the Utilitarian school, invented the term 'local 
government' (Hill, 1974,26). There has been an ongoing debate on the problem of 
what should be the appropriate functions of local government. In the realm of practice, 
both right and left-wing parties have placed local government at the centre of political 
debate. At the theoretical level, the public administration approach, based on the 
assumption that 'power lies where it is supposed to lie', has come under criticism 
(Stoker, 1988,219). As a return to the concept of the state has recently been argued, 
more concern is added to the underlying nature of local government. 
The fundamental nature of local authorities also cannot be underestimated in 
the exploration of policy variation. Studying local government cannot be regarded 
merely as studying the periphery of the state branches. Rather it is deeply connected 
with the fundamental nature of state systems, not only as a mode of adn-dnistration but 
also as an expression of political ideologies. The consideration of wider state theories is 
fundamental to positioning local government in the political and social contexts in 
which local government operates. To be more precise, the investigation of wider state 
theory is of use for several reasons here in this study: helping to categorise existing 
local government theories; helping to understand pre-conceptions about the character of 
local authorities; helping to capture the methodological premises and the lin-dtations of 
an empirical research; and helping to provide a departure for further theoretical 
development. In addition to these points, as in any other developing countries 
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(JUgen, 1988,12), a specification of underlying state theories of local government 
seems to have been virtually neglected in Korea for a long time 1. 
Not all issues relating to local government can be located on a single left-right 
continuum. It is more appropriate to take categories from the empirical development of 
political attitudes about local government. In this chapter, five contemporary theories 
of the state are explored under the following headings: pluralism, Marxism, the dual 
state theory, the New Urban Left and the New Right. Elitism and corporatism - two 
more important theories of the state - are not included here because they do not present 
any specific views on the spatial arrangements of government; they tend to focus 
mainly on the mode of policy-making. 
2.2. PLURALISM 
Views on the State 
Pluralism is the belief that there are, or ought to be, many things opposing 
'monism' (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987,13). This thesis proposes that although not all 
groups and interests do have the same amount of power, power is diffused in society. 
The sources of power - like authority, money and expertise - are various and 
competitive, and no one source is dominant (Ham and Hill, 1984,28). 
Basically pluralists, tend to take the state as a terrain on which forces rooted in 
society struggle over political resources (Jessop, 1990,281). Its organisation is merely 
a mechanism for converting social demands into public policies. It is assumed to be 
1. If any, pluralist arguments have been adopted by the specialists of public 
administration as an argument for decentralisadion in Korea. To a certain extent, the 
rationales of pluralists were exaggerated by those who argued for the launch of the new 
local government system in a normative sense. 
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passive (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987,43), neutral (Latham, 1952), survival-seeking 
(Niskanen, 1973) or as one set of pressure groups among many others (Dahl, 1961). As 
a consequence, government policies are usually portrayed as a result of the social input 
politics from the environment to the political system. 
Those pluralists who have taken an interest in government functions often attack 
the centralised monistic sovereignty and propose a dispersal of authority and power 
(Vincent, 1987,198; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987,57-8). A minimal state is preferred 
in which power is distributed as widely as possible while the political variety is 
increased. The term 'centralisation' itself is one of scary images of power concentration 
against which pluralist theories were originally generated. Tberefore, pluralists seem to 
be advocates for decentralising the structure and functions of government. Various 
rationales for local government are presented by pluralists in a normative sense. 
Rationale for Local Government 
The existence of diversity itself is a normative value for political democracy, 
and this develops a favourable comn-dtment to local government in pluralism. The main 
justifications for local government are liberty, participation, political education and 
responsiveness. 
Political liberty is stressed by pluralists like J. S. Mill. Mill (1861) believed that 
local government safeguarded citizens' rights, and enhanced their protection against the 
n-dsuse of power. It seems that his idea of liberty as an absence of restraint on self- 
regarding actions was extended to local communities. Following Mill (1861,346), most 
actions of government are self-regarding from the locality's point of view. Particularly 
in the nineteenth century, civil and political liberty was largely achieved as the franchise 
was widened, the legal system reformed, and corrupt central and local oligarchies gave 
way to elected government (Hill 1974,30). Pluralists like Mill believed that, during the 
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course of this development, local government helped prevent the emergence of 
despotism. The secret of liberty is the division of power (Laski, 1989,155), and the 
tyranny of concentrated and autocratic government is to be avoided by dispersing 
power. 
Localisation itself is equated by pluralists with the spread of political power. It 
helps individuals grasp greater liberty and share political resources. 'Mis pluralism, 
supported by the local government system, is able to moderate a tendency or temptation 
towards autocracy which is itself destructive of good government (Widdicombe Report, 
1986). Jones and Stewart (1983,5) make the point that diffusion of power is a 
fundamental value and local authorities as elected bodies 'can represent the dispersion 
of legitimate political power'. 
The second justification provided for local government is its role in the political 
education both of politicians and ordinary people. De Tocqueville (1956,30) stresses 
that local government is the unique setting not only for political understanding but also 
for fraternity. It allows individuals to transcend their self-interests and develop 
themselves as citizens2 with the 'developmental' benefits for a public spirit. In a more 
secular sense, both Wilson (1948) and Maddick (1963) say that local government 
teaches the possible, the expedient, and the uses and risks of power, ingenuity and 
versatility. Here the citizen learns to recognize the 'specious demagogue', to avoid 
electing the incompetent or corrupt representative, to debate issues effectively, to relate 
expenditure to income, to 'think for tomorrow' (Maddick, 1963,59 and 106). Panter- 
Brick (1953,347; 1954) also argues that local self-government teaches two prime 
democratic virtues: the justness of one's claims and those of others, and the need to 
select from among competing claims those that are to be given priority. 
On the other hand, Laski and Mackenzie focus on the educative effects of local 
government on politicians. Pointing to the value of training political leaders, Laski says 
that 'if members were, before their candidature, legally required, to serve three years on 
2. Tocqueville claims that 'town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to 
science: they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to 
enjoy it' (De Tocqueville, 1835,63). 
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a local body, they would gain the "feel" of institutions so necessary to success'. 
Mackenzie (1961) also argues that local government provides a valuable training 
ground for national leaders. In sum, local government is taken, both for ordinary 
citizens and for politicians, as a school in which democratic habits are acquired and 
practiced and the infrastructure of democracy laid down (Widdicombe Report, 1986). 
Allocative efficiency3 is another justification for local government in modem 
pluralist theories. Sharpe (1970,168) argues that the strongest justification for local 
government is its claim to be an efficient provider of services rather than its role as a 
defender of liberty or democracy. This theme seems to be highlighted under the 
modem government which is charged with economic planning (Hill, 1976,39; Booth, 
1988,15). Allocative efficiency is similarly viewed by some pluralist commentators in 
terms of responsiveness (Smith, 1985,28). They argue that needs vary from locality to 
locality, as do wishes and concerns. Those local needs should be locally defined for the 
provision of appropriate services, for constant innovation and for maxin-dzed public 
choice (Hambleton, 1988,137). 
The main assumption here is that the less remote and more manageable a state 
authority is, the more responsive it is to what people demand. 'Local' government 
exists adjacent enough for the citizens to make their voices heard. Not only elected 
representatives but also officials 'live close to the decisions they have to make, to the 
people whose lives they affect, and to the areas whose environment they shape' (Jones 
and Stewart, 1983,6). 
3. The concept of efficiency has been divided by economists like Foster (Foster et at, 
1980,217) into allocative efficiency and X-efficiency. While X-efficiency is concerned 
with the inputs that are required to produce a given level of output (Heald, 1983,88-9), 
allocative efficiency is concerned with matching the resources with the preferences of 
the people in the community. 
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The pluralist arguments for local government stem largely from the democratic 
theory of politics (Widdicombe Report, 1986). Their normative idealisation of local 
government s vulues is open to various criticisms. 
Firstly, pluralists' a priori reasoning4 for the intrinsic value of local government 
seems to lead to speculative romanticization. Modern pragmatists see local government 
not as possessing intrinsic virtues but as a part of the service delivery system. It is 
believed that democratic self-government does not necessarily entail locally 
differentiated government. Whalen (1960), for instance, claims that local government is 
part of a political tradition and a way of providing government services rather than self- 
government. It seems only a historical accident that local government had developed 
together with democracy in the nineteenth century (Langrod, 1953)5. There is no 
intrinsic relationship between local government and democracy (Laski, 1989,137). 
Secondly, the educative claim is refuted by Moulin, Sharpe and Sn-dth. Moulin 
(1954,434) focuses on the political education of leaders. He argues that few national 
leaders come from the local arena and the value of political experience on local councils 
for national politicians should not be exaggerated. Central government is so different in 
its scale as to be different in kind, so that local experience is hardly appropriate to 
national affairs. Sharpe and Sn-dth criticise the claims regarding its educative effects on 
ordinary people. It is based on a paternalistic stand-point (Sharpe, 1981,34) and the 
assumption that the mere existence of local bodies will lead to the nourishment of the 
4. Their strong commitment to the diffusion of power leads pluralists to take local 
government as a synonym of 'self-government'. One evidence is that only pluralists 
use the coinage 'seýf-government' with the prefix local as an unquestionable starting 
point of their arguments. It is not surprising that pluralist commentators bemoan the 
declining trend of local government as a crisis of democracy by analogizing local 
government as individual. 
5. Langrod (1953) concludes that 'local government and democracy triumphant 
represent indeed diametrically opposite tendencies ... the incompatibility of democratic 
principle with the practice of decentralisation is a phenomenon so evident that it may be 
considered as a kind of sociological law'. Laski (1989,137) also adn-dts that 'the 
scandals of municipal corruption, coupled with the obvious limitations of government 
by county justices confirmed to a particular class, led the more rigid reformers, such as 
Chadwick, to attempt a complete administrative centralisation'. 
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public spirit is not realistic (Smith, 1985,22). Educative claims may overlook the 
extent to which political education is the function of wider social processes at different 
dimensions, such as class and education system generally. 
Thirdly, in practice, local politics shows some less democratic features such as 
low turnouts and uncontested seats, let alone the overwhelming influence of national 
images. Furthermore, it is likely to reinforce narrow sectional interests, the vices of 
'negligent parochialism' in Laski's term (Laski, 1989,137), rather than an appreciation 
of democracy. Democracy is fundamentally concerned with the nation-state as a whole 
and with majority rule, equality and uniformity. The scale of life also cannot be limited 
merely to a certain locality in modern society. In this vein, pluralists' individualistic 
method can develop into parochial features, and thus equality between localities can be 
overlooked. In the end this parochial methodology tends 'to exaggerate the autonomy of 
the locality and to exclude from the analysis the full influence of other actors in the 
wider context (Dunleavy, 1980). 
2.3. MARXISM 
Views on the State 
Karl Marx expressed his view in his Communist Manifesto that 'the executive of 
the modem state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie' (Quoted in Ham and Hill, 1984,33). This statement, however, did not give 
a coherent theoretical view on the state. Marx's idea has been interpreted and adapted 
by different Marxists including Lenin, Trosky, Gramsci and Althusser. This was partly 
attributable to the fact that Marxism was a praxis ideology for differing situations. 
The conceptualisation of the role of the state is still at an issue of controversy 
among modem Marxist thinkers. Jessop (1990,26-28) classifies the differing 
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interpretations of the state provided by Marxist theorists as follows: a parasitic 
institution that plays no essential role in economic production or reproduction; an 
epiphenomena of the system of property relations; thefactor of cohesion in a given 
society; an instrument of class rule; a system of political domination with specific 
effects on the class struggle. Among these differing views, some important points of 
disagreement between Marxist theories about how the state should be explored appear 
in the distinction between instrumentalist and structuralist views (Offe, 1984,119). For 
instrumentalists such as Miliband (1969), state power is seen to be exercised merely by 
the economically dominant class; whereas for structuralists like Poulantzas (1973,294- 
5) the state does not favour specific interests (Offe, 1984,119) but serves the capitalist 
class society in the long run. The former position holds that the state can have no 
interests apart from the interests of the ruling class. The latter position presents the state 
as the battle field of class conflicts rather than as a simple instrument of the ruling class. 
Poulantzas argues that the state has a degree of 'relative autonomy' because it may 
make concessions to non-capitalist interests as a means of regulating the class struggle. 
Basically, in understanding the state, Marxism shares with pluralism the 
important feature of setting out to provide a theoretical structure; the society-centred 
'input politics'. However, Marxists deny that power is widely distributed and that the 
state is a neutral arbiter. Instead power is held in the hands of a don-dnant class and the 
state serves to create the conditions for capitalist accumulation. Therefore, an exclusive 
emphasis is given to what is known as class against class, i. e. the collective interests 
within a specific historical momentum. 
Traditional Indifference on Local Government and New Challenges 
The realm of the state, although its conquest was the crucial tactic in Marxist 
political movements, has been curiously underestimated in Marxist theories. Many 
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Marxist writers on the state have retained deeply imbedded society-centred 
assumptions, not allowing themselves to doubt that states are inherently shaped by 
classes or class struggles and function to preserve modes of production (Skocpol, 1985, 
5; Almond, 1988,869). 
Such a fundamentalist and holist approach was against the fragmentation of state 
issues. This tradition became echoed later with the Althusserian dichotomy placing the 
state institutions in the realm of appearances which is secondary to reality. Not 
surprisingly this belief has led 'to an undifferentiated assimilation of all governmental 
agencies into an apparently monolithic state apparatus' (Dunleavy, 1980,127). No 
particular importance had been attributed to institutionally or geographically (Smith, 
1985,37) differentiated matter in Marxist theories. After examining Marxism in local 
government in western Europe and Japan, Bell and Szajkowski (1986,1) summarise 
this feature as follows: 
The communists thus opted for anti-parliamentarianism. and 
revolutionary tactics to reach power. 'Ibis option not only dictated non- 
involvement in cenlral but also in local government (Bell and 
Szajkowski, 1986,1)1. 
In a relative sense, central government has been of more importance to Marxists 
as an attempt to change the capitalist state which is one whole unity serving the interest 
of monopoly capital. The transformation of society was an appropriate business for 
national rather than local for universalistic egalitarianism (Sharpe, 1984,39) through 
highly centralised public ownership. Local government here, whilst not unimportant, 
was regarded merely as of secondary concern for a long time (Seyd, 1987,137-8). The 
idea of localisation was the object of suspicion and was seen as disguising real problems 
rooted in class conflict. 
1. The main concern of this part is about the Marxist interpretations of local government 
in the capitalist state. Local government in communist countries appears to be different. 
For instance, local government's functions and powers in the former USSR was 
substantially circumscribed by the country's highly centralized administrative system, 
and local soviets have generally had to deal with administrative matters rather than 
policy-making (Jacobs, 1983,34). 
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In the meantime, a notable attack on the orthodoxies was delivered by urban 
sociologists like Castells(1977; 1978). Castells was interested in social forces which 
had been neglected by the political sciences rather than in spatial or cultural boundaries. 
He used the theoretical concepts of collective consumption and urban social movements 
to develop an account of urban service provision and local planning (Duncan and 
Goodwin, 1988,23). Castells and his colleagues contributed to contemporary Marxist 
analyses of local authorities which seem to centre on their role in social reproduction 
(Gottdiener, 1987,194; Sn-dth, 1985,38) in areas like housing, education, and social 
welfare. A lot of the Marxist-inspired researches accelerated an academic shift7 giving 
more stress to social relations including class relation in local politics. 
Local State Theme 
The term local state was coined by Cynthia Cockburn in her book, 'The Local 
State' (1977). The term itself immediately suggests a shift of research interest in this 
theme. The state, at whatever scale, is analysed in a broader socioeconomic focus 
rather than as an institutional arrangement. This is taken as the basic angle in the local 
state theme to analyse the role of local state, its policy making mode and even the 
central-local relationship. 
For Cockburn the concept of the 'local state' was a reaction to the orthodox 
political sciences. Pluralist analysts concentrated almost exclusively on the static and 
formal political process and Marxist theorists had rarely applied their ideas to the 
analysis of locality. Cockburn sets out to apply general Marxist theory to locality. 
Basing her arguments on Marx, and his latter-day interpreters Althusser and Poulantzas, 
7. Duncan and Goodwin (1988,28) succictly enumerate the studies drawing insights to 
the social relations operating around local government. See Byrne (1982); Clavel 
(1986); Cooke (1985); Francis and Smith (1980); Lojkine (1985); MacIntyre (1980); 
Mark-Lawson et al. (1985). 
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she explains local government as being a relatively autonomous instrument of class 
domination (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988,32). Accordingly, the main point is placed on 
the 'structural' context of 'local' government. Local government is not concerned as an 
issue about organisation, but with reference to core theoretical concerns derived from 
Marxist theories about the state, class relations and policy-making. 
Cockburn's interpretation of the state's primary role remains exactly the same as 
that of traditional Marxism. She says its basic role is 'continually to reproduce the 
conditions within which capitalist accumulation can take place'(Cockbum, 1977,51). 
The capitalist state is charged with securing the conditions favourable to capital 
accumulation as a whole and in the long term (Cockburn, 1977,41-5, italics in 
original). Cockburn goes on to say; 
When I refer to Lambeth Borough Council as 'local state' it is to say 
neither that it is something distinct from the 'national state, nor that it 
alone represents the state locally. It is to indicate that it is a part of a 
whole (Cockburn, 1977,46-7). 
Cockburn's analysis presents the local state as having a functional role within 
capitalism principally concerned with capitalist reproduction. It means that the 
particular role of the local state is to ensure the reproduction of the labour force and the 
relations of production (Stoker, 1988,219). 'Ibis is not only expressed through direct 
welfare, housing and educational provision to families, which helps to ensure an 
adequate supply of suitable labour, but also through the reproduction of wider 
ideologies of popular consent which make it difficult for the ruled to see the possibility 
of any other form of economic and political organization. The state's primary role, 
Cockburn writes, is 'continually to reproduce the conditions within which capitalist 
accumulation can take place (Cockburn, 1977,51) and the local state is part of this 
greater whole (Cochrane and Anderson, 1989). 
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Traditionally, Marxism has been much less interested in decentralization than 
Right-wing theories. This is not only because Marxist theories have a class 
deterministic view of the state apparatus but also because they tend to identify 
centralization with the promotion of public ownership and equality. As a result, local 
government has been neglected even while the statist and nationalisation model was 
adopted (Blunkett and Jackson, 1987,64). 
As a reaction to this indifference within Marxism, Castells presents a 
sociological approach to collective consumption and Cockburn developed her local state 
theme. Their innovative theoretical works have influenced radical approaches to local 
government since the late 1970s (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988,33). Both have showed 
that a general theory of Marxism can be applied to the local level by emphasising the 
underlying forces within the socio-econon-dc sphere. 
However, the emphasis of underlying forces is criticised. by those who advocate 
pluralism and the dual state theory. In particular the significance of class struggle in 
local politics is totally denied by the dual state theory. Saunders (1980; 1982) in his 
dual state theory explicitly denies the assumption that local politics are determined by 
class struggles. No less important, Marxist explanation gives too little attention to the 
immediate concern of local government such as service provision while giving too 
much concern to the fundamental structure of social forces. This is a flaw of Marxist 
explanations on local authorities. A second weakness of Marxist explanation is also 
derived from the over-stress of fundamental forces in social relations. Exclusive focus 
on the social forces leads to the problem that the specificity of local government is 
underestimated. As a matter of fact, the context in which local government operates is 
described differently from that of the centre by many writers. A typical example which 
amplifies the specificity of local government is the dual state theory. 
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Some efforts to overcome the limits of unitary explanations result in the dualist 
theory in which two theoretical views are presented to explain the local state. Saunders 
(1984,23), a key exponent of the dualist theory, argues for 'combining the strengths and 
avoiding the weakness of contemporary political science and Marxist approaches' 
(Saunders, 1982,63). He fully appreciates that the strengths of the Marxist explanation 
are the weakness of the traditional pluralist approach, and vice versa (Saunders, 1982, 
56). 
The traditional 'agent versus partnership' debate had not been applied to the 
broader socio-political context. The Marxist 'grand theory' successfully illun-dnates 
local government with reference to core theoretical concerns in social and political 
science. However, the problem is that the recent Marxist explanation (e. g. Cockburn's 
local state theory) has failed to highlight the specificity of local government. Reflecting 
on the 'failure in the Marxist tradition' to take account of the local state's operations 
(Cawson and Saunders, 1983) Saunders says: 
..... my argument is that local government (which is the principal and certainly the most accessible and visible agency of what has been termed the 'local 
state') has its own specificity (Saunders, 1982,57). 
Here Saunders (1982,55-6) goes on to warn about adopting a single perspective 
on the central-local relationship. He emphasises the danger concerning academic 
research initiatives into central-local relationships; namely, that the academic 
community may come to adopt one perspective on 'the problem' to the neglect or 
exclusion of others. The difficulty of applying a unitary theory to multilateral political 
practices is stated as follows. 
The state in Britain is not some unitary monolith ..... Theories of the state ..... should thus be treated with some caution and scepticism, for it seems 
more plausible to suggest that different aspects of state policy-making and 
administration will need to be explained in terms of different kinds of factors. 
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He tries to develop a more relevant explanation of local government by 
combining different theories which appear along two dimensions: horizontally between 
different functions (policy typology) and vertically between different levels (centre- 
locality). What is entailed in his approach is that two different political theories 
(pluralism and Marxism) are necessary to understand two different types of political 
process (Saunders, 1980,14; 1982,63; 1984,24). This is also an attempt to reflect the 
conflict and tension within the state caused by internal differentiation. 
Three Stages of Constructing the Dual State Theory 
Three stages are involved in the theoretical construction of the dual state theory. 
The first is to distinguish between the typologies of state functions. The proponents of 
the dual state theory, Saunders (1979; 1984) and Cawson (1978), draw a line between 
policy typologies. Originally O'Connor, whom they acknowledge as an important 
influence on their thinking, had distinguished three different areas of expenditure on the 
basis of the primary functions they perform: social expenses, social investment and 
social consumption. Social expenses refer to those policies for maintaining social 
order; social investment refers to the policies which directly help producers make their 
profits; and social consumption encompasses the policies that contribute to the 
reproduction of the workforce which otherwise would fall as a burden on producers. 
Unlike O'Connor, Saunders presents the state as having just two basic functions: social 
investment and social consumption8. 
The second stage is to extend this functional dualism into an institutional 
dualism by assigning different state functions to distinct tiers of government. Saunders 
argues that social investment is carried out by central government and social 
8. He tends to focus on collective consumption rather than individual consumption 
when he uses the concept of social consumption at this first stage. 
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consumption spending is vested in local government (Saunders, 1984,25). This 
institutional separation of social investment and social consumption allows the state 
apparatus to maintain incompatible ideological themes in tension. 
Local government in Britain is typically concerned with the provision of social 
consumption through competitive modes of political mediation and organized 
around the principle of citizenship rights and social need. Central and regional 
level of government, on the other hand, are typically the agencies through 
which social investment and fiscal policies are developed within a relatively 
exclusive corporate sector of politics organized around the principle of private 
property rights and the need to maintain private sector profitability (Saunders, 
1982,61). 
At this stage, the local state is seen as being fundamentally constrained by the 
dominance of the social investment politics at the centre. This is so because social 
consumption functions are necessarily subordinate to social investment functions in a 
capitalist state. The latter are crucial in maintaining the conditions in which production 
may continue (Saunders, 1980). 
Lastly, the modes of interest mediation and decision making are investigated and 
compared between central and local states in the ideological and political spheres. 
Whereas the politics of corporatist central government are dominated by a class-based 
struggle between capital and labour, the politics of consumption in the local state are 
not class conflicts (Saunders, 1984,32). Different social interests are involved in 
different consumption issues, hence sustaining a typically pluralist mode at local level. 
The Specificity of the Local State 
Saunders develops a framework of four dimensions in explaining the local state 
in comparison with the central state. The local state is distinguished from the central 
state on four main dimensions: the organisational division between different levels of 
government; the functional division between different areas of state intervention; the 
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political division between different modes of interest mediation; and the ideological 
division between different principles of political and social organisation. In each 
dimension there are four sets of tensions: between central control and local autonomy in 
the organisational dimension; between econon-dc and social policy priorities in the 
functional dimension; between democratic and rational modes of policy-making in the 
interest mediation dimension; and between the rights of citizenship and the rights of 
private property in the ideological dimension. 
Saunders argues that the above tensions may be seen to have been institutionally 
insulated in the division between local and central state agencies. He goes on to argue 
that; 
Movements at the local level are typically consumption-oriented (and thus 
divorced from broader issues regarding production), competitive (and thus 
variable in the social base they mobilise) and organised around principles of 
needs (but thereby failing to confront fundamental questions regarding private 
property) (Saunders, 1982,62). 
and, 
..... thus recent battles between central and local government (notably those involving the Heseltine Local Government Bill) have manifested not only the 
tension between central control and local autonomy, but also that between 
econon-dc and social priorities ..... and principles of profit as opposed to those of social need (Saunders, 1982,62). 
As regards each of these tensions, it is argued that local government is typically 
limited in each dimension. For example, social consumption functions are necessarily 
subordinate to social investment functions since the latter are crucial in maintaining the 
conditions in which production may continue. Democratic accountability to a local 
population is also necessarily curtailed by corporatist strategies at the centre. Lastly, 
ideologies of social need take second place in a capitalist society to ideologies of private 
property. Therefore, the dominance of central over local government agencies is best 
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explained with reference to the dominance of investment over consumption, 
corporatism over democracy, and profit over need. 
<Table 2- 1> The Four Dimensions of Local Government 
Dimension Class Sectoral Tension 
Politics Politics 
Organi- Central 
sational 
Functional Production 
Political Corporate 
Local Centralised 
direction versus 
local self- 
determination 
Consumption 
Competitive 
Economic versus 
social priority 
Rational planning 
versus 
democratic 
accountability 
Ideological Profit Need Private property 
rights versus 
citizenship right 
Source) Adapted from Saunders, Peter. (1985,30). 
Assessment 
The dual state theory has stimulated more writers to think that 'different kinds of 
theory may be appropriate to the analysis of different kinds of politics at different levels 
of government (Dearlove and Saunders, 1984,435). Consequently, this dual state 
theory could successfully highlight the broader context of local government without 
losing sight of its specificity. However, it is also subject to criticism from a variety of 
different theoretical camps. Most of these criticisms are based on the difficulties in 
applying the dual state theory to empirical reality. As with its major merits, so the 
demerits of the dual state theory arise from the fact that it is a superficial, crude, theory- 
oriented, ideal-typical schema. 
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The first criticism relates to the difficulty in distinguishing policy typologies 
(Dunleavy, 1984,71). It appears that state policies do not fit neatly into two or three 
typologies. Instead their classification can vary from society to society and from time 
to time. Even in a specific society, some policies cannot be placed in any typology and 
certain policies have characteristics which overlap the boundaries of typologies. It is 
very difficult to distinguish empirically between primarily production-oriented and 
primarily consumption-oriented policies (Stoker, 1988,236). Transport is a good 
example since it is generally an indivisible form of support for both production and 
consumption activities. Education (Dunleavy, 1984,71) may also be considered a form 
of social expenses, or as social investment in labour power, or as a type of collective 
consumption. Flynn (1983,103) makes the point that types of policy cannot be 
unambiguously assigned to either production or consumption. 
The second criticism refers to the problem of whether social production and 
consumption can be equated with a certain level or tier of government. Many doubts 
are raised about the argument that central government carries on social investment 
policies and local government social consumption policies. The local level in most 
countries no longer (as the model assumes) monopolizes social consumption, if it ever 
did (Sharpe, 1984,41), and the functions of local government spread widely across the 
social expenses, social investment and social consumption categories. The centre also 
has a sizeable share in social consumption expenditure - especially in monetary 
payments (i. e. transfers) which are easily centralized. 
Thirdly, the mode of decision-making at local level often does not appear to be a 
pluralist one. Many empirical studies have shown that there is some organised 
intervention in local policy making (Rhodes, 1986,240-1). Villadsen (1986,257) 
describes local policy making in terms of corporatism and King (1983) points to the 
corporate aspect of policy making in local government. Sharpe (1984,41) also criticises 
the dual state theory for exaggerating the permeability of the local level. Despite its 
clear superiority in formal democratic terms, because of its scale, local government does 
not seem to be the throbbing heart of mass democracy that the model postulates. 
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Despite these criticisms, the dual state theory has attracted academic attention 
for many reasons. It is explicitly successful in: 1) incorporating the social roots of 
governmental policies; 2) explicitly presenting the most systematic framework to 
explain local government; 3) encompassing highly important dimensions for policy 
studies such as basic functions and decision-making mode; and 4) highlighting the 
specificity of locality. 
2.5. THE NEW URBAN LEFT AND THE NEW RIGHT 
Concerning local government, the acaden-dc community seems to have a 
consensus in saying that a key development both in Right and Leftist strands has 
appeared in the 1970s. Local government was rediscovered by Right and Left-wing 
camps and rather different attitudes towards local government came to be possessed by 
the New Right and the New Urban Left (Castells, 1977; Cochrance and Massey, 1989, 
133; Kingdom, 1991,2). 
The New Urban Left 
The phrase 'New Urban Left'9 was coined by Gyford (1983,2) to identify the 
Left activists who had come to give a particular priority to local government and related 
issues within the Left. What is meant by 'new' is twofold; the old guard regimes of the 
late sixties were replaced by a new and young generation within the Left (Laffin and 
Young, 1985,41), and it presented a new alternative to the established Labour 
government's corporatist econon-dc strategy. What was 'urban' was that the councillors 
9. The New Urban Left has been called variously 'local socialism' (Duncan and 
Goodwin, 1988) or 'municipal labourism' (Cochrane and Massey, 1989,146). 
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tended to represent mainly industrial areas such as London, Liverpool and Sheffield, 
where Labour's traditional electoral support is concentrated (Seyd, 1987,140). Those 
areas contained young intellectuals at universities, workers in industrial zones and racial 
and sexual minorities in the inner cities. 
The Emergence of the New Urban Left 
Although many factors appear to have been of importance in its emergence, 
three merit discussion here. Firstly, in 1967 the Conservatives took office in such 
traditional Labour authorities as Sheffield, GLC, Bradford, Cardiff, Coventry, Leeds, 
Leicester, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Southampton (Gyford, 
1985,25). The Labour party lost more than 1,500 seats to the Conservatives in the local 
elections that year. The results of the 1968 election were also a massive pro- 
Conservative swing in the local level (Gyford, 1983,5). While the Conservatives took 
63 per cent of the seats, Labour secured less than 17 per cent in the London boroughs 
and in the provincial boroughs and urban districts. This series of electoral defeats was 
an event which prepared the way for the substitution of political actors within the Left 
in the 1970s. The shift in attitudes was accompanied by a change of political actors and 
many of the old Labour councillors who had lost their seats never returned (Saunders, 
1980,227). The newly returned Labour groups were seen to be a 'New Guard', 'Young 
Turks' and 'a youthful meritocracy'. 
Secondly, the 'insurrectionary' approach of the old Left became partly rejected 
by the 'new Labour Left' (Gyford, 1983,3). The far Left has traditionally emphasised 
the state's capacity to create equality and has down-played questions of liberty. Hence, 
it had too often been satisfied with the notion of a 'big state' (Held and Keane, 1984, 
175) particularly with the parliamentary approach. This traditional commitment was 
criticised as Statist (Fudge, 1984,192), paternalistic (Stoker, 1987,8), centralised (Seyd, 
1987,139) and bureaucratic. The New Urban Left warned of the dangers of merely 
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transmuting capitalist hierarchies into socialist ones which reproduce excessive 
surbordination and alienation. In response, it was argued that what was needed was the 
decentralisation of power, particularly through workers' control and workers' 
cooperatives based on the small-scale society (Luard, 1979,151), with attention to 
extra-parliamentary struggles. 
Thirdly, given Labour's structural defeat in central government (Seyd, 1987), 
many on the Left see local government as a key to the political regeneration of their 
movement (Parry et al., 1992,293). Local government became the stronghold or an 
'oases in the Conservative desert' (Seyd, 1987,139-40) where the Labour party found a 
minimal consensus for a defensive coalition facing the radical Conservatives in the 
centre. 
Values and Strategy 
The New Urban Left is not a completely homogeneous phenomenon. It is not a 
formally organized grouping and nor has it a single policy. It is, as Gyford (1985) 
describes, ameoba-like in the variety of its tactics and strategies. They include: a 
disdain for many of the traditional ways of conducting local authority business; a new 
concern for issues hitherto absent from or marginal to conventional local government, 
such as local economic planning, monitoring the police, women's rights, and racial 
equality; a view of local government as an arena both for combating the policies of a 
Conservative government and for displaying by example the potential of a grass-roots 
socialism; and, perhaps most fundamentally, a commitment to notions of mass politics 
based upon strategies of decentralisation and/or political mobilization at the local level 
(Gyford, 1985,18; Seyd, 1987). 
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On the management side of local administration, the strategies of the New Urban 
Left can be differentiated in accordance with their emphasis on: 1) the radical 
restructuring of the local state, 2) moderate improvement in the machinery of local 
government and 3) community action. The first is a radical approach to the 
restructuring of the 'local state' which shifts the focus increasingly from the symptoms 
of deprivation and its victims to its causes and to a 'structural' analysis of social 
problems (Higgins et al., 1983). This strand seems to have been influenced by the 
militant tradition of Poplar and the Little Moscows of the 1920s and 1930s that prepared 
to use locality as an instrument for challenging the established social order and 
mobilising mass support (Bassett, 1980,45). The local state was taken as an engine of 
socialism (Hambleton and Hoggett, 1984,8) advancing between a revolutionary and a 
parliamentary road to socialism (Green, 1987,207). A rainbow coalition was formed to 
embrace many groups outside the traditional party organisations of the Left and a wide 
range of groups whose interest is focussed very much on local struggles against the state 
(Bassett, 1981,57). 
The second strand within the New Urban Left places emphasis on the 
importance of better and more participative local administration. It is a notable change, 
compared with the 'old' Left (Gyford, 1985,16), to see involvement in local 
government as a worthwhile way in which to pursue that form of politics. The contents 
of this change are considered under two headings by Stoker (1988,203-8): 
responsiveness in service delivery and opening up the political process. There have 
been attempts to develop a 'public service orientation' and a rise of direct user-control 
over the management of services. More attention was given to a managerial approach 
oriented towards participation and efficiency to overcome the traditional bureaucratic, 
unresponsive, and inefficient practices. 
A third strand within the New Urban Left has given priority to community 
action as the way forward. Because the new urban Left is an alliance its supporters are 
drawn not only from working class but also from protest movements such as women's, 
ethnic and environmentalist organisations (Hampton, 1987,229). These various groups 
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concerned themselves with community-based action from outside the existing party or 
local authorities. 
Difficulties and Dilemmas 
The New Urban Left may be one of the examples which seek to bridge the gap 
between socialist comn-dtment and the process of political transformation using local 
government. However, the New Urban Left's policies have met hostile reactions from a 
number of quarters. 
As Leeson (1981,19) points out, it would be 'too romantic a vision to conjure 
up a picture of socialist republics operating on a local scale in an otherwise non-socialist 
environment' (Quoted in Gyford, 1983,20). Countervailing policies had been 
constantly imposed by the Thatcher Governments such as the abolition of the GLC and 
the metropolitan counties and the introduction of the community charge (Stoker, 1988, 
209-13). The financial recession was another constraint raised by the situational 
environment. 
The New Urban Left itself is not without its own dilemmas. At the ideological 
level there has been considerable ambiguity, uncertainty and conflict over objectives 
(Stoker, 1988,211). It was difficult to ensure cooperation between multiple actors. 
After exan-dning three cases, Fudge (1984,207-8) points out that there have been severe 
problems in ensuring the adjustments of various participants in the politics of reform. 
Another difficulty was the internal resistance within local government. Crucial parts of 
the workforce and the white-collar trades unions were unsympathetic to the new style of 
administration and the process by which it was introduced. 
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The New Right 
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It is paradoxical that the real challenge to the mould of British politics came 
from the right as the left vainly fought to preserve the status quo (Williams and 
Williams, 1989,1). Certainly, the New Right has inherited both conservative and 
liberal values from the 'old' Right. However, the New Right is characterised by the 
relatively greater emphasis it places on libertarian values, its strong ideological 
comn-dtment and its manifest policy alternatives. 
The Emergence of the New Right 
At the international level a breakdown occurred when the undisputed economic 
supremacy which the United States had enjoyed since the 1940s disappeared, and the 
world economy was plunged once more into recession. As a consequence, several 
countries, including West Germany (1983), the Netherlands (1982), Denmark (1981), 
Sweden (1976), the United States (1980,1984) and Britain (1979,1983,1987) swung 
electorally to the right. Gamble (1989) sees the radical new right programmes of both 
Thatcher and Reagan as responses to the breakdown of authority and stability in the 
world system and in national politics. 
At the national level the politics and institutions of post-War social democracy, 
based on Keynesianism and the Beveridge welfare state model, began to be discredited 
(Offe, 1984,65). During the nineteen sixties and early seventies, the proponents of 
egalitarian and anti-individualist values (Tunstall, 1970) were challenged. The 
expansion of state activity was criticised as inefficient, unresponsive and authoritative, 
and eventually threatened the authority and the legitimacy of the state (Douglas, 1976; 
Booth, 1989,15). The abuse of trade union powers also helped to increase a 
widespread feeling for change by the end of the 1970s (Johnson, 1989,144; Pollitt, 
1990,9). This kind of criticism was extended to a concern for social self-reliance in 
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moral crusades; to individual freedom and state authority in politics; and to free market 
competition in economics. 
Restructuring the State 
The New Right ideas have been developed by such think-tanks as the Institute of 
Econon-dc Affairs, the Centre for Policy Studies and the Adam Smith Institute in U. K. 
Usually their main ideas have centred around two components of new-liberal ideology: 
monetarism in economics and the public choice theory in politics (O'Leary, 1987,379; 
Rhodes, 1988,23). 
The monetary theory and the public choice theory are interconnected, in fact, in 
terms of anti-collectivist (Barry, 1987,111) and anti-statist thought. Within the field of 
economic theory, monetarists argue that an excess amount of money in circulation is the 
primary cause of inflation. Their point is that cuts in the level of public expenditure, 
particularly capital expenditure, are the key to controlling money supply and thus to 
ensuring economic growth. They reject any trade-offs between unemployment and 
inflation but show more concern about inflation than about unemployment (Rhodes, 
1988,21; Kavanagh, 1989,79). It is argued that if the increase in the money supply 
outstrips the growth of GDP then it will produce inflation. Friedman (1975), most 
associated with monetarism, argues for the control of inflation at the cost of higher 
levels of unemployment. His so-called 'supply side' theory advocates the need to 
stimulate production by cutting taxes and encouraging individual enterprise. Another 
important theme was to privatize state-run industries and to curb the powers of unions. 
Public choice theory, also known as collective choice or rational choice theory, 
is based on 'rational' 'self-interested' 'individuals' assumption at n-iicro-economics 
level. Its development has depended on the works of economists at the Virginia State 
Polytechnic such as Jim Buchanan (1962), Gordon Tullock (1979) and William 
Niskanen (1973). Their point is that the absence of profit criteria in the public sector 
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encourages its reckless expansion engineered by vote-maxin-dsing politicians and 
budget-maximising bureaucratslO. Friedrich von Hayek (1948) seems to be an 
intellectual hero of public choice theorists. He had argued (Eatwell, 1989,9) that 
centralised planning by the government is both politically dangerous and economically 
inefficient. 
Local Government as a Burden 
The New Right commitment was intermingled with an anti-Labour, anti-statist, 
anti-collectivist, and anti-welfare spirit. At least, at the political dimension, the minimal 
consensus was 'pushing back the frontiers of the state'(Booth, 1982,197; Jessop, 1990, 
278) and the safest item to attack was found in local government. 
Local government came into question by the imperatives of the market. Local 
government was criticised as being a burden on the road towards economic 
regeneration. It was seen by the New Right thinkers as financially wasteful, 
managerially inefficient (the Layfield Report, 1976; Jones and Stewart, 1982) and 
politically non-supportive (Henney, 1984,380; Mather, 1989,213). The conclusion of 
the New Right thinkers was that local government had to be controlled (Lambert, 1986, 
104; Duncan and Goodwin, 1988,50), constrained (Elcock, et al., 1989) and by-passed 
(Sharpe, 1984,42; Cochrane and Massey, 1989,137; Gamble, 1989,115). The attacks 
on local government appear in various forms. The most obvious manifestations are tax 
cuts (Lambert, 1986) spending controls (Jessop et al., 1988,143; Henney, 1984,149), 
privatisation (Ascher, 1987,209; Stoker, 1988,174), abolition (Duncan and Goodwin, 
1988,57) and the community charge in 1990. 
10. For instance, Niskanen (1973) identifies the following variables as factors serving 
the bureaucrats' motives: salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation, power, 
patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes and ease of managing the 
bureau. Bureaucrats are seen here as best serving their own welfare by continuously 
pursuing budgetary growth, which increases their numbers, improves promotion 
prospects, creates discretionary patronage and generally builds up organisational slack 
and improves job security. 
Chapter Two 37 
These attacks on local government seemed to be interpreted in two conflicting 
ways. Some consider central intervention as a threat to democracy. Those who 
emphasize the democratic values of local government have deplored central control as 
an erosion of democracy. However, on the other hand, this lament is not be matched by 
the general public at large, particularly those who think the ultimate territorial of 
governmental policy is the individual citizen rather than governmental tier - e. g. local 
government. Chandler (1988,98) argues that the media and the electorate have shown 
little interest in local government in this vein. 
2.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has sought to understand a fundamental context of local 
government theories as a prelude to the studies of policy-making in local government. 
Local government has been contextualised throughout the chapter under five headings: 
pluralism, Marxism, the dual state theory, the New Urban Left and the New Right. 
Among these five strands, pluralism and Marxism were helpful to grasp ideological 
commitment to local government in Left and Right-wing camps while the last two 
schools were informative to see current controversies over localities. 
As generally expected, each theory contains differences not only in its analysis 
method but also in the basic focus. For instance, pluralism focuses on the political 
values of local government whereas the New Right focuses on the economic aspects of 
it. While pluralism and Marxism are mainly interested in ideological principles, the 
New Urban Left and the New Right reflect practicality in situational contingencies. In 
contrast, the dual state theory draws its attempts mainly to theorise locality without any 
ideological stances. 
The general impression is that local government, as Laski (1989,139) points 
out, raises exactly the same issues as are raised by the general question of the modern 
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statell. Here, the most interesting point is that local government itself seems to be 
politically neutral. Political attitudes towards it are not something to be derived from 
premeditated ideas or an ideology. 'Ibis is evidenced by both the New Urban Left and 
the New Right which can be seen as situational anomalies 12 of Marxism and pluralism 
respectively. As mentioned above, some commentators believe that consideration of 
power and interests explains much of the appearance of these anomalies (Lambert, 
1986,112; Leech, 1988,15; Cochrane and Massey, 1989,135). This is why this 
chapter has given much attention to the political intentions13 behind the theories to 
understand the real motives and interests of their proponents. 
Historically control of local government has always offered the opposition a 
foothold from which to develop alternative policy strategies. Whether it is by the 
Conservatives or Labour, local autonomy is claimed against central control when they 
are limited to locality. The following table summarises the differing attitudes towards 
local government in state theories. The next step is now to examine the existing 
explanations on policy-making in local government. 
11. It appears that pluralist theories still dominate the traditional textbooks. Likewise, 
rationales for decentralisation have been sought exclusively in pluralist arguments in 
Korea. More details will be discussed later in chapter Six. 
12. The New Urban Left and the New Right, as situational anomalies, encounter 
ideological dilemmas against which their origins were developed. For example, the 
New Urban Left faces the problem of pluralism (Gyford, 1983,28). The people and the 
various groups, once mobilised and armed with power, may choose to go their own 
several ways. There is also the problem of uncertainties and fragmentation. Likewise, 
the New Right, as a situational anomaly of pluralism, represents a sharp reversal of 
previous Conservative thought in many ways. Conventionally the basic rules of the 
Right school of thought have been to make people self reliant through market 
mechanisms with least intervention of the state. However, the state comes to be 
simultaneously rolled back and rolled forward (Gamble, 1989,28) in the New Right. 
13. Some critics who focus on the personal intention behind the New Right denying its 
ideological and theoretical feature, see the New Right as a question of personality rather 
than ideology, style rather than substance. 
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CHAPTER THREE: POLICY-MAKING IN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
It was during the fifties and sixties (Fried, 1975,305) that growing attention was 
given to the determinants of public policy in local politics. The determining factors of 
local expenditure were no longer taken for granted but instead were investigated from 
the Lasswelian interest in "Who gets what, when, and how? ". In particular, as 
government's role encompassed more economic functions (Booth, 1988), budgetary 
policies of the government were increasingly taken as the most visible measure of 
priority allocation. 
Historically, the study of public expenditure determinants is traced back to Key 
(1940; 1951; 1956), Fabricant (1952) or Dawson and Robinson (1963). Their 
fundamental question was "On what basis shall it be decided to allocate X dollars to 
activity A instead of activity B? " (Key, 1940,1137). While Fabricant pointed out the 
impact of socio-econon-dc variables such as population density, per capita income and 
urbanisation, Key and Dawson and Robinson emphasised political factors such as 
interparty competition. The relative importance of socio-econon-dc and political 
variables has since been the major subject in studies of local expenditure decisions (Alt, 
1977,83; Lewis-Beck, 1977,559; Boyne, 1985b). In fact, a glance at the existing 
literature suggests that almost all studies employ a scheme of classification falling 
between the above two extremes. Holding the expenditure level or variation as the 
dependent variable, the researchers investigated the relative impact of the two groups of 
independent variables, that is socio-economic and political factors. 
Firstly, environmental deten-ninism states that socio-economic circumstances 
constrain expenditure decisions leaving policy makers with little room for manoeuvre. 
LTE'ARy 
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Policy output is seen largely as the product of geographic, demographic and economic 
conditions in this school. Secondly, political determinism indicates that a considerable 
autonomy is held by political actors during the policy process. The political system is 
not an automatic transmission belt: not only the pre-legislative (e. g. interest groups, 
political party and voting behaviour) but also the post-legislative processes are sources 
of diversity in government activities. 
Based on the above two schools, a lot of writers have developed models to 
investigate policy variation in local government with higher explanatory power than the 
model hitherto presented. However, as will be explained throughout this chapter, the 
socio-econon-dc versus political dichotomy is based on conceptual boundaries which are 
questionable. It has also contributed to disguising methodological issues which are 
fundamental to the study of policy-making in local government. For example, the 
discussion on the empirical works in this field has been surprisingly patchy. Therefore, 
this study starts with the distinction of output and process approaches in the analysis of 
policy variation in local authorities. What is meant by output analysis is the empirical 
analysis of policy outputs in local government. And process approach refers to the 
empirical approach to the political dynamics of policy-making in local government. 
This distinction between output and process approaches helps to understand a 
fundamental aspect in the methods of analysing local policy-making. Under this 
classification the socio-economic versus political debate can also be characterised as the 
mainstream research tradition in output analysis. 
The existing literature in the field of process approach will be examined in the 
next chapter, and this chapter first investigates the empirical works in the field of output 
analysis. Four mode of explanation are adopted here in reviewing the empirical works 
in output analysis: socio-econon-dc analysis, political studies, urban hierarchy theory 
and incrementalism. A table summarising the existing empirical studies will be 
presented in each section. 
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3.1. SOCIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Mushrooming of Socioeconomic Variables in Output Analysis 
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Quite a few studies of public expenditure appeared to be challenging the 
conventional wisdom that public policy was the immediate product of the political 
process. Fabricant employed a multiple regression method to investigate interstate 
spending variations. He concluded 72 per cent of local expenditure variability could be 
explained by socio-economic factors such as population density, per capita income and 
urbanisation (Fabricant, 1952). Fabricant's seminal study has been elaborated upon by 
a number of studies in the National Tax Journal. The overall finding of these studies 
was a consistently high explanatory power of the socioeconomic variables employed 
relative to absolute levels of expenditure (Fry and Winters, 1970,509). Thomas R. Dye 
(1966), in his book Politics, Economics and the Public, examined the relationships 
between socio-econon-dc factors, political factors and expenditure measures by using a 
multiple regression method. Dye reported: 
..... correlation analysis reveals that these [political] system characteristics have 
relatively little independent effect on policy outcomes in the states ..... Most of the association that occurs between system characteristics and policy outcomes 
can be attributed to the influence of economic development (Dye, 1966,293). 
In those studies, the influence of political factors has been reduced by the 
diversity of structural determinants in which the political factors are moulded. 
Differences of political variables appeared largely as a product of differences in the 
socio-economic environment rather than as an immediate influence of the political 
system. Fry and Winters had found that interparty competition is very closely 
connected with welfare orientation, but this relationship disappears when controls for 
per capita income are introduced (Fry, and Winters, 1970,509). Political variables 
examined in relation to tax and expenditure levels were usually overshadowed by the 
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effect of socio-economic variables, and often have shown no independent impact 
whatsoever. Alt (1971,50) also shows that significant associations are often found 
between population, wealth, party control, and competition as independent variables. 
Here the problem is that when a wide range of socio-economic variables are considered, 
party control of councils ceases to have any independent impact (Nicholson and 
Topham, 1971). Only in a very few cases can the impact of party control be shown to 
hold up independently of other environmental variables (Alt, 1977,88). 
Another notable example is provided by Fried (1975,358) who has found 
political control to be an insignificant variable in contrast to Fry and Winters (1970), 
Dearlove (1973) and Newton and Karran (1985). Of the seventeen outputs, he says, 
only two are more strongly correlated to party variables than to ecological variables 
(Fried, 1975,18). The "merely" secondary impact of party variables on performance 
appears to be re-confirmed: 
..... political variables have relatively less direct and independent impact than 
socioeconon-dc variables. In many, probably most cases, some socioeconomic 
variable has been found more useful in explaining the variance in outputs than 
any political variable (Fried, 1975,337). 
More recently, Buchanan and his colleagues (Buchanan et al., 1991) confirm the 
relative importance of socioeconon-dc factors in the U. S. Their question is 'What 
factors determine the differences in Medicaid expenditures found among the states? '. 
To answer this question, they develop a model that focuses on eight independent 
variables encompassing economic, political and adn-dnistrative aspects. Their 
conclusion is that economic factors have the greater influence, while political factors 
have a marginal impact. Least important were political factors (Buchanan et al., 1991, 
71). They conclude: 
Our model of social environment indicates that economic forces and 
conditions, rather than political forces, have a significant impact on state 
Medicaid spending levels (Buchanan et al., 1991,7 1). 
P 
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In this vein, Klein (1976,402) argues that to discuss the political factors 
affecting public expenditure decisions may be to fall into the trap of discussing the 
illusions of policy-makers. So far as policy-makers are driven by external forces 
(Hoggart, 1989,3) it is thought to be redundant and more difficult to seek an 
explanation in terms of political process. 
Assessment of Socioeconomic Analysis 
What does seem clear here is that environmental factors outweigh political 
variables (Klein, 1976,402; Boyne, 1985a, 473). Most debate in this vein has been 
about whether political process exerts an autonomous influence on expenditure 
decisions, or whether it just reflects local environments (Barnett et al., 1990,218). 
As indicated by Table 3-1, the list of socio-economic variables is wide and far 
from exhaustive. It n-dght be said that the study of expenditure determinants was 
launched with a great emphasis on the socio-econon-dc aspect of public policy from the 
beginning. The variable number of structural environments is much larger than that of 
political variables and the former appears to be far more elaborated. What is suggested 
by this is that the output analysis of policy variation in local government has until 
recently tended to discount the importance of political variables (Ashford et al., 1976, 
6). The socio-economic determinists have treated political factors with suspicion and 
dismissal and generated further doubt concerning the early assumptions about political 
influence. 
However, the neglect of political factors cannot be attributed merely to the 
researchers' personal preferences. This result in output analysis has been accentuated 
and accelerated by many forces in contemporary policy studies. First of all, the concept 
of social environment has been strongly linked with a non-native concern in the study of 
public policy. At the bottom of this normative concern is the belief that governmental 
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policies should be framed by the social environments. It seems that this normative 
value partly accounts for the relative primacy of socioeconomic variables in the study of 
policy variation in local government. In the theoretical dimension, at least implicitly, 
most output analyses have been based on Eastonian system models which take the 
political process merely as a black box (Dearlove, 1973; Boyne, 1985a, 479). Their 
functionalist assumption tended to see the 'black box' as an automatic transmission belt. 
The conversion process lying between inputs and outputs was not dealt with to any 
significant degree (Hill and Bramley, 1986,154). Albeit for a different reason, this 
neglect of politico-govemmental aspects is similarly found in Marxism as well. Since 
the 1950s and 1960s the attempts of the Marxists, being trapped in its traditional 
economic determinism, has been unsatisfactory in coming to terms with the question of 
the state itself during the same period. The Marxists are regarded as still too concerned 
with economic power to give adequate consideration to state power (Ham and Hill, 
1984,53). The attempt by some Marxists to account for the increasing power of the 
state through the concept of relative autonomy is beset by difficulties. 
In the methodological dimension, the studies of policy-making was strikingly 
influenced by the legacy of hypothetico-deductive approach in which theories were 
tested rather than generated. This trend has been paralleled by a shift of research 
methods from qualitative to quantitative studies. In particular, the quantitative approach 
to the study of policy variation was stepped up by the development of newer methods of 
comparison using computer techniques. The advent of computer techniques made it 
possible to use a newer method of comparison, mostly comparison of R2, under the 
legacy of hypothetico-deductive studies. Socio-econon-dc variables were available 
while being elaborated and quantified in huge numbers for this purpose. On the other 
hand, there were fundamental difficulties in quantifying political concepts like political 
power. 
As a consequence, a controversy was provoked amongst political scientists who 
were inherently against the sort of atheoretical. empiricism which has often degenerated 
into socio-economic determinism. It is argued that the selection of independent 
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variables in socio-economic studies is seriously deficient. It seems to decline into a 
very atheoretical approach by 'firing any available official data' (Boyne, 1985,490) 
such as periodical statistics, census data and ready-made social surveys. An easy 
increase in the number of independent variables usually appears as an increase in the 
regression coefficients. But it is questionable whether its statistical generalisation can 
be extended to analytical generalisation. Newton and Sharpe (1977,68) criticise it as 
being just 'mindless reductionism'. 
<Table 3-1> Socio-economic Variables 
Researcher Year Country A* B C* 
Dawson & 1963 U. S. 6,33,40 2 2 
Robinson 
Dye 1969 U. S. 6,20,28,33, 2 2,3 
35,36,40 
Cnudde & 1969 U. S. 6,20,38,40 2 3 
McCrone 
Boaden & 1969 U. K. 1,13,16 1 1 
Alford 
Fry & 1970 U. S. 6,8,20,33, 2 2 
Winters 40 
Alt 1971 U. K. 1,6,17 1 2 
Fried 1971 Italy 1,21,32 city 3 
41,44,46 
Davies 1972 U. K. 3,5,11, 2,4,5 
et al. 27,34 
Booms & 1973 U. S. 6,8,12,20 2 2,3 
Halldorson 32,40 
Tompkins 1975 U. S. 6,28,33 2 4 
Cowart 1975 Norway 10,37,42,43 Oslo 3 
et al. 
Ashford 1976 U. K. 1,6,20,40 1 3 
et al. 
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Fried 1976 Gen-nany 10,47 city 
Schofield 19781 U. K. 1,2,4,17 1 3 
19,48 
Hansen 1981 Norway 1,2,13,25 3 
26,39 
Ginsburgh 1981 Belgium 1,3,30,31 city & 3,5 
& Pestieau 40,48 commune 
Karran 1982 U. K. 1,2,3,13, 1 2 
17,40,41 
Plotnick & 1982 U. S. 29 2 LISREL 
Winters 
Sharpe & 1984 U. K. more than 1 2,3 
Newton fourty var. 
Boyne 1989 U. K. 16 1 3 
Hoggart 1989 U. S. 3,7,15,28 urban 3 
municipali ty 
Plotnick & 1990 U. S. 6,9,28 2 3 
Winters 
Buchanan 1991 U. S. 6,14 2 3 
et al. 
A*: Independent variables 
DEMOGRAPIRC CHARACIMSTICS 
1) Population Size 2) Population Density 
3) Age Composition of the 4) Population Change 
Population (e. g. % over 60) 5) Birth Place 
INCOME LEVEL 
6) Income Level 7) Income Inequality 
8) Gini Index 9) Poor's Visibility 
10) Motorization 11) Dwelling Type 
12) % of Pensioners 13) Social Class 
FINANCIAL RESOURCE 
14) Financial Sources 15) Local Tax Rate 
16) Level of Resources 17) Rateable Value per 
18) Property Ownership capita 
19) Penny Rate Product per capita 
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SOCLAL FACrORS 
20) Education 21) Literacy 
22) Public Opinion 23) Citizen 
24) Voters' Liberalism Participation 
25) Persons per Household 26) Single Parent 
27) Infant Mortality Rate Families 
28) Ethnic Group 29) Social Diversity 
30) Language 3 1) % of Foreigners 
INDUSTRIAL & OCCUPATIONAL FEATURES 
32) Indusuial Structure 33) Industrialisation 
34) Employment Pattern 35) Occupation 
36) Unemployment 37) Lorries 
38) Non-Agricultural Occupations 39) Woman in Labour 
Force 
URBANISATION 
40) Urbanisation 41) Rumlity 
42) Housing 43) Street 
ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES AND OTHERS 
44) Economic Growth 45) Inflation 
46) Latitude 47) City Size 
48) Geographic Area 
B*: Level of analysis C*: Statistical technique 
1) County, Borough 1) Percentage 
2) American State 2) Correlation 
3) Others 3) Regression 
4) Path Analysis 
5) Others 
49 
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3.2. POLITICO-GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES 
Political Approach in Output Analysis 
Traditionally, political scientists have assumed the primacy of political factors in 
public policy making. They assumed that the primary determinants of public policy 
were political and therefore confined their attention to political institutions and 
processes, especially to legislative and pre-legislative politics (Newton and Sharpe, 
1977,61). However, the socio-economic studies threatened the traditional political 
scientists' assumption that public policy was the product of political activities. Being 
overwhelmed by socio-economic studies in public policy making in the post-war period 
(Sharpe, 1981,1), political scientists unavoidably had to make enormous efforts to show 
that 'politics does matter'. The debate about the relative importance of political 
variables and the socio-economic environment in local expenditure studies can be seen 
partly as a quest for the autonomous influences of political factors on policy-making 
(Barnett et al., 1990,218). 
Continuous efforts have been made to restore the conventional wisdom in public 
expenditure studies by political scientists. Key (1951,310) argued that welfare policies 
were better provided in those areas of the American South which had competitive party 
systems. Downs (1957; 1960) held that political leaders had policy initiatives to pursue 
necessary political support for political power. As a result, even some economists like 
Wilensky (1975) who have exan-dned the effects of the ideology of ruling parties in 
twenty-two countries gave their attention to political variables in expenditure studies. 
Many other political scientists joined the ranks of those studying political factors 
later such as Dearlove (1973), Wildavsky (1975), Dye (1966), Sharpe and Newton 
(1984), Barnett et al. (1990). First of all they criticized the socioeconomic approaches. 
The atheoretical feature of the socioeconomic studies has been criticized as 'barefoot 
empiricism' and their methodological individualism was also another target of criticism. 
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The assumption of socioeconomic analysis on the political process was questioned as 
well: 
In this model the representative process was, in effect, a kind of transn-dssion 
belt in which the political mechanisms as such had little independent effect on 
public policy since they merely performed the task of reflecting in policy terms 
the presumed wants derived from the socio-econon-dc structure of the 
participative citizenry (Sharpe and Newton, 1984: 205). 
On the other hand researchers have presented the impact of political variables by 
adding various political factors to the lists of independent variables. Most of their 
efforts were concentrated on the selection of political factors which can be 
operationalised for quantitative studies. For example, Cho and Frederickson (1973) 
used forty two political variables to assess the effect of the local government system on 
local policy outcomes in the United States. According to Boyne (1985a, 485), it may be 
that the range of political variables in output studies is a monument to the ingenuity of 
American political scientists in quantifying political concepts. By contrast the range of 
political variables in British output studies is quite narrow. 
Table 3-2 shows that most independent variables derived from the political 
system fall into the 'parties and election' category. The most popular one which has 
been adopted as an independent variable is party control, especially left party. The left 
party which has traditionally had a strong ideological commitment to changes has been 
considered to exert a strong impact on public expenditure decisions. As an example, 
Alt shows that non-Conservative authorities appear systematically more sensitive to 
need than Conservative authorities (Alt, 1971,49). The presence of greater Labour 
representation on councils is associated in such redistributive areas (Hoggart, 1989,77) 
as housing, education, and local health with higher levels, and in the case of the police 
service with lower levels, of expenditure. Barrett et al. also demonstrate that Labour 
controlled authorities show a preference for higher levels of provision in education and 
provide significantly increased resources for elderly people (Barrett et al., 1990,221 
and 223). Such findings could confirm the view that there is indeed a political effect on 
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the provision of local public services in the variations between spending areas rather 
than in the absolute level of public expenditure (Barrett et al., 1990,228). 
In fact, many political scientists have participated in this 'environment versus 
politics' dispute. 'A great deal of scrambling' was made 'by scholars ideologically 
committed to proving that party competition, voter participation, partisanship, and 
apportionment do indeed influence public policy' (Dye, 1976,30). However, they 
found'no convincing evidence that politics did matter. Evidences on the effect of local 
politics has produced less conclusive findings than those on the impact of socio- 
economic environment (Glennerster, 1985,65). The politics was taken as largely the 
epiphenomenon of social and economic factors (Newton and Sharpe, 1977,69) in most 
output analyses. Those results have shown 'near panic' (Dye, 1976,30; Hoggart, 1989, 
2) in political science and 'continuing embarrassment' (Peterson, 1981,10) to political 
scientists. 
Assessment of Political Approach 
Several reasons were explained above as to why political factors have inevitably 
been outweighed by socio-economic variables. In addition to them, the nature of 
political factors should be considered here. As generally recognised, political influence 
is extremely difficult to quantify. As long as politics is taken as something that can and 
should be moulded in the process of community life, its nature is closely linked to 
tsituational' contingencies. These situational factors are not favoured by comparative 
output studies which mostly rely on quantitative methods. The result is less 
development of available political indicators than ecological data (Newton and Sharpe, 
1977,68) in operational dimensions. 
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In many cases, output analyses try to search for data sets that incorporate 
variation and, in turn, attempt to account for the variation that is found. This pursuit of 
variance leads researchers to pick certain problems and ignore others, depending on 
whether they can obtain data sets that are 'appropriate' (Lieberson, 1985,91). 
Accordingly, the earliest output studies included very few political variables: for 
instance with a ratio of between 30 to 40 socio-economic variables to two or three 
political variables (Alt, 1977,84). Even in recent studies, post-legislative politics (such 
as structures of local government) tend to be neglected while too much attention is 
drawn to party control. Finally, it is worth noting that the feature of 'locality' has not 
received adequate attention in many political studies. What this means is that in many 
cases the central government factor is not taken as a political variable. 
<Table 3-2> Political Variables 
Researcher Year Country A B C 
Dawson & 1963 U. S. 2 3 2 
Robinson 
Boaden 1969 U. K. 1 1 1 
Alford 
Cnudde & 1969 U. S. 2 3 3 
McCrone 
Fry & 1970 U. S. 2,3,16 3 2 
Winters 17,18,20 
22,25,27 
28,30 
Alt 1971 U. K. 1,2 2, 2 
Davies 1972 U. K. more than 2,4,7 
et al. sixty var. 
Booms & 1973 U. S. 2,3,16,17 3 2,3 
Halldorson 18,19,20,21 
25,26 
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Uslaner & 1975 U. S. 1,2,18 3 3 
Weber 19,27 
Ashford 1976 U. K. 1 1,2 ? 
et al. 
Gray 1976 U. S. 2,22 3 3 
Alt 1977 U. K. 1,2 2 2,4 
Schofield 1978 U. K. 1,8,9 2 3 
Hansen 1978 Norway 3 multi 1 
Foster et al. 1980 U. K. 1,31,33 1,2 1 
Ginsburgh & 1981 Belgium 1 city and F 
Pestieau commune test 
Karran 1982 U. K. 1,2,4,13 1 1 
22,33 
Hoggart 1983 U. K. 1,2,13 2 3 
Sharpe & 1984 U. K. 1,2,6,7 1,2 2,3 
Newton 9,22 
Meier & 1984 U. S. 25,30 city school 3 
England district 
Newton & 1985 U. K. 13,19,31 1 1 
Karran 33 
Plotnick & 1985 U. S. 1,2,23 3 LISREL 
Winters 29,30 
Hoggart 1987 U. K. 1,15 2 2 
Hoggart 1989 U. S. 1,2,13,19 2,3 
Boyne 1990 U. K. 3 2,3 3 
Barnett 1990 U. K. 1,9,10 4 3 
et al. 11 
Page et al. 1990 U. K. 9,10,11 3,4 
Plotnick & 1990 U. S. 2,16,29 3 3 
Winters 30 
Buchanan 1991 U. S. 2,14,29 3 3 
et al. 
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A*: Independent variables 
PARTY POLITICS 
1) Party Control - 2) Interparty 
3) Party Cohesion Competitiveness 
4) Party Policy-Making 5) Party Conflict 
6) Years of Conservative 7) Years of Labour 
Control Control 
8) Proportion of Council Seats 9) Labour Control &% 
10) Newly-Elected Labour Seats 
Labour Council 
11) Newly-Elected Conservative Council 
LOCALBUREAUCRACY 
12) Bureaucratic Influence 13) Governmental 
14) Government Management S tructure 
15) Bureaucratic Control 16) Governor Power, 
17) Professionalism Tenure 
18) Apportionment 
THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
19) The General Public 20) Democratic Vote 
21) Political Participation 22) Turnout 
23) Voter Preference 24) Voter Participation 
ELITE BEHAVIOUR 
25) Elite Behaviour 26) Refonnism 
27) Legislature 28) Innovation Index 
29) Index of Liberal Ideology 
SOCIAL GROUPS 
30) Social Groups 
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSIRPS 
3 1) Central Control 32) Inter-governmental 
33) Governmental Aid 
B*: Level of analysis C*: Statistical technique 
1) County and Borough 1) Percentage 
2) District 2) Correlation 
3) American State 3) Simple and/or 
Multiple 
Regression 
4) Path Analysis 
5) Others 
55 
Chapter Three 56 
3.3. URBAN HIERARCHY THEORY 
Searching for a Unitary Theory 
The 'socio-econon-dcs versus politics' debate in local expenditure studies has 
been subjected to criticisms in various ways. The debate has been based on the implicit 
assumption that the activities performed by local government benefit only the local 
residents (Hansen, 1984,343) of each competitive (Tiebout, 1972) jurisdiction. Each 
locality was treated as an 'isolated' (Paddison, 1983,160) political system in the 
absence of a general theory (Newton, 1981,117). The only extra-local force that was 
sometimes adn-dtted was the central influence. Moreover, the growing number of 
studies of the relative importance of socio-econon-dc and political variables has led to 
confusion rather than to increased understanding (Fried, 1975,305; Boyne, 1989,133). 
Their empirical results are generally rather contradictory: basically forn-ling other 
monuments to 'adhockery' in Fried's term. Differences in setting boundaries and in 
selecting independent variables, analysis level, policy area and statistical technique 
resulted in the impossibility of comparing between determinant studies with 
considerable differences in R2. A more unitary and coherent theory was needed with 
increased interests in the linkages between localities, or to be more precise, the fate of 
localities. 
Some efforts have been made to replace the 'meaningless' (Simon and Duncan, 
1988) debate in policy determinant studies with the urban hierarchy theory. This theory 
was considered to provide a unitary and coherent explanation of local expenditure 
decisions. Originally it was developed by Walter Christaller in his book entitled Die 
Zentralen Orte in Suddeutschland (Central Places in Southern Germany) in 1933. 
Christaller used it in an attempt to identify the general principles in the locational 
pattern of retail shopping and human settlements (King, 1984,30) in cross sectional 
perspective. Geographers and economists have since developed it to explain the spatial 
distribution of econon-dc activities as a whole within a wider system. 
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When employed in cross-sectional studies of local expenditure, the main theme 
is that the spending levels of localities depend on the relative position occupied by a 
locality in the nation as a whole. As table 3-3 illustrates, four concepts lie at the heart 
of this idea: ecological centrality, economic centrality, administrative centrality and 
urbanity. 
The ecological centrality from which central place theory originated measures 
the magnitude of public service demands from the external hinterland. A locality which 
is positioned high in ecological centrality is likely to encounter greater use of its public 
services not only by its residents but also by the hinterland residents. Economic 
centrality is used by Aiken and Depre (1981) and Sorensen (1987,50) to refer to the 
city's function as a centre for public and private activities. The city's function as a 
centre for a specific economic activity is likely to generate a specific pattern both to the 
demands and revenues of public service. 
Adn-dnistrative centrality refers to the relative position in the hierarchical 
pyramid of government organisation. Certain types of services can necessitate higher 
expenditures particularly in high order localities (Paddison, 1983,160). 
The last concept of urbanity refers to the relative degree of internal service 
needs generated in highly populated cities. Internal needs for specific services such as 
public transport, refuse collection and police can be paralleled with a city's position in 
the degree of urbanity. Figure 3-1 surnmarises several correlations between urban 
hierarchy and service provision patterns. The figure shows that the different position in 
urban hierarchy can lead to different spending patterns. 
Kasarda (1972) adopts the ecological centrality concept to investigate the 
relationship between suburban population growth and service functions performed in 
central cities. He concludes that the suburban population and the commuting 
population exert strong effects on police, fire, highway, sanitation, recreation and the 
general administrative functions in the central cities (Kasarda, 1972,1123). Paddison 
(1983,160) introduces various aspects of centrality including ecological centrality, 
economic centrality and urbanity. But his empirical analysis is limited to the 
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administrative centrality which means the hierarchical tier of the government 
organisation. He shows the variations in spending on 'central place services' and on 
'the protective services' amongst the three Irish governmental tiers: national, regional 
and sub-regional. Newton (1981; 1984) has also shown that a city's relative position in 
the urban hierarchy can affect its spending patterns. Dissimilarities of welfare 
expenditure can be attributed to differences in their status and role. He applies the 
economic centrality concept to the county borough expenditures by examining the 
correlation between numbers of business headquarters and per capita expenditure on 
public services (Newton, 1984,363). Using the 1971 records about the spatial 
concentration of head offices in Britain, 327 (65%) of the top 500 firms were found to 
have their headquarters in London, 66 in Birmingham, 45 in Manchester, 33 in Leeds, 
29 in Sheffield, 25 in Glasgow, 15 in Liverpool and 9 in Newcastle at that time. His 
analysis implies that economic centrality is related to service expenditures, particularly 
to what are termed public or indivisible services such as parks, libraries, fire, police, 
sewage, highways, and planning. These services are named collective services by 
Hansen (1984,344) because their costs and benefits are city-wide, and because they are 
available to any person or resident who wishes to make use of them. Sharpe and 
Newton apply this idea in an attempt to explain variations in British county boroughs. 
They correlate expenditure patterns of county boroughs with a centrality points score 
originally devised by Carruthers in 1961. Their conclusion is that central place theory 
explains expenditure variations between localities as whole and indivisible entities 
which exist in a hierarchy (Sharpe and Newton, 1984,130). 
First, city governments will themselves produce central place services and 
facilities which, in Britain, are likely to include libraries, museums, art 
galleries, parks and sports facilities, and special educational services; second, 
the large number of people who visit central place cities for business and 
pleasure purposes are likely to use local services such as police, planning, 
highways, and public transport (Sharpe and Newton, 1984,130). 
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Assessment of the Urban Hierarchy Theory 
As noted above, the urban hierarchy theory can be seen as an attempt to develop 
an unitary theory of policy variation in local government. The advocates of this theory 
strongly criticize the 'meaningless' (Simon and Duncan, 1988) debate concerning the 
traditional research question in output analysis. Certainly, unlike the dispute on the 
relative importance of socioeconomic and political variables, the urban hierarchy theory 
provides a unitary and coherent explanation of local expenditure decisions. 
On the other hand, however, the urban hierarchy theory is not without defects. 
If the fate of locality is predominant, there would be little room for local authorities to 
change or improve their service provision. Certainly this is another defect of the 
deterministic trap. A locality's relative hierarchy may well be meaningful, but it does 
not show how its forces are integrated with the working practice of locality. The urban 
hierarchy theory does not satisfy those who need to know the unique mechanism around 
which local policies are made. 
<Table 3-3> Researches on the Effects of Urban Hierarchy 
Researcher Year Country A*B*C* 
Kasarda, 1972 U. S. 1 3 3 
Newton 1981 U. K. 1,2,4 1 1,2 
Aiken & 1981 Belgium 1 3 2 
Depre 
Paddison 1983 Irland 3 3 5 
Newton 1984 U. K. 2 1 1,2 
Newton & 1984 U. K. 1 1 1,2 
Sharpe 
Hansen 1984 Norway 1,2 4 2 
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Sorensen 1987 Norway 1,2,4 2,4 
Aiken 1987 Europe 1,2 42 
et al. 
A Independent variables 
1) Ecological Centrality 
2) Economic Centrality 
3) Administrative Centrality 
4) Urbanity 
B Level of analysis 
1) County, County Borough 
2) District 
3) City and Town 
4) Metropolitan Region 
C Statistical technique 
1) Correlation 
2) Regression 
3) Path Analysis 
4) Chi-square 
5) Others 
3.4. INCREMENTALISM 
Inward-Looking Explanation of Organisation 
61 
The incrementalist approach has been applied to the study of public expenditure 
detem-dnants since the 1960s; almost half a century after Maffeo Pantaleon, the father 
of incremental analysis in public finance (1958), presented his seminal attempts at the 
beginning of the century. Since then Wildavsky's theory of budgetary incrementalism 
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has been the most widely read theory in recent decades (Rubin, 1989,78; Lessmann, 
1989,453). 
Looking at it from the perspective of the socioeconomic versus politics debate, 
incrementalism has been a good hiding place for political scientists who insisted that 
'politics should matter'. One of the responses of political scientists to so-called socio- 
economic deten-ninism has been to develop an incrementalist explanation of public 
policy-making. In the 1950s (Leach, 1982,6) they began to develop the research 
concern into an inward-looking explanation of bureaucracy. Unlike in the socio- 
economic detern-dnism, great emphasis was placed on the primacy of 'extra-rational'l 
practices in the organisational process (Dempster and Wildavsky, 1979,374). 
At the first formulation of incrementalism, its proponents (Dahl and Lindblom, 
1953; Popper, 1957; Lindblom, 1965) focussed on the aspect of process in policy- 
making. They seemed to emphasise the general theory of incremental decision-making 
rather than the incrementalist theory of budgeting both in descriptive and normative 
senses. Their central concept was either about analysis or politics in the policy-making 
process: analysis as limited calculation (see Walker, 1984,83) and politics as 'partisan 
mutual adjustment' (Lindblom, 1965,9) for vested interests. 
Firstly, Lindblom, in his co-authored work with Braybrook (1963), denies the 
possibility of a comprehensive and rational analysis in advance of deciding alternatives. 
He argues that policy-making processes are constrained by decision makers' limited 
cognitive capacity, by time pressures, by the lack of information and by limited 
financial resources2. Policy makers do not and cannot ensure rational-synoptic analysis 
in terms of efficiency or effectiveness as the rationalist model suggests (Booth, 1988, 
5). Relying on past practices rather than future goals, they instead adopt serial and 
1. The term 'irrational' is deliberately avoided in this study. The dichotomy between 
rational and incremental models in which incrementalism is often taken to be irrational 
has been misleading for a long time. The opposite of 'rational' is merely irrational, not 
'incremental' at all. Those incrementlists who criticise the rational model do not appear 
irrational. What they do is to stress a different facet of rationality in policy-making. 
2. In a sense, the impossibility of ideal policy-making seems to have overshadowed the 
practical significance of the rational model. Leach (1982) makes the point that the 
appropriate response may be not to abandon one's attempts to pursue an ideal 
alternative but to develop an awareness of related variables. 
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fragmented remedies through 'trial-and error' (Walker, 1984,71). 'Ibis notion is 
explicitly exemplified by Greenwood (1979) who says: 
The thesis of incrementalism involves two principal ideas which we shall 
discuss in terms of the parameters of budgetary review and the mode of 
budgetary analysis ..... In recent years local authorities have become less incremental in that they have increasingly sought to inform the process of 
budgetary choice through the use of rational rather than political analysis 
(Greenwood, 1979,93 and 94). 
Secondly, Lindblom and Braybrook go on to discuss incrementalism as politics 
to maintain social equilibrium. Rested on the notion on multiplicity of participants 
(Jordan, 1990,293), they stress the political process of decision-making. According to 
them, democracy is often endangered by non-incremental change (Lindblom and 
Braybrook, 1963,73) but gradualist change does not stir up the considerable 
antagonisms (Lindblom, 1979,520) among those who have varying vested interests. 
These political necessities force the decision makers to pursue mutual adjustment which 
results in 'a step-by-step' change (Booth, 1988,7). As a consequence, policy changes 
contain just a few marginal alterations from the status quo3. 
When incrementalism is applied to the output analysis of public spending 
decisions, the tendency is to emphasise the gradualist change of budgetary decision- 
making. It is argued that general expenditures in one year are almost linearly predicted 
from expenditures in the previous year. Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky claim that: 
This year's budget is based on last year's budget, with special attention given 
to a narrow range of increase or decrease (Davis et al., 1966). 
Afterwards Alt (1977) says again: 
Ext = f(Ext-k, CO +e..... the pattern of expenditures in year t is that linearly 
predicted ftom expenditures in year t-k, subject to shocks introduced by the 
fact that control of the council has changed hands between years t-k and t (Alt, 
1977,90). 
3. Apparently incrementalism is treated as a process in the above two strands while 
most emphasis is placed on the mode of decision-making in organisational behaviour. 
The two views are not necessarily related but are often intermingled by many writers. 
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However, their focus has been bifurcated into the magnitude and regularity4 of 
budgetary changes. It appears clear in his original formulation that the magnitude of 
each year's change is taken as a measure of its incremental character. Originally 
Wildavsky (1974,14) had presented a table showing the percentage annual increases for 
thirty-seven federal agencies setting the parameter by asserting that any change is 
'incremental' if it is within the range ± .3 ALLd-1 (that is, the allocation level in year t- 
1). This was refined by Danziger (1976a, 338) into three categories where 1.05 to 1.15 
ALLOt-I is 'incremental', 1.16 to 1.30 ALLO" is 'relatively incremental' and 1.30 to 
1.90 is 'non-incremental'. Here the magnitude of each year's change in budgetary 
allocation is regarded as an inverse measure of its incremental character (Sharpe and 
Newton, 1984,84) but there are no objective criteria for judging whether an output as 
incremental or non-incremental. 
Wildavsky himself, with Dempster and Danziger, redefined the concept of 
incrementalism later: they shifted emphasis from the magnitude to the regularity of each 
year's change. Danziger (1976a, 338) presented two operationalised models for 
assessing the regularity of change. In particular, Model 2 below is formulated to avoid 
the possibility that the 'apparent massive stability' of the base might hide differential 
rates of growth or decay. It displays the equation for the score, which is the average 
yearly difference between the ratio of programme to total service expenditure and the 
mean of that ratio. However, as Danziger himself recognises (Danziger, 1976a, 335), 
the operationalisation of the concept remains an unsolved issue. For instance, even a 
100 per cent increase can be interpreted as incremental so far as it shows a regularity in 
this model. 
4. The term regularity is used to refer either to 'constant rate' or to 'fair share' 
(Danziger, 1976a, 338) in budgetary changes. Constant rate means a sin-dlar rate of 
changes over several years whatever the absolute size is. Fair share refers to the portion 
of resources which is taken as accepted as reasonable in comparison to other 
departments in a given year. 
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<Table 3-4> Danziger's Operationalization of the Incremental Models 
Model 1) Incremental Trend Model: ALLOt = P(ALLOt-1) + 
Model 2) Prosperity Chwige Score: 
I '. .., (Pr og Base) / (Pr og Base) p= 
n 
Where, 
ALLOt = Net budgetary aRocation in fumcial year t 
AALLO, = 
ALLO, 
ALLO, 
-, 
Base ALLO, = 
ALLO, Servicei 
ALLO, Total Expenditure 
Pr og Base, m 
ALLO, Pr ograMh 
ALLO, Service, 
Source: Danziger, James N. (1976a), p. 338. 
Assessment of Empirical Studies on Incrementalism 
Especially in this study, incremenalism is a useful example through which some 
significant differences between process and output approaches can be captured. 
Greenwood and his colleagues have shown tremendous concern to this point since long 
ago (Greenwood et al., 1977,37). They clearly assert that it is important that the 
distinction between the budgetary process and budgetary outputs be made. According to 
them, the two are not necessarily related and should receive at least analytic separate 
treatment. 
Finally, deserving of mention is a recent development in incrementalism. 
More concern is being given than ever to the environmental stability which is presumed 
to mould incrementalism. Conventional incrementalism in budgetary studies is open to 
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criticisms not only for the narrowness of the locus skewed towards the inward politics 
of adn-dnistrative organisations but also for the neglect of the broader environmental 
process. Rubin (1989,78) says that the environment is treated as an exogenous 
variable, not part of the real budgetary process by incrementalists. Boyne (1989,131) 
also agrees with Bailley and O'Connor (1975) that there is little substantive and 
explanatory appeal in the incrementalist argument that one year's expenditure is caused 
by the previous year's. This substantive weakness is related to the impractical 
assumption that an external 'shock' (Boyne, 1989) always exerts little impact on policy- 
maker's decisions, and that a marginal change of process always results in a marginal 
output5. Therefore, Boyne traces the original forces of incrementalism back to the 
stability of needs, resources and politics in the environment. 
<Table 3-5> Researches on Incrementalism 
Writer Year Country A*Bc 
Dahl & 1953 U. S. 1,2 
Lindblom 
Lindblom 1965 U. S. 1,2 
Davis et al. 1966 U. S. 32 
5. It seems that incrementalism remains as a trendline which has not been adequately 
developed into a theory (Schick, 1983,3). The above incrementalist explanations in 
local budgetary studies are often assessed in four aspects: value premises, theoretical 
consistency, empirical application and the backgrounds of its proponents. First, 
incrementalists' commitment to the status quo, if not to the past, is not desirable from 
the prescriptive perspectives. Goodin (1982,37) makes the point that "it is enormously 
desirable to eradicate evils once and for all". Secondly, internal consistency is 
questioned because of the many differing strands in the school. The concept of 
incrementalism itself is oppositely interpreted by Greenwood (1979,96) and Sharpe 
(1984) for example. Whereas Greenwood refers with incrementalism to an analysis as 
the other extreme of rational model Sharpe refers to the size of change over years. 
Third, there is no objective criterion to judge whether the result is incremental or non- 
incremental in empirical application. Presumably a 40 per cent n-dght be incremental 
whilst 50 per cent not to some writers. Fourthly, incrementalists are, at least implicitly, 
those who are against the scienticism which focuses exclusively on the socio-econon-dc 
factors in policy studies since the 1950s. 
Chapter Three 
Wildavsky 1974 U. S. 3 4 1 
Cowart 1975 Norway 1,3 Oslo 2 
et al. 
Danziger 1976-1 U. K. 3,4 2 1,3 
Alt 1977 U. K. 3 3 
Greenwood 1977 U. K. 1,2,3 2 
et al. 
Dempster & 1979 U. S. 3,4 4 1 
Wildavsky 
Greenwood 1979 U. K. 1 
Hoggart 1983 U. K. 3,4 1,2 3 
Sharpe & 1984 U. K. 3 1,2 2 
Newton 
Boyne 1989 U. K. 3 1,2,3 2 
A Concept of incrementalism 
1) Incrementalism as an Analysis (Process) 
2) Incrementalism as a Politics (Process) 
3) Incrementalism as a Magnitude of Change (Output) 
4) Incrementalism as a Regularity of Change (Output) 
B Level of analysis 
1) County Council 
2) County Borough 
3) District 
4) Others 
C Statistical technique 
1) Percentage 
2) Correlation 
3) Regression 
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3.5. CONCLUSION 
The existing studies of policy outputs in local government have been classified 
into four modes of explanation in this study: socio-econornic analysis, political studies, 
urban hierarchy theory and the incrementalist approach. The traditional socio-econon-dc 
versus political dichotomy was refined into more relevant categories, based upon , the 
nature of output variables. 
Certainly the urban hierarchy theory and incrementalism have several 
sin-dlarities here. The urban hierarchy theory relies on a cross-sectional perspective and 
incrementalism on a time series analysis respectively. However, both strands seem to 
have pre-determined viewpoints on expenditure determination; that is, they tend to 
verify their self-contained views by paying attention exclusively to a single aspect 
(either the policy-maker's behaviour or to the structural hierarchy between localities) of 
determining factors. This means they start with pre-determined explanations on the 
question of policy variation, and this rules out the other sources of policy variation in 
local authorities. These features are simultaneously both a strength and a weakness of 
those theories. Certainly it is a strength that they can show a unitary and coherent 
explanation on policy-making. On the other hand, coherent though they are, they pay 
inadequate attention to the other sources of policy variation which still deserves 
investigation. Even if their predetermined views hold true, there remains a great need to 
know the internal process through which those theoretical factors become effective in 
local policy-making. Moreover, the aspects which are stressed by incrementalism and 
urban hierarchy theory have been suggested by other schools such as the organisational 
theory and the socio-economic approach. 
In the case of the first two strands, socio-economic analysis and political 
approach, relatively more empirical studies suggest that environmental factors outweigh 
political variables in local policy-making. But this cannot be the conclusive answer to 
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the question about the relative importance of socio-economic and political factors. The 
so-called 'socio-economics versus politics' debate remains unresolved (Hoggart, 1989, 
2) and, more precisely, increased studies of local expenditure detern-dnants lead to 
confusion rather than increased understanding (Fried, 1975,305; Boyne, 1989,133). 
For instance, Booms and Halldorson (1973,932) present much higher coefficients for 
the socio-economic variables than Fry and Winters (1970), being higher by from . 17 to 
. 56. Some other studies found 
A in regression analysis as low as 43 % to 73 % 
(Fabricant, 1952; Foster et al., 1980; Sharpe and Newton, 1984) while others produced 
A as high as 80 % to 89 % (Ashford et al., 1976; Danziger, 1976b). Criticising the 
misleading inferences in the existing studies, Boyne (1985a, 508) claims that the 
unreliability results from statistical models which are inconsistent with their theoretical 
base rather than from the nature of output analysis. Though Boyne (1983) himself 
argues that output analysis is superior to process approach, he warns that the 
contribution of output studies to political science may not be impressive (Boyne, 
1985b). Boyne's warning seems to be in line with Lieberson's point (1985,88) that the 
empirical questions can sometimes be framed in ways that are actually damaging to the 
advancement of knowledge. 
There are four separate sources of confusion in the studies of the relative 
importance of socio-economic versus political determinants. They are the main source 
of difficulties in comparing the comparative studies between the studies of policy 
variation. 
Differences in the level of analysis 
Differences in conceptualisation and varying measures 
Differing policy areas 
Differences of research technique 
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The first relates to differences in the level of analysis (e. g. British county vs 
American state). As an example, in counties there appeared to be relatively little 
variance in spending attributed to political variables (Alt, 197 1), but in boroughs Labour 
and Conservative councillors seemed to assess needs and choices in different ways 
(Ashford et al., 1976,6). The second source of confusion is differences in 
conceptualisation and varying measures (e. g. party control vs seat proportion). The 
selection of each independent variable is usually based on an exiting theory or a writer's 
judgement. In this process, the different conceptualisation, or operationalisation, leads 
to a distortion in selecting the independent variables. A typical example is the choice of 
varying boundaries between the socio-econon-dc and political systems which basically 
stems from a different conceptualisation. The third one is differing policy areas (e. g. 
total spending vs welfare expenditure). When considering variations in decision- 
making within one specific policy area across several local governments, the same 
policy area should be chosen. If cases are selected across different policy areas, then 
the level of influence of variables can appear different. Total expenditure data, as an 
example, may conceal the effects of central government on a social policy area. The 
last is differences of research technique (e. g. correlation vs regression). Usually the 
immediate impacts of independent variables are assessed by correlation coefficients and 
their comparative influences are assessed by regression analysis, cross-tabulation, path 
analysis and factor analysis. Lewis-Beck (1977,560) argues that many studies fail to 
compare accurately the relative importance of the independent variables partly because 
they have adopted statistical techniques inadequate to the task. The models are often 
imposed by a statistical requirement rather than the substantive nature of the problem 
(Boyne, 1985,496). In short, according to sceptics, the quest of relative importance 
between socio-economic and political factors now proves a false one (Nardulle and 
Stonecash, 1982,45; Boyne, 1989). 
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the conventional research question 
on the relative importance between socioeconon-dc and political factors should be 
refused in the. field of output analysis of policy variation in local government. It is 
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meaningless to compare the studies in so far as they do not exan-dne the same policy 
area in the same locality using the same method with the same variables during the 
same periods. For the comparison of results between or within output studies, much 
more stress should be placed on conceptualising and selecting related variables in 
research designs. Otherwise, unwarranted inferences are inevitable. 
Interestingly, many contrasting features are found in the process approach to 
policy-making in local authorities. The empirical works in the field show many 
differences in their assumptions, focuses and research methods. The following chapter 
will examine the features of process approaches which basically aims at explaining the 
process of policy-making in local authorities. After reviewing the existing literature, 
the next chapter will seek to construct a theoretical model to explore the process of 
policy-making in local government. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE POLITICS OF THE POLICY PROCESS 
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter explored the use of output analysis as a means of 
investigating policy variation in local government. It examined a broad range of 
existing literature on output analysis. The results clearly show that almost all output 
analyses seek to identify the source of policy variation in the socioeconomic 
environment. 
After the search for data sets that incorporate variation in the end-products of 
local policies, output analysts make attempts to account for the variations found. 
Though the output analyses have tended to give relatively more weight to 
socioeconomic variables, research attention has been given to the relative importance of 
political and socioeconomic factors in policy-making. This orthodox research question 
has drawn some political scientists who are 'ideologically comn-dtted to proving that 
party competition, voter participation, partisanship, and apportionment do indeed 
influence public policy' (Dye, 1976,30). Despite their engagement in the 'environment 
versus politics' dispute these political scientists have found no convincing evidence that 
politics does matter. Rather, the dispute in output analysis brought 'near panic' 
(Hoggart, 1989,2) in political science and 'continuing embarrassment' to political 
scientists. A lot of conflicting results arising from the orthodox research question were 
illustrated in the preceding chapter. Chapter Three concluded that the research question 
itself now appeared to be n-dsguided (Stonecash, 1980, Nardulle and Stonewalls, 1982; 
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Boyne, 1989)1, and re-classified output analyses into four categories: financial sources, 
socioeconon-dc variables, the urban hierarchy theory and incrementalism. 
'Ibis chapter now aims to examine the other research tradition in the study of 
policy variation in local government; namely, the process approach. A number of 
political scientists have continued to study the policy process, particularly in Britain 
(Hill and Bramley, 1986,154). As indicated by the name itself, the process approach 
refers to policy studies which explore the procedural working of local policy-making. It 
usually focuses either on the interaction patterns of procedural factors within the policy 
process or, sometimes, on the effects of these procedural factors on policy outputs. 
Unlike output analysis, little significance is attributed to the socioeconon-dc 
environment in this process approach. In addition, quite different views are found 
within the process approach to those characteristics of output analysis, and this is 
expected to provide a good starting point for considering methodological issues in the 
analysis of policy variation in local government. 
4.2. TOWARD A THEORETICAL MODEL 
Refining the features of the process approach, this section develops a three 
dimensional model of local policy-making. An important problem in model-building is 
clarifying related concepts. It helps to conceptualise the components of the model and 
to operationalise each component for empirical investigation. Therefore, before 
1. Interestingly, the impact of the 'false issue' seemed to be more serious in the United 
States than in the United Kingdom. The research question itself raised during the 
period, to a certain extent, required quantitative approaches to a large number of cases 
in the United States. However, in the United Kingdom, the case study method has 
traditionally been admired and often employed in studies of expenditure decisions. 
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proceeding to further discussion this section starts by defining the three concepts which 
are the crucial components of local policy-making in this study. 
- POLITICAL LEADERSHIP refers to the ideological comn-dtments advocated 
by political representatives. Political leadership, as pointed out by Hill (1972, 
213; 1986,71), is moulded by the elected politicians such as the local 
councillors. 
- ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS means the organisational procedures in 
which functional rationality needs to be ensured by professional officialA 
Administrative process is characterised by several unique features: hierarchical 
organisation, with different levels of responsibility, clearly demarcated areas of 
functions and established lines of information flow. 
- SOCIAL INPUT refers to the demands and supports derived from the local 
environment. The society in which local government operates is the prime 
source of power and the ultimate goal of public authorities. Thus, local 
government cannot be purely independent of the social environment. 
2. In the eighteenth century there was no clear distinction between the civil service and 
the political personnel (Etzioni-Halevy, 1979,123). Some efforts were made to 
separate administration from politics in Britain partly in consequence of the campaign 
begun in the 1780s to diminish the influence of the crown (Parris, 1969,33) and partly 
because the growing volume and complexity of government business forced a division 
of labour between ministers and their officials (Drewry and Butcher, 1991,38). In 1854 
the Northcote - Charles Trevelyan report was subn-dtted (Chapman and Dunsire, 1971, 45), which argued the principle of a clear-cut distinction between the appointed, 
permanent, non-political executive and the politician. 
Chapter Four 
Political Leadership 
Ideological Traits of Councillors 
75 
The first important component in the political leadership of local government is 
the ideological disposition of councillors. The ideology of the party in office has long 
been taken as a source of policy variation in local authorities. Almost all the studies of 
the determinants of local policies in the UK have found that party politics does make a 
difference to the policy outputs (Burch and Wood, 1990,35; Boyne, 1989,128). While 
the Conservative party, in principle, favours lower expenditure with a preference for 
divisible services (Glennerster, 1979,11) the Labour Party is associated with higher 
spending (Castles and McKinlay, 1979,17 1). 
The councillor has a key role in the management of the authority, for only 
through the councillor can the political and management processes be linked (Stewart, 
1990,26). The councillors can take service distributions as the primary medium by 
which they account to their electors (Marshall, 1974,74). Usually, they are interested 
in the reflection of political values3 rather than any detailed analysis of policies. In this 
sense, councillors can be seen as the custodians of political values in local government. 
As far as the internal process of local government is concerned, the council itself 
must be the final arbiter of service distributions (Byrne, 1990,140). This means that the 
local council is considered as the last and ultimate machinery by which decisions must 
be passed and permitted. It is located at the last stage of the budgetary process in 
Crecine's (1969) distinction. He divides budgetary behaviour into three stages; 1) 
departmental request 2) budget recommendation and 3) council appropriation. Here the 
councillors are expected to play the roles of arbiter not only in determining the local tax 
3. Councillors often come to act as defenders of constituency interests. They must 
compromise somewhere between the ideological stances of their party and their own 
interpretation of constituency interests (Stoker, 1988,93). 
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levels but also in settling unresolved disputes between the finance committee and other 
comn-dttees (MarshaH, 1974,79). 
The main resource of the council in the process of local policy-making is likely 
to be political legitimacy. It is widely understood to be a normative requirement that 
the party control of the council ought to make a difference to local expenditure (Boyne, 
1989,127) in representative democracy. Another resource may be the control of the 
agenda in a locality. Their selection of a policy program me for discussion provides a 
considerable momentum for a change in policy priorities. Setting the agenda is taken to 
be the first step in the policy process itself. 
According to Hill (1972), councillors' influence on service distributions tends to 
be strong in the local authorities in which vigorous partisan controversy or conflict is 
produced over the local financial situation. Under a disciplined party such as the 
Labour party, councillors are determined to implement their political comn-dtments 
despite constraints (Elcock, 1987,243). 
However, the general dominance of local policy-making by the local council 
now often means that the decisions on local service distributions tend to be concentrated 
in the ruling group (Elcock et al, 1989,51). Key decisions remain in the hands of a 
small leading caucus of majority party members (Cockburn, 1977,6; Saunders, 1979; 
Blowers, 1980; Green, 1981; Alexander, 1982). Following Elcock and his colleagues, 
one consequence of the party control of British local government has been to enhance 
the positions of the Leader of the Council and the comn-dttee chairmen. In some 
authorities, especially in the large cities, there has been a long tradition of don-dnant 
leadership (Dearlove, 1973; Jones and Norton, 1978; Elcock et al., 1989,52) but more 
generally, Leaders may be acquiring the status of 'Local Prime Ministers'. 
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Another significant factor in the political leadership is the local ministeA The 
6straw man' view of pluralism has been challenged notably by Weberian (Weber, 1947) 
managerialist views5. 
Following the managerial views, the roles played by the local minister are 
decisively important in local policy-maldng. His office is the focal point of political 
organisations which are expected to fulfil the management of local affairs and 
administrative accountability within local authorities. Needless to say, a key 
mechanism for the local minister in accomplishing these goals is the expenditure 
process. The decisions that emerge from the expenditure process constitute a plan of 
action distributing the public benefits and allowing the departments to proceed along the 
lines laid down, up to the limits prescribed. 
The best known propagator of this view of public policy-making is Downs 
(1957). Downs' model describes the detern-driation of political orientation in the public 
sector with an economic market analogy. Basically Downs focuses on the politician's 
personal interests in maximizing social support in elections. Downs argues that 
politicians exercise their leadership in a way which gains the most votes and loses the 
fewest (Downs, 1957,52 and 69). In practice, the scope of the local minister's activities 
is far beyond the reflection of social demands through elections. Election itself cannot 
specify anything like a price a citizen wishes to pay. Voters are allowed to make a 
decision to choose a single issue, mostly a person, every four or five years. It is usually 
4. The term local n-dnister is a direct translation of a Korean word referring to the head 
of local administration. It is difficult to choose an English word to refer to the head of 
local adn-dnistration since the practices of local government systems differ from country 
to country. In Britain, the head of local government is just a figurehead in most cases, 
compared with the American mayor, the French maire or the German Burgmeister 
(Jones, 1978,27; Hambleton, 1978; Clements, 1978,321). 
5. Saunders (1980,166) argues that this perspective derives mainly from that of Weber, 
and in particular it reflects the two key principles in Weber's political sociology: that 
there is no necessary relationship between economic classes and politics and that the 
mode of political domination in modem societies is increasingly and necessarily 
bureaucratic. Ham and Hill (1984,15) remind us that political leaders can create 
conditions for their own action by imposing their own definitions of problems. 
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a matter of simply 'buying' or 'not buying' large packages, much of which one does not 
want (Burnheim, 1985,83). Much of the discretion is delegated for the political 
leadership to use in the process of management. Clearly policy-making is not an event 
but a process which lasts for a long time. 
In the case of managerial accountability within local authorities (Gyford et al., 
1989,151), the local minister is the organised centre of power among the local 
departments and the administrative pyramid leads up to a narrow apex of his position. 
Jones (1978,27) suggests that leaders in local government may perform the following 
four roles: 1) maintaining the unity of the organisation; 2) representing, defending and 
gaining support for the organization in the outside world; 3) developing the tasks of the 
organization; and 4) directing it to achieve its goals. These roles give the local n-dnister 
power and formal authority in policy-making. This suggests that particular emphasis 
should be placed on the roles played by the local minister when investigating the service 
distribution in local government in Korea. The local n-dnister has the political 
responsibility of meeting the social demands arising from the civil society. He has 
fon-nal authority to frame the distribution of public benefits by asking all local 
departments to reduce or increase their draft estimates. 
Several studies have implied that more discretion is given to the local minister 
by 'rational choice' approaches such as PPBS and ZBB, whereby participants list and 
evaluate goal priorities (Midwinter, 1984,473). Greenwood (1979,90) characterises 
this trend as corporate policy-making for two reasons. First, the analysis covers the 
entire scope of the authority's services (that is, it is not concerned with a single 
department), and second, it is frequently carried out by inter-departmental corporate 
groups. The thrust of corporate analysis is to provide explicit information on what is 
being achieved by existing expenditure, what 'needs' are still unmet, what the scope is 
for alternative action, and what the consequences are of making economies in one area 
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rather than another6. For this reason, the local minister is often considered analogous to 
an economic entrepreneur (McLean, 1987,28). 
Administrative Process within Government 
Organisational Sources of Administrative Politics 
The real decisions on governmental service distribution can be undermined by 
the administrative process. It has long been pointed out that bureaucracy becomes a 
system of governance, and the locus of power has shifted to the hands of bureaucrats. 
This convention is largely based on the assumption that professional expertise is vital to 
policy-making given the imperatives of functional efficiency in the modem state 
(O'Leary, 1987,370). This may be called 'non-political politics' in policy-making. 
Indictment of the bureaucracy for assurning an excessive and aggrandizing role 
in policy-making is not new although the view that policy-making is the prerogative of 
the officials rather than of the elected members of representative bodies is alarmist. 
Analysts have found that governmental organisations7 pursue their own motives such as 
salary, promotion, and prestige (Niskanen, 1973; Breton, 1974,161; Benson, 1975,229; 
Booth, 1988,43; Dunleavy, 1991,200). These motives of bureaucrats are not mutuaRy 
6. Cawson (1985a, 131) argues that this corporate management should not be confused 
with corporatism. Corporate management refers to the ideology, and to some extent the 
administrative practice, which sees the local authority as a single corporate entity that 
can be more rationally integrated through a holistic and synoptic approach to policy- 
making. Neither the theory nor the practice of corporate management necessarily 
involves the incorporation of interest groups into the making or implementation of 
policy. 
7. In particular, the relative importance of administrative politics has been accelerated 
by the expansion of the executive branch in the modem state (Parkinson, 1965; Cawson, 
1978,182; Ham and Hill, 1984; Gamble, 1989,17). 
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exclusive and are therefore often discussed under the heading 'budget-maxin-dsation' 
(Booth, 1988,43). Recently a staff-maximisation hypothesis was put forward by Boyne 
(1991,556) and mission-orientation was suggested by Stoker (1988). All these motives 
are sometimes seen as serving 'organisational interests' such as survival, autonomy and 
growth (Leach, 1980,288). 
The principle of political impartiality (Byrne, 1990,191) does not necessarily 
mean that civil servants are unaware of the political implications of their work (Etzioni- 
Halevy, 1979,127). And the government bureaucracy cannot be seen as an 'essential 
unity' (Allison, 1971; Cawson, 1985c, 224), nor simply as a disinterested servant of the 
public8. Any explanation which depicts government organisations as unitary actors 
blindly following the policies determined by the political leadership is likely to be 
unsatisfactory. Such an approach neglects the diversity of perception, resources and 
interests within the public authorities. Different organisations carry out different 
missions interacting with different social environments in a variety of different ways. 
Each organisation's policy network (McInnes, 1991; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992) may 
affect the allocation of resources through multiple stages of policy-making such as the 
filtration of information, the definition of problems, and the choice of criteria. Ham and 
Hill (1984) make the point that the development of these administrative networks can 
lead to the development of interests which in turn can influence policy. Such a 
dimension needs to be acknowledged as a source of administrative politics in 
governmental policy-making (Gray and Jenkins, 1985; Piskotin, 1988,14). In this 
sense, two themes emerge here for the analysis of local service distributions at the level 
of administrative process. They include the power balance between local departments 
and the central-local relationship9. 
8. In particular, the public choice school has applied the methods of economic analysis 
to the behaviour of agents in the public sector. They start with the assumption that 
politicians and bureaucrats have their own interests which they pursue with the utmost 
vigour. 
9. The central-local relationship is discussed within the field of administrative process 
in this study. More than anything else, it is because the starting assumption of this 
study is to see local government as a body. Secondly, when the central government 
takes measures to influence local policy-making, the channel of influence is mainly the 
adn-dnistrative part of local government. It is in this case that the agency view might be 
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Just as with any other social groups (Piskotin, 1988,14) local departments have 
their own specific n-dssions and interests, and they engineer situations in which their 
policy preferences will prevail. They often conduct their n-dssions in a fragmented way 
under conflict. Booth (1982,203) points to the plurality of local authorities. 
Interdepartmental collaboration is the exception rather than the rule, so that in 
making and implementing polices departments still act for most purposes in 
isolation from each other. Much the same is true also of local government 
where the committee and departmental structure, with its traditions, loyalties 
and rivalries tends to foster among members and officers afike a view of the 
authority as, in the words of one Chief Officer, a grouping of 'separate firms 
operated by a parent company' (Booth, 1982,203). 
Until recently, when the administrative politics of local expenditure decisions 
came under examination, academic concern had largely centred on the officer- 
councillor relationship. An underlying assumption was that policy is formulated by 
councillors and adn-dnistered by officials. This assumption has been challenged by the 
results of empirical studies. Officials have been shown to dominate the political 
leadership initiated by the council in the local policy process. For example, Alexander 
(1982,82) argues that councillors accept or reject policy alternatives put to them by 
officials. Although councillors can develop specific ideas, professionals shape the 
choices and councillors take them (Midwinter, 1984,475; Gyford et al., 1989,96). 
These observations point to the significant impact of administrative politics on local 
policy-making. 
However, this dispute throws light exclusively on the councillor-officer 
relationship in local authorities. The multitude of relationships between local 
departments cannot be simplified into a councillor-officer dichotomy. Hill (1986,71) 
appropriate. Thirdly, the influence of central intervention affects all of the policy actors 
in local government. There is no exception from this influence and this fact cannot 
demolish the features of local policy-making explained in the three dimensional 
framework. 
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makes the point that the 'politics' are organisational rather than public, and many of the 
key conflicts are between departments particularly in local government. 
In fact, inter-departmental conflicts can appear for various reasons. The 
bureaucratic motives of self-interest were mentioned in the introductory part of this 
section (Breton, 1974,161; Benson, 1975,229; Booth, 1988,43; Boyne, 1991,556). 
Needless to say, these are potential sources of organisational inertia with which the 
bureaucrats protect their status-quo and expand their influence. The rnission-oriented 
feature of departments (Goodin, 1982) - though its content is very different from the 
motivation of self-interest - can also yield the same result in inter-departmental 
relationships. Departments' commitment to a certain policy unavoidably competes with 
the comn-dtments of other departments to their own missions. Inter-departmental 
tension arises from the different priority given to different policies. Departmentalism 
(Booth, 1988,37) is also one consequence of these conflicts. 'Mis can best be described 
as the existence of a great number of fragmented centres of power, only partly linked to 
each other. 
Several studies have shown that an underlying competition and conflict between 
departments can result in substantial changes in local policy making. Lambert et al. 
(1978) illustrate how inter-departmental conflicts contributed to the collapse of a phased 
housing redevelopment programme. Davies (1981) explains the Wandsworth case in 
which the estates department ignored the political leadership of the local council. 
Stoker (1985) gives a Manchester example in which the involvement of various 
departments resulted in slow progress in housing improvement. 
In general, the conflicts between departments are liable to come to the surface 
when the budget is under consideration. Departments prepare their estimates containing 
their demands before the coming financial year, and mobilise to ensure their 
influencelO. This is so especially when a change is proposed which threatens existing 
10. At the budget time departmental performances in attaining their targets are likely to 
be reviewed by the budget bureau. The budget bureau is described by many writers as a 
necessary evil (Wildavsky, 1964,38) which is basically negative towards departments 
asking for what they can get rather than for what they actually need (Wildavsky, 1964, 
25). For their purposes, departments adopt budgetary strategies to keep their bases and 
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relationships (Midwinter, 1984,475). For instance, it occurs when a department is 
damaged by cuts or when it intends to add an extra item of policy to the existing ones. 
Usually a department follows one of the following strategies (Wildavsky, 1964,102- 
123): 1) defending the base: guarding against cuts in the old programmes; 2) increasing 
the base: inching ahead with existing programmes; 3) expanding the base: adding new 
programmes. 
To conclude, in most local authorities the power balance between and within 
local departments (Stewart, 1983; Elcock, 1987,253) has a notable influence on 
budgeting. Since the budgetary process is a lengthy procedure each department may be 
subject to changing contingencies over the whole fiscal year. Nonetheless, each 
department tends to show different perceptions of policy priorities and to play a part in a 
division of labour. This functions as a calculation mechanism, in addition to the 
political leadership explained above and the input politics which will be described later. 
Central-Local Relationships 
The central-local relationship is another crucial factor which influences local 
policy-makingll. It demands a balance of control and independence, a balance of 
to increase the financial resources available to them. They include mobilizing client 
groups, approaching the local minister and disseminating information to the press. 
11. There have been five ways of looking at the central-local relationships: the agency 
model, the partnership model, the resource dependency model (Rhodes, 1986,17), the 
local state view (Cockburn, 1977,46-7) and the dual state model (Cawson and 
Saunders, 1983). While the first sees local adn-dnistration as merely the implementation 
of central policies, the second gives more attention to the independent process in local 
expenditure decisions (Dearlove, 1973,208). The third, the resource dependence 
model, is presented by Rhodes (1986) who rejects both the agency and partnership 
models as oversimple. He stresses the resources owned by central and local 
government, arguing that local authorities possess political legitimacy and professional 
knowledge whereas central government has statutory and financial resources. Fourthly, 
the local state view has a conception of a unitary state in which local government is just 
another part of the overall state apparatus. Finally, Saunders dual state model 
(Saunders, 1985,30) suggests that while the central government is primarily concerned 
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partnership and separation. However, local authorities are inevitably subject to the 
intervention of the centre. The various mechanisms of central intervention on local 
authorities have been well-documented by Foster et al. (1980,35) and by Glennerster 
(1985,40). 
In general, the orthodox treatment of central intervention divides it into three 
sectors: Parliamentary, Administrative and Judiciary interventions (Richards, 1980,76). 
This classification seems to fit the traditional tripartite division of political institutions 
into the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Of these mechanisms of central 
intervention, the judicial control might be prevailing before the second half of the 
nineteenth century rather than today. Therefore, the term central intervention is used 
mostly to denote the administrative measures and the Paliamentary legislation. It is 
extremely difficult to differentiate one from the other in this case. 
Six measures of central intervention appear to deserve mentioning here: (1) 
Inspection: the use of inspection is one of the oldest forms of central supervision. An 
inspector usually conduct his duties in the aspects of efficient management of local 
authorities; (2) Ministerial approval: ministerial approval is also a powerful ministerial 
resource for central government since various actions of local authorities require it. 
Ministers are often entrusted by Parliament with a broad oversight of a particular local 
government function; (3) Guidance: general guidance from departments to local 
authorities comes through a variety of documents and personal contact. 
The remaining types of central intervention are all related to finance: (4) Audit: 
auditors are normally concerned with ensuring that the accounts of a locality are an 
accurate record of its financial position and that employers or directors have not been 
absconding with the funds (Glennerster, 1985,42); (5) Capital bids: when a locality 
wishes to construct a capital asset by spreading the cost of the asset, it needs to obtain 
loan sanction. Under the loan sanction procedure local authorities are subject to fairly 
with social production and adopts a more corporate approach to policy-making, local 
government concerns itself with social consumption and follows a more pluralist 
approach to policy-making. 
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tight central intervention on their capital spending. The Treasury often gives permission 
for a council's total capital expenditure on individual projects; (6) The grant structure: 
specific grants are distributed for services which the central department wishes to 
control (Glennerster, 1985,45). The main purpose is to produce incentives for 
authorities to keep within government spending limits. Where a grant is made for 
expenditure on a specific service, the way in which that service is developed can be 
greatly influenced by an alteration in the amount of the grant or by a change in the rules 
regarding the eligibility for grants (Richards, 1980,82) 
Since there is a growing reliance of local authorities on central finance (Foster et 
al, 1980,35), the part played by the central government12 has mostly been discussed in 
13 terms of financial measures . Various forms of financial equations have been 
presented including equations using central finance as a significant determinant of local 
policy-making (Stewart, 1980,12; 1983,198; Holtz-Eakin, 1992,20). Among these 
Ashford's equation in particular is worth quoting because it is very clear and 
informative. It is shown graphically in the figure as expenditure level E* and tax rate 
t 
12. Many studies have investigated the diversity of local expenditure in an attempt to 
identify some indications of local autonomy (Davies et al., 1986,208; Boyne, 1989, 
124). Their main question has been whether increasing central financing has led to an 
increase in central control and a weakening of local autonomy (Boyne, 1990,207). The 
'conventional wisdom' (Rhodes, 1985; Davies et al, 1986,213) was that the larger the 
share that central government has in the local budget, the stronger will be the influence 
exercised by the central government. Using variations in local expenditure decisions as 
evidence of local discretion these analysts found the grant scale approach to have no 
effect on the diversity of local expenditure. 
13. Davies and his colleagues (1986,214) present some reasons why the scale of the 
central grant cannot be ignored. Firstly the scale of grant overall could have an effect 
through the attitudes of politicians and officers in central government in legitimating 
and encouraging intervention in the affairs of local government. Secondly, for the vast 
majority of authorities, the degree of variation was not sufficiently great for that effect 
to be significant. Nonetheless, it seems questionable to take the variations in local 
expenditure as evidence of local autonomy (Page, 1980; Davies, E. M. et al., 1986; 
Boyne, 1989). The point is that it is not in all policy areas that the central government 
tries to ensure uniforn-dty of local services. Local authorities, therefore, can show a 
range of variation regardless of the extent of central intervention. 
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However, central-local relationships in a country may vary a lot from one 
policy area to another. (Page and Goldsmith, 1987; Elander et al., 1990,165). 'Mey 
vary greatly from function to function and between different parts of the same 
function. For instance, central authorities may be deeply involved in certain policies 
such as education and police while giving less attention to public libraries and 
recreational facilities (Richards, 1980,78). In addition, British experience shows how 
an unchanged constitution can accommodate great variations in the relative authority 
of central and local government (Foster et al., 1980,21). 
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Inputs from Social Action Units 
Policy-making in local government can be seen as a response by local 
authorities to the wishes and activities of the social environment. Local government is 
expected to test public aspirations and needs in the round. Its ability to examine the 
public's needs and demands is crucial for its existence. This is a central idea of pluralist 
assumptions on public policy-making (Jordan and Richardson, 1987; Hoggart, 1989, 
20). 
The pluralist model gives paramount concern to elections (Tiebout, 1956; 
Downs, 1957). Elections have often been quoted not only because they contain a 
normative tinge but also because they incorporate the econon-dc analogy into the 
explanation of public policy-making. However, these models tend to be based on pure 
assumptions (Sharpe and Newton, 1984,63) that exaggerate the position of an 
individual citizen (Hampton, 1970,214). In fact, an individual voter is neither equipped 
with full knowledge (Keating, 1991,136) nor is fully mobile to vote with his feetl4. 
Their methodological individualism also fails to catch the increasingly important roles 
played by bureaucracies and organised groups in the policy process. There are some 
sorts of social action units through which people interact with the policy-making 
mechanism and via which public benefits are distributed. Individuals are able to make 
their voices heard through these action units in policy-making. Newton (1976) argues 
that participation in modern politics means organised and collective actions and, thus, 
political power means joining organisations. These organisations have come between 
the elector and the elected representative, presenting the views of the organised few as 
the voice of the inarticulate majority (Hampton, 1970,214). 
14. The intervention of social variables such as economic externalties and free-rider 
problems is another problem (Rose-Ackerman, 1983,57). What is more, some strong 
scepticism is raised about the nature of elections (Newton, 1976,12; Gamble, 1988). It 
is pointed out that the general public decide who decides their policies. Even the 
chances of election come every three or four years while many important policies are 
made everyday. 
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A relevant measure of social action units in the environment15 is not easy to 
define. Different views are presented by different writers on what constitutes the social 
action unit functioning in local policy-making. Those who see the political mechanism 
as susceptible to organised interests16 suggest various linkages between the two: 
pressure groups (Villadsen, 1986,261), regionalities (Warde, 1986,33; Stoker, 1988; 
Keating, 1991,135), consumption areas (Cawson, 1985b, 13), ethnicity (Keating, 1991, 
135) and classes (George and Wilding, 1972,245; OLeary, 1987,375; Lee and Raban, 
1988,201). 
It seems that the pressure group is cited most often as a social action unit 
functioning in local policy-making (Danziger, 1983,67; Hampton, 1987,129)17. 
Newton (Newton, 1976,32) surveyed Birmingham and identified about 4264 local 
groups including 2,144 sports organisations, about 666 social welfare groups, 388 
cultural groups and 176 trade associations. The most active, according to Newton 
(1976,38), are usually the social welfare, health and trade union groups. A study of 40 
Danish local authorities is presented by Villadsen (1986,259) using postal 
questionnaires and interviews with leading local councillors and officials. The results 
show that typical participants in local politics include trade unions, tenants, house 
15. The influence of the environment has long been dealt with under the theme of public 
participation over the last two decades. Participation was often taken as a panacea for 
all the problems for a long time. The notion itself had undeniably normative and 
emotional overtones. However, overuse of the term 'public participation' has resulted, 
not in a total but a partial abandonment of the practical usefulness of the term. 
Participation is a chimeric word, capable of meaning many things to many people 
(Boaden et al., 1982,11). 
16. From this viewpoint, the state is not a competitive market place for all individuals, 
but a structured battlefield where some groups are strategically placed while others are 
located far from the real centres of power (Friedland, 1982: 211-212). 
17. The definition of pressure group varies on account of the different interests of 
analysts. In this study, the term pressure group is used to mean a voluntary association 
in the local environment which seeks certain influence on local expenditure decisions 
without attempting to infiltrate that process to the point where its activities adopt formal 
governmental roles. 'Iberefore, so called public pressure groups formed within 
governmental bodies are not included in the concept of pressure group. However, the 
term pressure group is used interchangeably with interest group, although the former is 
a wider concept involving 'cause group'. 
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owners. However, not all local groups are equally well placed to influence local policy- 
making according to Dearlove's study of Kensington and Chelsea (1973), Newton's 
survey on Birmingham (1976) and Saunders' study of Croydon (1980). 
Stoker (1988,107-108) proposes a distinction between four types of interest 
group by stressing their roles in making demands on local authority policy. The first 
category is producer or economic groups. It includes businesses, trade unions and 
professional associations. The second comprises community groups which draw on a 
distinct social base for their support. The main thrust of their activity is towards 
influencing policy-making and local state policy-maidng. A third type of interest group 
increasingly active at the local level is the 'cause' group, concerned with promoting a 
particular set of ideas and beliefs rather than their immediate material interests. A 
fourth category is the voluntary sector. Organisations in this category are established to 
meet a perceived need in the community on a non-commercial, non-statutory basis. 
Likewise, Parry et al. (1992,390) has more recently suggested four categories of groups 
which may be found in the local environment: social groups (such as sports, hobby and 
recreational clubs), sectional or interest groups, community and welfare organisations, 
and political groups. 
However, as can be seen above, even pressure group is defined in differing 
ways. It is felt that the concept needs to be specified and refined into a series of specific 
procedures and practices relating to particular services. The present study needs to 
focus on the procedures of policy-making in the social policy area. 
Target Groups 
What is meant by target group is the user groups of each social policy sector. 
Such a group is seen to have 'the right to be consulted' (Hampton, 1970,216; Boaden et 
al., 1982,1) by public authorities on matters that affect them. Quite often it is the needy 
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people who are provoked by governmental stances and refer themselves (Packman, 
1986,71). Such groups are of importance in that their views ought to be taken into 
account in the policy-making process. Not every group appears in all policy-makings in 
local authorities. Local expenditure decisions are usually experienced differently by 
different groups (Hampton, 1987,130). 
When efficiency and effectiveness are considered in practice, what is meant by 
the public is usually the users of services. The guiding principle of Sheffield City 
Council's policy statement Improving Service Delivery, published in 1986, is a good 
example here. 
...... the user should be at the centre of our thinking ....... What this n-dght mean in practice can be seen from a check-list of possible council actions in Closer 
to the Public, including regular surveys to establish customer reaction to 
proposed changes in services; reviewing pron-dses and reception areas for ease 
of access; ensuring that senior management visit customers and that chief 
officers spend some time on reception duties; inviting suggestions for service 
improvement; and ensuring that council comn-dttees regularly review service 
quality in the light of experience (Gyford et al., 1989,265). 
The idea of target groups fits into the picture of policy-making in the social 
policy area. Boaden et al. (1982,14) point out that the users of services are particularly 
important in the social policy category. Wildavsky (1986,380) also stresses the 
importance of target group approach in explaining why spending does not decline, once 
it has reached a certain level. For if there were a general disposition to hold the line, 
higher spending for some would lead to lower spending for others. The beneficiaries of 
the status quo pay close attention to their own share of services. They can exert 
influence on policy decisions that affect themselves in some way or another. They are 
likely to turn to the department when they wish to make an enquiry. They also vote in 
elections, contact councillors, write to newspapers and pay taxes. It is this that 
constitutes the notion of social inputs in the empirical investigation of this volume. 
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The three dimensions - political leadership, administrative process and social 
inputs - are not necessarily incompatible with one another but each has its own distinct 
features. Figure 4-2 summarises the fundamental idea of the framework described 
above and provides a basis upon which to explore the local policy process in this study. 
The lines between the dimensions denote the interplay between competing forces. The 
relationships are explained further in the rest of this chapter. 
Political 
Leadership 
Administrative Social 
Process Input Politics 
dFigure 4-2ý Throe DImanslonal Model of Local Polloy-Moking 
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Political Leadership and Administrative Process 
'llie expected role of bureaucratic organisations is to carry out the commitments 
of the political leadership (Byme, 1990,191). 'Mis is still seen as the role of the 
management team in connection with its responsibility for 'the efficient and effective 
implementation of the Council's programmes and policies' (Gyford et al., 1989,114). 
Officials have a duty to provide assistance to members, and adn-dnistrative organisations 
are expected to follow the policy priorities set by the political representatives. In this 
respect, the political leadership is in a position to instruct (Hill, 1986) the adn-dnistrative 
organisation with the formal authority of personnel and financial management. 
However, there is certainly interdependence between the two dimensions 
(Gyford, et al., 1989,131-60). The mobilisation of administrative actors is crucial for 
the political leadership to put policies into effect in local government. Usually it is the 
case that political values are taken into account rather than professional rationality by 
the political leadership (Laffin and Young 1985,42). These political values should be 
matched with technical rationality responding to functional imperatives (O'Leary, 1987, 
370) during the administrative process 18. 
It is a well-known fact that administrative actors - particularly top civil servants 
and council chief officers (Burch and Wood, 1990,38) - affect the political leadership 
through their interactions. O'Leary (1987,383) gives an example of the bureaucratic 
politics appearing in the organisation of education in London. Lobbying of an 
adn-dnistrative network crossing local government decisively undern-dned the declared 
party-political rationale behind the two-tier metropolitan system. The main resources of 
administrative actors, in this case, include professional expertise (Jones and Stewart, 
1982,75; Chandler, 1988,54) and information (Goodin, 1982; Gray and Jenkins, 1985, 
18. Laffin and Young conducted interviews with a range of chief officers in a number of 
authorities. They concluded that the principle of mutuality between the political 
leadership and administrative actors could be disrupted by political partisanship, 
financial restraint and member assertiveness (Laffin and Young, 1985,42). 
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68). Possession of technical knowledge and infonnation gives discretionary power to 
the officials. Officials can shape the policy choices so that councillors may take them 
(Midwinter, 1984,475). 
While the political actors are sensitive to values and interests, the administrative 
actors are expected to pursue rational efficiency in the policy process. For example, the 
adn-dnistrative actors are interested in the feasibility of programmes including economic 
and administrative rationality. They also ensure the continuity of administration despite 
the oscillations of political leadership. 
Particularly in non-partisan local authorities, public officials are likely to control 
policy-making. This means the political leadership is weak or cannot show a specific 
policy priority on a service. A good example is the hung-council where no single party 
is dominant (Hill, 1972). Laffin and Young (1985,52) present empirical evidence that 
chief officers working for hung-councils find themselves almost inevitably drawn into 
the political process. Chief officers find themselves involved in giving advice on 
political tactics. 
Finally, the relationship between the two dimensions can be affected by the level 
of central influencel9. The administrative branches are the major channel through 
which the central government exerts influence on local policies. The more influence the 
centre exerts on the locality, the more the administrative actors are likely to have 
relative discretion in relation to the political leadership within local authorities. 
Needless to say, personalities can also bring differences to the relationship between the 
two dimensions. 
19. From a longitudinal perspective, the economic situation can have considerable 
implications for the member-officer relationship. Laffin and Young (1985 , 42) show that budgeting choices become much tougher under conditions of constraint. The 
opportunity costs of any new service provision have to be confronted in the form of 
competing priorities. The zero-sum conditions of standstill make it difficult to adjust to 
making trade-offs in service expenditure. 
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It is a normative requirement that policies be decided by the social needs of the 
society (Boyne, 1989,127). Local authorities must ensure public support from the 
community by meeting these social demands if they are to survive. First and foremost, 
the government's political leadership is largely formulated on the basis of the political 
commitments manifested through the electoral system. Secondly, it may be forced to 
take action by pressure groups (Chandler, 1988,97) in policy-making. 
However, it would be naive to assume that the political leadership merely 
responds to the social inputs from the local environment. Political leaders themselves 
can take initiatives and function as change-agents as well. They can dominate the 
general public, claiming a mandate from the electorate as justification for attempting to 
carry out their own programmes (Burch and Wood, 1989,37). T'herefore, in theory, a 
conflict exists between the discretion desired by political leadership and the requirement 
of democratic responsiveness to social environments. 
The points of contact between the political leadership and the society are 
manifold and inter-linked. The lines of issue politics are crossed by those of group 
politics. As an example, area-based territory (Warde, 1986,33) which is another 
important unit for the political leadership (Stoker and Wilson, 1986,292; Stoker, 1988) 
is crossed by the pressure to be in ideological line. According to Green, nonetheless, 
ward councillors are much better informed about policies affecting their wards (Green 
1981,159). 
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Most policies involve a lengthy period of interaction between the adn-dnistrative 
agencies and the target groups. The goals of policies are interpreted and are put into 
effect by administrative actors. Analysts say that filtering of social inputs is commonly 
made by the administrative actors during this process. 
Inevitably, target groups have frequent contacts with administrative actors. 
Particularly in the case of divisible social policy, an individual's first line of approach is 
likely to be the administrative branch of local authorities. In Hampton's survey (1970, 
139), 64 per cent of the Sheffield respondents mentioned the administration as their first 
line of approach; but if disappointed, either by the administration or elsewhere, then 42 
per cent would approach their political representative. The NOP/ Widdicombe survey 
also reports that roughly 50 percent of respondents had been in touch with their council 
offices while about 25 percent had contacted councillors (Gyford et A, 1989,244). It 
may be that an individual has not enough resources to mobilise the political leadership 
and that policies are put into effect mostly by administrative actors in the policy 
process. 
In the case of indivisible social policies, there are likely to be more organised 
interests (Gamble, 1988,17). The target groups are often well-organised with a certain 
amount of resources. As a result, local departments keep multiple networks (Knoke and 
Kuklinski, 1982; Scott, 1991) of relationships with the users of services. Each part can 
mobilise the others to pursue their own goals. However, there are inequalities in the 
resources and access opportunities between target groups: every target group does not 
exercise the same level of power in local policy-making. 
Turning to the relationship between administrative process and target groups, in 
principle, the administrative actors are expected to respond to the social demands. This 
is why any administrative discretion is often discussed in an alarn-dst manner. Public 
scepticism arises to administrative actors particularly when there is a growing gap 
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between the societal problems which professionals are expected to deal with, and their 
perceived capacity for dealing with them. 
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4.4. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to develop understanding of the significant 
dimensions of local policy-making and to establish a general model to be employed for 
empirical analysis in this study. The underlying intention was to display 
methodological issues in analysing policy variation in local government. The greater 
part of this chapter has focused on the development of a theoretical model for empirical 
study in the next chapters. Based upon British literature, the model was developed into 
a general one which is applicable to public policy-making in Korean local government. 
It consists of three dimensions: political leadership, administrative process and social 
inputs. 
The relationships between these dimensions are not fixed but are vulnerable to 
influences such as elections, central intervention, contingencies, personalities and so on. 
This means that the relative level of influence of each dimension is affected by the 
environment. When this point is taken into account, a more precise representation of 
the model presented in Figure 4-2 is given in Figure 4-3. It would be dogmatic to argue 
that policy-making in local government fits exclusively a certain dimension of the 
framework. Rather, the framework will provide insights into competing forces in 
policy-making in local government. This explanatory framework will be applied 
empirically in the following chapters. The next chapter will present a methodology for 
the empirical analysis of local government of Korea. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DESIGN OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the methodological framework of the empirical analysis. It 
describes general characteristics of process and output approaches in analysing policy 
variation in local governments. Afterwards, this chapter develops a research strategy 
for reconciling the output and process approaches. Full details of the research methods 
which will be used for the empirical work of this research project are explained 
throughout this chapter. The research design includes data collection, the method of the 
output analysis part and the instrumentation of the process approach part. Before 
proceeding to the details of empirical survey, the chapter starts by outlining an 
important methodological issue in policy studies. 
5.2. RECONCILING THE OUTPUT AND PROCESS APPROACHES 
Theories of social policy expenditure in local government can be almost as 
numerous as there are writers. As shown in chapters Three and Four, this study 
examines the various explanations with the output and process schema. Most previous 
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studies, in fact, can be classified into one or other of these two approaches, although 
explicit concern has rarely been drawn to this schema by the writers. 
In general, output analysis (Alt, 1971; Hoggart, 1989; Boyne 1989) develops 
reasoning from the end points of the policy process. Just as the name 'output' itself 
suggests, it focuses on the later stage of the policy process while the process approach 
(Stewart, 1983; Newton and Karran, 1985; Elcock et al., 1989; Stoker, 1988) gives 
more attention to the dynamics of the conversion process. This fact gives the two 
policy research traditions many different features. They have existed largely in 
isolation from one another and have competed for support among policy researchers. 
Output analysis tends to focus on the identification of association of policy 
outputs or policy outcomes with the socioeconomic constraints upon policy-making. In 
their distinction between policy output and the socioeconomic environment, output 
studies rely heavily upon the viewpoints of systems theory. Policy researchers in this 
tradition are keen to associate a given policy output with certain environmental factors 
within the context of available information. Macro-level comparisons of a large number 
of localities, mostly with quantitative data, are often made to produce the evidence of 
underlying relationships. This output analysis provides objective and observable 
information on the inter-variable relationships. Ibis feature often enables the output 
analysis to be adopted in current hypothesis-testing studies (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
However, output analysis can be criticised from various points of view. Its 
shortcomings are found just where its strengths are observed. More than anything else, 
macro-level comparison of a large number of localities gives only a superficial picture 
of the research question. In other words, the generalisability of research findings is 
ensured at the cost of a lack of detailed information. Secondly, statistical inference is 
over-stressed at the cost of logical inference. The main defence of the statistical 
technique is that it is very much objective and systematic. However, statistical 
association does not necessarily mean that there is a cause and effect relationship 
between the variables (Hill and Bramley, 1986,154). Rather, there seems to be a 
danger that the existence of certain policy phenomena is denied by output analysts if 
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those phenomena are difficult to quantify. For example, adequate attention is not drawn 
to the exercise of power - for instance, non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1963) - which is a concept central to the study of politics. 'Mirdly, it is not easy to get 
any specific solution to the problems found in the researches because of their concern 
with end-products rather than with the procedural elements in policy-making. In any 
case, statistical associations do not explain HOW the black box works lying between 
socioeconomic inputs and policy outputs. Lieberson (1985,115) makes the point that 
explanation of a variable's variation should not be confused with an explanation of the 
process itself. Contrary to the assumption commonly made in policy research, 
according to Lieberson, 'we cannot learn the fundamental cause of an event by studying 
the factors affecting its variation'. 
In contrast, process approach, which relies mostly on a micro-level case studyl, 
assumes the primacy of political process in local policy-making. Newton and Karran 
(1985) summarise this point briefly by saying that local spending does not rise 
automatically in response to changing population patterns. For this thing to happen 
political decisions must be taken, political policies and priorities must be adopted, and 
political issues about budgets have to be resolved (Newton and Karran, 1985,67). 
Newton and Karran go on to say that increases in local spending are not simply an 
involuntary response to changing social and economic circumstances. Social and 
economic changes can have no implication for local budgets unless and until politicians 
recognise them and act accordingly. Stoker and Wilson (1986) put this idea again in the 
following way: 
1. A definition that fits the notion of case study as used in this research is by Bennett 
(1983,93) who defines the concept as referring to a fairly intensive examination of a 
single unit. This case study is a useful method for exploring processes in organisations 
with exploratory purposes (Gummesson, 1991,75). Yin (1984,13) distinguishes three 
types of uses of case study research: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. The 
exploratory case study refers to a pilot study that can form a basis for formulaitng more 
precise questions or testable hypotheses for further studies. The descriptive case study 
limits its scope merely to discription whilst the explanatory case study extends it to 
explanation. However, it is extremely difficult to find three types in isolation 
(Gummesson, 1991,76) 
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..... it would seem that the adn-dnistrative routines, power structures and 
conflicts of interest within local authorities can affect policy processes by 
modifying and mediating external influences ..... In short, the internal politics of local authorities reflect not only an ability to make choices in the context of 
external influences, but also a facility for taking initiatives and independent 
action (Stoker and Wilson, 1986,285-286). 
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However, this emphasis on process approach is often inadequate because of the 
lack of comparative infon-nation in a wider context. Exclusive focus on a single case 
decontextualises the case which is in question. Secondly, process approach gives 
inadequate attention to the ultimate effects of procedural factors on policy outputs. At 
best, the process approach tends to exaggerate the influence of certain procedural 
variables on policy-making without any objective evidences. It lacks concern about the 
ultimate effects of selected variables on policy outputs. Finally, it is plagued by a 
perennial measurement problem. As generally recognised, the process approach has a 
tendency towards impressionistic interpretation of the data in a non-standardized way. 
Its 'isolated, episodic description' has been subject to criticisms in the study of policy- 
making (Heclo, 1972,90; Ribbins and Brown, 1979,189). In addition to these, the case 
study deals with only a few cases - notably a single and atypical case2 - which appear to 
be exceptional in their nature. All of these are crucial flaws of the process approach 
significantly limiting the generalisability of its findings. 
A brief comparison of the two approaches is illustrated in Table 5-1. It 
illustrates the features of the two research methods in policy analysis. Different 
conceptions of each method probably account for the vehemence with which they are 
either attacked or defended. It has hardly been recognised that certain aspects are better 
examined by means of output analysis whilst, others are better tackled by the process 
approach. 
2. There are three kinds of cases: the typical, the deviant and the extreme types (Sjoberg 
and Nett, 1968,144). 
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<Table 5-1> A Comparison ofProcess and Output Approaches 
Process Approach Output Analysis 
1. Focus of Conversion Process Policy Outputs or 
Research Policy Outcomes 
2. Research Explanation of Identification of 
Concern Political Dynamics Policy Variation 
within the Black Box in Relation to 
Environments 
3. Types of Generating a Testing a Set of 
Research Theory or Insights Hypotheses 
4. Number of Very Limited Many Cases 
Cases (Mostly One or (Cross-Sectional 
Two Cases) or Time-Series) 
5. Main Intensive Generalisation of 
Value Understanding Research Findings 
6. Kind of Tends to be Mostly Quantitative 
information- Qualitative 
(Can be Quantitative) 
7. Patterns Logical Statistical 
of Inference Inference Inference 
8. Handling Subjective & Objective & 
of Data Impressionistic Systematic 
9. Selection Non-probability Random or 
of Cases Sampling Non-random 
Sampling (A Case is 
Selected because it 
is of Importance 
and of Interest) 
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As an attempt to bridge the two methods, this study employs two main stages of 
empirical research. The first approach focuses on the end-product distribution of the 
local budget. The main issue is how much do budgetary decisions differ between 
localities and what implications do socio-economic factors have in this context. This 
issue is to be exan-dned by the statistical analysis of budgetary outputs. This involves 
computation of the expenditure variations in local social policies, the impact of socio- 
economic factors and the effects of urban hierarchy. In order to ensure the practical 
value of this research, 1992 budgetary data (estimates of 1992 budget to be more 
precise) are to be used in this study. This will reflect the effects of policy activities 
played by the local council which was newly established in early 1991. 
At the second stage, based on the analysis of the first stage, efforts are made to 
explore which procedural factors determine the variations in the local budgetary 
outcomes, to what extent and in which way. The main focus is on the comparison of 
two extreme case localities. The framework for analysing local expenditure decisions 
has already been established in the earlier chapters and consists of three dimensions: the 
ideological dimension of political leadership, the administrative dimension of 
organisations and the environmental dimension of social input politics. 
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5.3. OUTPUT ANALYSIS METHOD 
The Level and Unit of Analysis 
104 
The significance of the level of analysis should be borne in mind in any 
methodological discussion. It would be potentially fallacious to assume that the 
linkages at one level need occur at another level (Lieberson, 1985,107). Lieberson 
(1985,117) argues that a theory must indicate the appropriate level of analysis, and this 
must be made explicit because there is otherwise a danger of leaping to the wrong level. 
Although some empirical evidences obtained at a lower level can be relevant for 
deterrnining the validity of a theory for higher level of analysis in policy process, the 
higher level of analysis is not simply a function of the summation of the subunits but 
deserves a separate investigation. 
In this study, two tiers of local government are available for empirical research 
in Korea (see Figure 6-5 in chapter Six). The first tier comprises the metropolitan 
government, which is equivalent to the previous metropolitan counties of England, and 
includes 1 special city (Seoul), 5 direct control cities and 9 provinces. The special city, 
Seoul, is under the control of the Prime Minister whereas the five direct control cities 
and nine provinces are answerable to the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
This study examines the larger of the two local government tiers in Korea. 
There are two practical reasons for this choice. First of all, the basic tier governments 
have been extremely limited in their policy autonomy. They are directly answerable to 
the large tier local authorities which exist under the central government. This 
hierarchical structure of the unitary local system leaves the basic tier local authorities 
little room for manoeuvre in terms of expenditure decisions. Secondly, the councillors 
in the basic tier localities are not entitled to have party membership. They are expected 
to manage local affairs as administrators rather than as political decision-makers. This 
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means that it is difficult to measure any party effects on policy-making in the basic tier 
localities. As a consequence, despite the fact that the basic tier localities are more 
accessible for data collection, they have been excluded. The large tier of the local 
government system remains the most suitable level in this cross-sectional analysis of 
'local' policy-making. 
The choice of level of analysis has direct implications for the unit of analysis in 
this study. In theory, various targets can be the unit of analysis to which case study 
methods are applied. They range widely from single human beings to a locality, policy 
area and even country. In this study, however, where the main research question 
concerns the distribution of public expenditure by each local authority, local 
government is the unit of analysis. Accordingly the 15 metropolitan authorities become 
the units of analysis in this study. 
Data Sources and Collection 
Research data for the output analysis in this part come mostly from the official 
government publications, in particular, the Statistical Year-books of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs and the Regional Statistics of Seoul Special City and the Kyonggi local 
govemments. 
It should be mentioned that the data collection for the output analysis was 
extremely difficult. The need for the 1992 statistics was the main source of the 
difficulties. Since the previous data had been made without considering the policy 
activities of the newly-established local councils, a more appropriate analysis needed to 
acquire the 1992 data to reflect the changed local environment. Fortunately, a personal 
route to the Ministry of Home Affairs was found and the related data were released for 
this research before being officially distributed by the Ministry. 
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Technique of Analysis 
An approach to the summation of quantitative data is comparison of OLS 
regression coefficients. The regression technique is a flexible statistical method 
employed to identify the relationship between a dependent variable and a set of 
independent variables. This technique is useful in the analysis of the direction of 
relationships between the variables. 
The use of regression techniques in policy studies has been subjected to various 
criticisms (Lewis-Beck, 1977,563; Foster et al., 1980,423; Midwinter et al., 1987,37). 
Most of the criticisms are basically either about the prerequisites of precise regression 
analysis or about the construction of a valid causal structure between variables. The 
omission of indirect effects of socio-econon-lic variables is pointed out by Lewis-Beck 
(1977) while the underlying assumptions made when using the regression technique are 
challenged by Foster et al. (1980). The problem of collinearity in the assessment of 
local expenditure needs is pointed out by Midwinter and his colleagues (1987). 
However, the regression technique is employed here to assess the direction of 
statistical relationships between the same kinds of quantitative variables which do not 
need to be standardized. This is to say that two fundamental problems are not 
meaningful in this study. Special efforts are made to refine and reclassify the existing 
sets of independent variables here. Independent variables are categorised in this study 
based on the nature of variables throughout the literature review. In addition, adequate 
attention is paid to the problem of indirect effects between variables. As a consequence, 
this study avoids the difficulty of unstandardized coefficients and the problem of 
indirect effects which exists in the 'orthodox' study on the relative importance between 
socioeconomic and political variables. 
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5.4. PROCESS APPROACH METHOD 
The research adopts a case study approach for the exploration of local policy- 
making processes. As a matter of fact, the process approach itself is taken as a 
synonym for the case study method by most policy researchers. This is mainly because 
process studies need an in-depth explanation of a limited number of research targets. 
Because the general nature of the case study method was examined above, the following 
section describes only the empirical details of this research. 
The Selection of Cases 
The exploration of the procedural factors in this study is based on case studies of 
two local authorities. The major difficulties in the design of the empirical research were 
encountered at the stage of case selection. Several points of a theoretical and practical 
nature need mentioning. 
From a theoretical point of view, the case study is one of the research methods 
which have scarcely been discussed whilst being frequently employed for policy studies 
in practice. It is often confused with the burgeoning use of qualitative3 research (Yin, 
1984,25; Bryman, 1990,87) but, in fact, the concept of a case study itself is a non- 
specified one like, a comparative study and a statistical technique. It refers neither to 
any particular approach to policy research nor to any particular feature of the data. 
The only thing that is meant by a case study is an intensive exploration of the limited 
number - mostly o7he - of samples4. Almost four decades ago, Goode and Hatt (1952, 
3. Qualitative measurement has to do with the kinds of data or information that are 
collected (Patton, 1980,22). In contrast, what is meant by the term 'case study' is that 
the number of cases is extremely limited to ensure the 'depth and details' of data 
collected. 
4. Charles Ragin (Ragin, 1989,57) describes the frequency distribution showing the 
number of empirical studies conducted in the last quarter century plotted by sample 
size. He argues that the U-shaped plot shows much concentration of studies There is a 
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339) made the point that the case study is essentially a means of organising data rather 
than a technique for gathering it5. It can incorporate a number of separate techniques, 
each of which illun-dnates certain aspects of a situation. 
In this study, the selection of cases raised several theoretical questions during 
the process of research design. Firstly, the question of case selection was raised, as in 
any other case study. Which localities are to be selected and for what reasons? 6 It is a 
well-known fact that most case studies have devoted insufficient attention to the 
conceptual and theoretical underpinning of their case selections. Their illogical jump 
into practical manageability largely erodes the theoretical implications of those studies, 
and the adequacy of the case study method itself, although excuses for case selection are 
usually presented. It seems that methodological adequacy is seriously threatened by the 
practical and personal factors in Booth's continuum (Booth, 1988,1990). 
In this research, two case localities were selected for empirical study in an 
attempt to maximise the theoretical implications of the case study method. Two 
localities which deserve more detailed exploration were chosen after output analysis. 
Of special note is that two extreme cases were selected out of 15 units of analysis, of 
which one shows the highest and the other the lowest level of expenditure in the social 
policy area. The comparison of the two extreme cases is expected to sharpen the 
contrast between the procedural features which otherwise might easily be obscured. 
sharp drop-off in the number of studies with sample sizes in the middle range - from 
five or so to about thirty cases- and then, at about forty or fifty cases, the number of 
studies increases with increasing sample size. 
5. The case study method used to be employed in policy research for a variety of 
reasons: when events need to be approached in a detailed way with actors' own 
perceptions (Booth, 1981,28); when a given phenomenon needs to be tackled from a 
variety of angles (Glennerster et al., 1983,7); and where the data being sought is 
relatively difficult to obtain for large number of cases etc. Under those needs, types of 
topics to which case studies are applied range widely from a single person to a locality 
and a policy area. Many potential cases usually come to be included in a single case 
study. In this situation, the judgement of what is the case depends purely on the 
theoretical construction of the preliminary study. 
6. Those writers who employ a case study method have devoted insufficient attention to 
the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of their selection of cases. Accordingly 
their theoretical implications are restricted by atheoretical leap into certain cases 
although there are usually several justifications suggested in practical terms. The 
theoretical conclusions in those studies are seriously threatened by omitting theoretical 
logics in selecting research targets. 
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The second question raised in the research design was more specific and 
practical. What is meant by policy variations? The picture of policy variations appears 
different under different criteria. Traditionally, adequate attention has not been given in 
either Korea or Britain to the question of different dimensions of policy variation7. At 
least four different criteria were identified in analysing the expenditure variations in 
social policies of Korean local government. These include: 
A. Proportion of social policy expenditure in local budget 
B. Per capita social policy expenditure 
C. Number of recipients of public services in the field of social policies 
D. Amount of redistributive benefits per recipient 
Conventionally, there have been two methods of standardisation for expenditure 
figures. One is to focus on the aspect of target groups which benefit from social 
policies (Hoggart, 1989,35) as in C and D. The other is to use the figures of total 
population as in B, which has been most frequently adopted in the output analyses8. Of 
course, each of the two criteria illun-dnates different spheres of expenditure variation in 
7. Output studies which employ either the cross-sectional or time-series methods rarely 
base their analysis on absolute expenditure figures (Hoggart, 1989,35). To do so would 
lead to the simplistic conclusion that local expenditure is decided by the size of 
governments. Hoggart insists that the effects of size should be 'removed' to make 
useful comparisons. 
8. Criterion B might be the best measure with which the output analysts infer a direct 
interlink between the socioeconon-dc variables and the governmental policy outcomes. 
Hoggart raises scepticism against this most common criterion. 
..... expenditure levels are not simply determined by current decisions, but 
carry within them past policy comn-dtments (most visibly seen in debt 
repayments). Hence, cities which have lost population have to carry costs 
from earlier days when the population they served was larger. It therefore 
comes as no surprise to find that older, declining cities have higher expenditure 
levels than those with more stable populations (Listokin and Beaton, 1983; 
Dye, 1984) (Hoggart, 1989,36). 
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social policies. For example, C and D can highlight the distribution of divisible 
(individual) services, whilst B can illuminate the indivisible (collective) and divisible 
(individual) services together. There appear to be pay-off relationships when these 
criteria are employed to explain policy variations between local authorities. For one 
thing, criterion D can measure the extent of social policy benefits and criterion C shows 
the relative width of spread in social policy benefits. In this case, criterion D leaves the 
range of redistributive benefits unexplained whilst C does not give attention to the 
adequacy of service provision. Criterion B, which has been most frequently adopted in 
existing studies, measures the magnitude of social policy benefits distributed to the 
individual resident. However, in this case, criterion B can give some distorted data by 
not distinguishing indivisible services from divisible services. 
In this study, criterion A is employed to explore the variations in social policies 
between local governments in Korea. It should be borne in mind that this study 
basically aims to measure the relative welfare efforts of the local government. Criterion 
A suits this purpose and it does provide the best measure of expenditure standardisation 
about the willingness of a local government. The selection of criterion A needs further 
analytical clarification. More than anything else, social policy as defined in this study 
ranges from individual to collective services. This range of services covered by the 
concept of social policy excludes consideration of the last two criteria C and D. Criteria 
C and D do not encompass indivisible (collective) services such as fire, police and 
environment services. At the same time, this study aims to measure the relative welfare 
efforts of local government and to explore the determining factors yielding those 
varying efforts. It is not aimed at evaluating the ultimate effects or magnitude of social 
policy benefits distributed to the individual resident. Consequently, for these reasons, 
the criterion A appears well-suited to this research. 
Table 5-2 illustrates those variations in social policy expenditure across the 
localities in Korea. Only a glance at the table is needed to see how total and social 
policy expenditure vary between localities in Korea. Seoul and Kyonggi are the highest 
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and lowest spenders respectively as measured by the percentage of social policy 
expenditure in the total local budget. Consequently these two extreme cases are 
selected for the process approach in this study. Seoul, the province with the highest 
level of social policy expenditure, spent 11.37 percent more than Kyonggi in 1992. 
<Table 5-2> Variations ofLocal Expenditure on Social Policies (LESP) 
Locality A/B 
M 
LESPI) 
(A) 
TOEX2) 
(B) 
1. Seoul 28.16 890,819 3,163,140 
2. Pusan 25.69 231,105 899,564 
3. Taegu 19.56 137,442 702,800 
4. Inchon 26.22 122,773 468,262 
5. Kwangju 24.29 84,080 346,080 
6. Taejon 27.61 90,578 328,081 
7. Kyonggi 16.79 163,227 972,272 
8. Kangwon 20.34 62,510 307,286 
9. Chungbuk 24.49 61,027 249,215 
10. Chungnam 22.43 79,350 353,751 
II. Chonbuk 26.03 99,906 383,826 
12. Chonnam 23.35 103,517 443,288 
13. Kyogbuk 18.93 111,579 589,373 
14. Kyognam 17.58 110,847 630,425 
15. Cheju 24.81 31,467 126,834 
Note 1) 1) and 2) Million Won. 
Note 2) LESP: Local Expenditure on Social Policies, TOEX: Total Expenditure. 
Note 3) LESP includes education, fire, sports and culture. 
Source: Chibang Yesan Kaeyo (Summary of Local Government Budgets), Ministry of 
Home Affairs, 1992. 
Table 5-3 provides an overall comparison of the two localities. Seoul is the 
largest city in South Korea, consisting of 22 wards (Gu) employing 73,135 on full-time 
basis as of 1991 (Seoul Statistical Year Book, 1991,426). Its population size is 
10,628,790 and this population ammounts to 25 per cent of the total population in South 
Korea. Kyonggi is located adjacent to the city of Seoul. The province has experienced 
a rapid increase in population growth mainly because of immigration from other 
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localities between 1970 and 1980. The rate of population expansion in Kyonggi has far 
exceeded the average for the country. Both Seoul and Kyonggi enjoy relatively high 
levels of financial autonomy with their own sources of local finance. Seoul and 
Kyonggi show 83.3 per cent and 66.2 per cent respectively whereas the national average 
was 54.5 per cent in 1990 (National Bureau of Statistics, 1991,28). 
<Table 5-3> General Indicators of Two Case Areas 
Seoul Kyonggi 
Size 605 km2 10,773 km2 
(0.6%) (10.9%) 
Population (person) 10,627,790 6,154,000 
Employment Structure (person) 
Agriculture/ Fishery 18,000 494,000 
Manufacture/ Mining 1,223,000 707,000 
Construction 356,000 143,000 
Commerce, Food & 
Lodging 1,150,000 457,000 
Service overhead 
Capital 608,000 259,000 
Government Employees 1,932 1,576 
Source: Chiyok Tongkye Yonbo (Regional Statistical Year Book), National Bureau of 
Statistics, 1991. 
Instrumentation: Questionnaire Survey 
The main aim of the process approach is to identify the factors determining 
social policy expenditure. A comparison of these two extreme cases is expected to give 
relatively clear information about these determining factors. Of the selected case 
localities, in this study, the public officials were chosen for the empirical survey. This 
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choice was not made because they were independent policy actors who single-handedly 
framed the local policies. Rather it was made because they were working at the centre 
of the local policy process through which expenditure decisions are made. They were in 
a better position than anyone else to assess all the related policy actors. 
The information on the policy-making process of the two selected case areas 
was collected mainly by questionnaire survey. According to Bailey (1987), the chief 
goal of questionnaire survey is to construct an instrument that will not only minimize 
non-response, but will also ensure that the infon-nation collected was complete, valid 
and reliable. Particularly in a structured questionnaire the respondent is clearer about 
what is asked and therefore time can be saved. Uniforn-dty of data collected through a 
structured questionnaire also makes it easier to code and to make comparison of the 
respondents' answers. 
Basically, in this research, the construction of the survey questionnaire was 
detern-dned by the conceptual model developed in the theoretical chapters. The three 
dimensions of the conceptual model were incorporated into the questionnaire items 
focusing on the 1992 local budgetary decision making process. These draft survey 
questions were checked in pilot interviews with local officials who were attending the 
Graduate School of Public Adn-dnistration in Yonsei University in November 1991. 
These pilot interviews were helpful in reducing the risk of pre-judging the related 
variables. 
In the end, the survey questionnaire consisted of 24 questions which could be 
categorised into four main parts; 1) measurement of each policy actors' influence level 
2) assessment of policy actor's interest mediation 3) policy resources and strategies 
employed by each policy actor and 4) others, including incrementalist mode of policy- 
making. All the detailed survey questions are presented in Appendix 6. As shown in 
Appendix 6, respondents were asked to assess each policy actor on a five point scale 
ranging from I to 5 in most survey questions. Additionally, an open-ended item was 
added to the survey questionnaire in an attempt to overcome the practical limitations of 
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the structured questionnaird. Since the question was open-ended in that responses 
were neither categorised nor specified, respondents could think up their own answers 
(de Vaus, 1991,86). It is generally recognised that the major advantages of open-ended 
questions are their flexibility and depth (Berger and Patchner, 1988,20). The 
r espondent is free to respond his or her own words in open-ended questions since the 
question supplies a frame of reference but puts a n-dnimum of restraint on the 
respondents' answer. In this study, some statements were provided on the open-ended 
question which were difficult to get with the structured questions. For example, as 
explained in chapter Six, fifteen kinds of different responses were provided to the 
question 'What would you think of the local government reforrns? What do you think is 
the most notable change during the last yearT. 
During the conduct of the empirical survey, when necessary, unstructured 
interviews were undertaken with a very limited number of key public officials like the 
Director of Local Tax, Ministry of Home Affairs. This strategy was helpful for 
supplementing the data from the structured survey questionnaire (Glennerster et al., 
1983,254). 
Sampling and Survey Implementation 
Sampling is considered crucial in ensuring generalisability of the survey 
findings. In this study, survey population (that is, public officials in Seoul and Kyonggi 
local authorities) was limited so deciding the sample size was not a matter of statistical 
9. In a structured questionnaire, the appropriate category for answer may not be 
provided. More important is the possibility that significant questions may not be 
included in the survey questionnaire. Finally, a structured questionnaire has the danger 
of guiding the answers of respondents. 
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justification. Rather it was a matter of feasibility considering the difficulties in 
approaching public officials who are known to like the notice 'Keep Out Please'. 
Table 5-4 surnmarises the sampling distribution of this survey. Based on the 
conceptual model, the sampling should be made to reflect both cross-sectional and inter- 
policy area characteristics. Tberefore, firstly, the sample size of 250 was equally 
distributed between Seoul (125) and Kyonggi localities (125). This was so because the 
size of the population in each strata was not notably different and the same size samples 
helped in making comparison between the two different groups. Secondly, the same 
distribution was made between the social policy (63) and the economic policy area (62) 
in each local government. In the case of the social policy area, a stratified sampling 
method was partly adopted. The total sample of 63 in Seoul and 62 in Kyonggi was 
distributed to the strata proportional to its representation in the population. 
<Table 5-4> Sample Size and Distribution (person) 
Name of Bureau Sample Size TNPE 
Seoul 
Health & Social Welfare Bureau 42 115 
Family Welfare Bureau 21 58 
Industry & Econon-dc Affairs Bureau 62 124 
Kyonggi 
Health & Social Welfare Bureau 46 101 
Fan-lily Welfare Bureau 16 34 
Regional Economic Division 63 95 
Total 250 527 
Note) TNPE: Total Number of Public Employees in the Bureau. 
Source: Seoul Statistical Year Book, Seoul City Government, 1991 and Statistical Year 
Book of Kyonggi, Kyonggi Local Government, 199 1. 
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Ile survey was conducted by the researcher during the months of December 
1991 and January 1992. The British Council provided the financial support for the 
implementation of this field survey. 
The survey relied mainly on the self-administration method. This process 
depended heavily on two advisers: a University professor and the Director of Local 
Tax, Ministry of Home Affairs. These two advisers have considerable experience of 
administering survey questionnaires not only in theory but also in practice. By the help 
of these two advisers, prior briefings about the content of the questionnaire could be 
made for the respondents to ensure adequate understanding of the survey questions. 
The respondents were told that participation was voluntary and that their responses 
would remain confidential. In the end, the survey questionnaires were delivered to 250 
public officials in Seoul and Kyonggi at the same time in December 1991. Of the 250 
surveyed, 222 returned a completed questionnaire, giving a response rate of 88 percent. 
This unusually high response rate was firstly due to the carefully planning and design of 
the questionnaire. The high response rate can also be attributed to the fact that the two 
established advisers helped the whole process of survey administration. 
Validity and Reliability 
Validity refers to the success of the instrument in measuring what is sets out to 
estimate. This validity of a measurement detern-dnes the plausibility of one ever-present 
rival explanation of research findings (Dooley, 1990,94). Therefore, when the validity 
of an instrument is satisfactory, differences between individuals' scores can be taken as 
representing true differences in the characteristics under study (Moser and Kalton, 1985, 
355). There are three main ways of assessing validity (Wilkin and Thompson, 1989,9): 
content validity, criterion validity and construct validity. Content validity is the 
simplest of these, where the emphasis is placed on ensuring that the measure'apparently 
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reflects the content of the concept in question (Bryman and Cramer, 1990,72). 
Criterion validity is based upon comparisons between the results obtained using the 
measure in question and some alternative measure, either of the same concept or of 
outcomes which might be expected to reflect results obtained using the measure (Wilkin 
and Thompson, 1989,9). Finally, construct validity involves looking at whether the 
results support the hypotheses that were used to construct the measure in the first place. 
Despite these various approaches to measuring the validity of measures, the 
notion of validity is of little practical use in questionnaire surveys. The most serious 
problem of validity lies in the lack of empirical methods to test or ensure it. In the case 
of criterion validity, of course, the validity coefficient is suggested by several advocates 
like Dooley (1990,95). A criterion, in this case, is an existing measure that is accepted 
as an adequate indicator of the characteristic of interest. Criterion validation consists of 
correlating the criterion with the new measure that is being assessed for validity. The 
correlation of the new measure with the criterion measure is the criterion validity 
coefficient. However, it is highly questionable whether every researcher has an existing 
criterion that is explicitly defined and accepted as an adequate indicator of the 
characteristic of interest. 
As an attempt to test for the construct validity of the questions, in this study, the 
survey questions which had been deduced from related theories were submitted for 
critical appraisal by two advisers from the academic and practical field of local 
government. The relevance of and understandability were increased through 
discussions with the advisers. Also, a pre-test was conducted prior to December 1991. 
Fifteen questionnaires were administered to public officials of Seoul local government 
for this pre-test. 
As a result, considerable changes were made to the questionnaire before being 
set out. Public officials in local governments were found to be able to understand most 
technical terms appearing in the questionnaire. The results of the pilot study indicated 
that almost all of the respondents were university-educated and were usually involved 
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with such terms. However, two kinds of major amendment were suggested by the 
results of the pre-test. Firstly, a main amendment resulting from the pre-test was a 
change in the wording of several questions which did not appear to mean the same thing 
to the respondents as to the researcher. For one thing the term 'government authorities' 
in the questionnaire was always interpreted as central authorities by respondents. A 
much more severe problem was found in the number of survey questions. It was 
suggested that the number of survey questions should be reduced greatly. It consisted 
of 38 questions before the pre-test. Five out of 13 collected questionnaires were left 
unanswered in their latter half. It seemed that an excessive list of survey questions 
might lead respondents to refuse to answer or to give distorted answers. The inference 
was that the low response rate might indicate problems not only of validity but also of 
reliability. 
The notion of reliability is concerned with the consistency of measures (Wilkin 
and Thompson, 1989,11). Unlike in validity, three types of reliability measures are 
often used in empirical studies: test-retest reliability, split-half reliability and Cronbach 
alpha. The correlation of scores from two administrations of the same test estimates 
test-retest reliability. This is a method which has ideally been suggested to test external 
reliabilitylO. The split-half method splits the test into two parts (either randomly or on 
an odd-even basis) and correlates one half with the other half. A coefficient is 
calculated, ranging from 0 to 1, and interpreted in the same way as Pearson's correlation 
coefficient (Bryman and Cramer, 1990,71). The Cronbach's alpha which is widely 
used at present generates the average of all possible split-half reliability coefficients. 
Again, the result varies between 0 and 1 and the nearer the result is to 1- preferably at 
or over 0.8 - the more internally reliable is the scale. In this study, Cronbach's alpha is 
employed to test the reliability of the survey results. A reliability of 0.82 was produced 
by the Cronbach's alpha method. 
10. External reliability refers to the extent of consistency of a measure over time while 
internal reliability means the degree of consistency between item scales in a single 
survey at any one time. 
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5.5. CONCLUSION 
119 
The methodological framework has been explained in this chapter. Firstly, this 
chapter examined the methodological issues in analysing policy variation in local 
governments from the point of view of process and output approaches. Secondly, a 
reconciliation of the output and process approaches was proposed and a two-stage 
strategy was developed for the empirical survey of this research. The next stage of the 
study is to conduct an empirical analysis. Following this chapter is a series of empirical 
analyses of expenditure decisions on local social policies in Korea. First, though, 
chapter Six describes the context of the Korean local government system particularly 
concerning recent decentralisation in 199 1. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
REFORM 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to depict what changes have been made by the 
recent reforms in Korean local government and how these changes are related to the 
social and political contexts. Particular concern will be given to examining the 
background of the local government reforms for decentralisation in 1991. This will 
provide informative accounts of local policy-making in Korea. 
The chapter consists of two parts. The first section depicts the social and 
political environment which has accelerated decentralisation over the period of the last 
three decades. As in any country, it is essential to understand Korean local government 
in the context of the society in which it operates. The significance of this historical 
trend will be traced back to the government's role in the 'development era' during the 
last three decades. The second part of this chapter reviews the 1991 local government 
reforms in terms of the process of decentralisation, the main issues of the reforms and 
the changes and continuities after the reforms. Finally, an effort will be made to 
evaluate the consequences of the 1991 reforms. 
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The past three decades are often labelled as the period of economic development 
and industrialisation in Korea. The growth of per capita GNP (expressed in current 
prices) provides a ready indication of the rate of economic change during this period, 
increasing from $80 in 1960 to $6,200 in 1990 ($ refers to US dollars in this paper). 
Over the years from 1961 to 1970, GNP growth averaged 8.5 percent, compared to 3.7 
percent between 1953 and 1960 (EPB, 1985,1990). Although industrialisation was 
spurred by foreign investment in its early stage, Korea is now being geared towards 
technology-intensive industries. Rapid development has made her a competitor in the 
world market. 
Many factors have contributed to these changes. Some writers point to 
leadership factors (Lee, 1982,293; Cotton, 1991), others to cultural traditiod (Song, 
1990; Foster-Carter, 1992,28) and others to international environments (Choi, 1976, 
157-161; Lee, 1982,293; Lim, 1986). Foster-Carter (1987,252-253; 1992 19) lists 
over 20 factors which different authorities have pin-pointed as significant in this 
context. Of these variables2, this study is concerned with the part played by the 
government. Korea's recent industrialisation cannot be fully understood without a 
careful examination of the influence exerted by the government. As a matter of fact, 
considerable agreement exists among writers exploring the Korean development about 
the pervasive influence of the government. The seeds of recent decentralisation can be 
found in the government's role in the development era. The basic contours of the 1991 
1. In particular, Confucianism is said to contribute to industrialisation with its emphasis 
on learning and meritocratic bureaucracy which is useful for mobilizing the skilled 
man-power required for industrialisation. 
2. The development experience of South Korea offers an outstanding case example for 
comparative analysis of differing development approaches. See James Cotton (1992) 
"Understanding the State in South Korea: bureaucratic-authoritarian or state autonomy 
theory? ", Comparative Political Studies, 24, pp 19-35. Of course, there is no single 
unifying theme to an explanation of the Korean development. Nonetheless, it is not 
difficult to summarise the features of the processes: 1) an outward-looking development 
strategy; 2) human resource-based strategies in its initial stage 3) government-led 
policies in the major areas. 
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reforms began to evolve into their current form before the changes in laws and 
institutions took affect in 199 1. 
Government's Role in the Development Era 
In general, the government has various means of public intervention in almost 
every social sphere. Accordingly, the role of the government appears to be different in 
respect of different theoretical perspectives3. However, the real magnitude of the 
government's roles and functions is hardly captured by an impressionistic theory. A 
more analytical approach is desperately needed in order to grasp the actual degree of 
governmental intervention in any country. The explanation of the role played by the 
Korean government is no exception here. It is necessary to conceptualise governmental 
activities in a more systematic way on more specified fields (Raggin, 1989). This study 
traces the pervasive roles played by the government in Korea under four different 
functions: government budget, public corporation, fiscal and monetary inducement and 
regulatory policies. 
Government Budget 
In the industrial democracies, the first instrument which governments use to 
achieve their socio-political objectives is the national budget. Because nearly all 
policies involve spending (Booth, 1979), the national budget comes to play a crucial 
role in the modern state. During the process of budget-making (resource mobilisation) 
3. Chapter Two examined how different views were presented of local government in 
the field of state theory. 
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and of its distribution (resource allocation) the government plays the decisive role in 
allocating social benefits. 
The national budget, in this vein, is the window through which a synopsis of the 
national policy priorities can be observed. Table 6-1 shows a relative comparison of 
governmental consumption among selected countries. The table shows that the relative 
size of the Korean government's consumption is much smaller than that of the other 
selected countries, except Japan. The government's consumption in Korea has hovered 
around 10 percent of GDP during the past three decades. 
<Table 6-1> Comparison of Government Consumption in Selected Five Countries, 
1962-1990 (Percentage of GDP) 
Year 
U. K. France Germany Japan Korea 
1962 17.0 13.5 15.0 8.7 14.4 
1966 17.2 13.3 15.7 9.6 10.3 
1970 18.1 12.4 15.9 8.2 14.8 
1972 19.0 12.3 17.7 9.1 11.3 
1976 21.5 14.9 20.2 9.8 11.2 
1980 21.3 15.5 20.1 9.8 11.2 
1982 21.9 16.5 20.4 9.9 11.5 
1986 20.7 19.2 19.9 9.7 10.1 
1990 19.9 18.3 18.4 9.1 10.9 
Source: calculated from the data in International Financial Statistics, IMF, 1968,1974, 
1980,1986,1992. 
The immediate inference is that the national budget has not been the sole 
measure of government intervention in Korea. As can be seen in the international 
comparison, the national budget accounts for a much smaller part of the governmental 
activities than expected. Its relative size is not commensurate with the pervasive roles 
of the government in Korea. It seems that other measures have been used as a more 
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important instrument through which governmental intervention is conducted in Korea. 
This is amply illustrated in Table 6-2 showing the sectoral share of the gross domestic 
capital formation (GDCF). Another plausible explanation may be that the government 
places its priority mostly on the development-related policies and therefore the sheer 
size of the national budget reflects mostly development-related activities. Even in 1992, 
almost 50 percent of the national budget is to be distributed to economy-related policies 
(Ministry of Home Affairs, 1992,48). 
Public Corporation 
The public ownership of economic activities is the next means of government 
intervention. Public corporations in Korea perform very comprehensive functions. 
Some operate like their equivalents in other countries in managing certain essential 
industries and ensuring the infrastructure for resource mobilisation. But other public 
corporations are used strongly to promote development purposes through public 
enterprise. These public corporations usually help declining sectors of the economy, aid 
infant industries, and support export-related companies (EPB, 1988,65). For instance 
KOTRA, one of the public corporations instituted in June 1962, has aimed to help the 
export industries compete in international markets. 
Table 6-2 provides a comparison of the public corporations between Korea and 
Britain. It shows how far the Korean government has intervened in economic activities 
through the public corporations. The extent of the public corporations appears to be 
strikingly high in Korea. It accounted for up to 33.2 percent of the Gross Domestic 
Capital Formation (GDCF) (1975) in Korea as against 4.6 percent (1985) in Britain. 
According to the data from the Economic Planning Board in Korea, public corporations 
in Korea had accounted for 30 per cent of the GDCF duing the last 25 years (EPB, 
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1988,83). This fact is partly evidenced by the increase in the number of public 
corporations -from 52 in 1963 to 221 in 1986 (EPB, 1988,81) - during the period of 
economic development. This has also been accompanied by an expansion of their 
service areas (Jones, 1975,56). 
.. ýTable 6-2> Gross Domesticfixed Capital Formation in Comparison (%) 
Item\ Year '66 '70 '75 '80 '85 
GDFC 100 100 100 100 100 
General U. K. 24. ý, 26.1 24.4 13.2 10.9 
Gov't Korea 9.51) 19.1 11.6 7.0 
Public U. K. 21.3 17.6 19.1 16.0 9.4 
Corp. Korea 31.71) 18.9 33.2 27.6 15.62) 
Private U. K. 54.0 56.3 56.5 70.8 79.7 
Sector Korea 58.81) 62 54.2 65.4 
Note) 1) refers to the statistical data for 1963 and 2) refers to the statistical data for 
1986. 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics, (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationary Office), 1973,1978,1982,1985,1992 and Song (1985), p. 15. 
Fiscal and Monetary Incentives 
The list of policy instruments through which the government pursued its 
objectives goes beyond the national budget and the public corporations. Fiscal and 
monetary inducements are another crucial mechanism of governmental intervention in 
the modem state. They have taken various forms in Korea. 
Fiscal inducement was made most effective through the tax system in Korea. 
The relative reliance on indirect taxes is an indication of the government's efforts to 
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pursue the aims of econon-dc growth even at the cost of redistributive effects. Tax relief 
or suspension is another fiscal policy measure adopted for resource mobilisation by the 
Korean government. It is intended to promote exports, foster technological 
development and rationalise the industrial structure. On the other hand, the monetary 
measures include long-term low-interest funds and subsidies supplied to designated 
industries. These policy measures have been particularly supportive of the export- 
related4 industries. The government has stimulated the supply of intermediate inputs 
and the stock of productive industrial capital; factors which in turn have been intimately 
tied to the patterns of foreign trade and the policies affecting foreign trade (Cole and 
Lyman, 1971,153). 
Regulatory Measures 
The concept of regulation adopted in this study refers to the administrative 
control over the private sectors5. Traditionally the authoritarian statism in Korea has 
left a regulationist legacy to the government (Amsden, 1989). The government has 
been ready to take regulationist stances in order to ensure a relative stability in politics 
and a comparative advantage in terms of 'getting the prices right' (Foster-Carter, 1992, 
21) in the economy. As far as the economic activities are concerned, the government's 
extensive licensing and approval system functioned as a strict means of regulation. The 
government had the right to give licenses granting pern-dssion to open a business, to 
approve rates to be charged, and to audit specially selected companies (Mason et al., 
4. Outward-looking strategies were unavoidable in Korea because of its very limited 
endowment of natural resources (Cole and Lyman, 1971,137). 
5. In the case of the expenditure process the term rationing is used by Booth (1979) to 
refer to a similar aspect. His rationing is 'by limiting through direct controls the 
demand for services and benefits'. 
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1980,263). At the same time, the government has exercised its discretionary power to 
discourage consumption of luxury commodities, to restrict imports and to control credit. 
It is conventional to argue that regulatory polices can make for welfare losses in 
the long-term. The pulls of short-term comparative advantage had the potential to be 
converted into long-term disadvantage both in domestic and international markets for 
Korea. However, the Korean government appears to have selected certain industries 
with a potential long-term comparative advantage and vigorously promoted them 
through and beyond the infant industry state (Toye, 1989,88). By the help of this 
strategy, regulatory measures have proved effective in maxin-dsing economic efficiency. 
Expanding Functions of Local Government 
As in other countries, local government has been an important part of the system 
of government in Korea. Central government has pursued many of its strategic 
objectives through local authorities over the last three decades. The changes in local 
government's roles in that period can be exan-dned in terms of its spending and its 
employees. As can be seen in the two figures below, local government has acquired 
increasing functions over the last three decades. 
Firstly, the expanding role of local government is reflected in a growing number 
of local authority employees. Korean local authorities currently employed about 
252,123 persons in 1989 (EPB, 1990) or 32.2 per cent of the total government 
workforce in Korea. Figure 6-1 depicts the changes in the number of local government 
employees between 1958 and 1989. 
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<FIgure 6-1)- Share of Local Government 
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The figure shows that there was an increase of more than 500 per cent in the 
number of full-time employees of local authorities between 1958 and 1989. This rapid 
increase is apparent in the doubling of the ratio of local government employees to total 
government employees during the same period (from 15.1 % in 1958 to 32.2 % in 
1989). 'Mis rate of growth is also reflected in its share of public spending. Local 
authorities spent approximately 6,042,100 million Won in 1987 or 33.8 per cent of all 
public expenditure (KDI, 1991,666). The share of Gross National Product accounted 
for by local expenditure is 6.8 per cent (KDI, 1991,23). Figure 6-2 demonstrates the 
steady expansion of local authority's roles in Korea. 
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-cFigure 6-2)- Local Expenditure (B) in 
National Budget (A) 1962-1992 
illudoet (100 billion Won) III/A W 
350- 60 
300 so 
250 . ..... ............................................. ................................................. 
I 
. ............ . ........................................................... ................................................................................... .................. -40 
................. 200 . ........................................................... * .................................................... .... 06 ............. . ................... 
.......... ......................... ................ ... 9K.. * ....................... ................... -30 
150 ......................................... 
ý)*.. 
.................................... ................... ....... ............ ....... . .... 
...... * ............... * ...... ....... ........ .... ...... ..... - 20 100 .............. ........... ............... . ........ 
5(3 ... ... ..... ... 
10 
................. 
..... ....... . 
0i, II -I IIIIIIIIIa 
62 G4 66 68 70 72 74 76 76 80 82 84 86 SS 20 02 
Year 
-National Budget(A) Local Expenditure(S) B/A 
Souroog KDI (1901). SOGg MHO (1092), 10. 
However, its expanding function was not an indication of decentralisation in the 
name of local autonomy. 'Efficient implementation' has been a slogan which for the 
past twenty years has been accompanied by a considerable amount of rhetoric which 
ignores of the political context of locality. The central authorities still had most of the 
administrative and financial mechanisms in their control. Only since the mid-eighties 
have social and political moves been formulated to erode the conventional 
adn-dnistrative system. 
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6.3. BACKGROUND OF DECENTRALISATION 
As pointed out above, Korea has experienced a legacy of statism while 
maintaining an extremely centralised administrative system until the mid-1980s. The 
prime concern of Korean society was the mobilisation of national resources for rapid 
economic growth. This has been the main reason for the neglect of the case for 
decentralisation. 
During the development era, local government was considered primarily as an 
instrument of policy implementation. T'herefore, a plethora of local authorities was seen 
to be inimical to the purpose of rapid development in the national interest. 'Ibis 
negative image of local autonomy was amplified by a rigidly defined concept of 
national security6. 'Local' meant parochial and inefficient for economic purposes, and 
'decentralisation' referred to disintegration from a security point of view. From a more 
critical angle, Cotton (1989) describes the conventional administration in Korea as 
'non-democratic'. He suggests several reasons: 
Its non-democratic past is best seen as a response to specific factors, including 
Korea's position in the prevailing world system, the absence of countervailing 
elites as a result of war and rapid social transformation and the development of 
a strong and relatively independent state (Cotton, 1989,244). 
Cotton (1989,244) rightly goes on to say that 'the recent domestic and 
international impact of modernization has been to reverse the influence of these 
factors'. As diagnosed by Cotton, the 1980s witnessed a sweeping challenge to the 
traditional roles and functions of the state. This included the devolution of central 
power and the expansion of local power at the same time. The next step is to describe 
6. The partition of the Korean peninsula has led to confrontation with communism. 
Political elites in Korea have been worried about the polarised political attitudes. 
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the background of the emergence of decentralisation as a response to the past forms of 
centralised administration of the conventional government in Korea. 
Social Impetus for Democratisation 
The rapid econon-dc development since the 1960s has brought about a 
remarkable impact on Korean society. It is beyond the scope of this volume to examine 
the full extent of the impact. This study is concerned mainly with the background of 
decentralisation movements. First of all, popular aspiration for democracy became 
extremely strong (Kihl, 1990,67) as living standards increased and the by-products of 
rapid development remained unsolved until the 1980s. On the one hand, increased 
numbers of the middle class (mostly educated urban dwellers) started to exert pressures 
to reform the governmental structure of the development era. Social moves to 
democratise politics were strongly backed by the middle class in order to give 'Botong 
Saram' (ordinary people) a larger share in their affairs. More participative and 
responsive government was required by these people. 
On the other hand, a radical thrust for drastic reform and revolution arose (Kihl, 
1990,67) among disadvantaged groups7. Many of the political roots of social problems 
were unveiled, and the uneven development8 was attributed to the development policies 
of authoritarian governments. These moves served to radicalise groups which might 
7. Income distribution improved in the 1960s but deteriorated in the 1970s (Lim, 1986, 
123). Even in the 1980s there was little evidence to show that the benefits of economic 
growth were shared by the low and middle classes. 
8. Local inequalities of wealth and power were a crucial background of popular 
militancy for local government reform. The concentration of political and economic 
power in government meant the centralisation of opportunities exclusively in Seoul. 
The physical size of Seoul is only 0.63 percent of the land mass but around a quarter of 
the whole population (24.4%) live in Seoul. This is further demonstrated by the fact 
that in 1990 44.2% of banks, 33.3% of museums, 36.9% of the property tax, 27.4% of 
service industries, 42.6% of motor vehicles, 28.1% of large hospitals, 34.8% of medical 
personnels and 29.6% of universities were concentrated in Seoul. Chiyok Tongkye 
Yonbo (Regional Statistics), Bureau of Statistics, Korea, 1991. 
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otherwise have evolved as interest or pressure groups working through parliamentary 
institutions (Cotton, 1989,250). Radical challenges have taken many different forms. 
Violent protest reached its apogee in June 10,1987 (Han, 1988,54) and labour 
organisations proliferated after 19879. Though differing ideologies were presented by 
these disadvantaged groups, all their political demands seemed to be backed by the 
slogan of democratisation. This movement culminated in the political conflicts over the 
period of 1987 and 198810. 
These 'atmospheric' threats by various groups led political leadersll to 
recognise the fact that the authoritarian and centralised administration was out of favour 
and had led to severe public censure. The main party seemed to recognise that the 
'system which they have led and presumably benefited from no longer meets their needs 
or those of their society' (Huntington, 1984,213). For opposition parties, these 
circumstances were expected to be a platform of challence to the ruling party. They 
wished to use locality as an avenue to start 'from the bottom' on the road to political 
power. 
Bringing the State Back In 
As indicated above, the state in Korea, particularly the executive branch, has 
dominated the whole societal process in the development period. It has exercised 
exclusive influence not only on the conversion process of administration but also on the 
general input mechanism of national politics. The government elite, particularly non- 
9. Asian Monitor Resource Centre, Min-ju No-jo, (Democratic Unions): South Korea's 
New Trade Unions, Hong Kong: Asia Monitor resource Centre, 1988. 
10. Warning bells had began to sound in 1987 when opposition groups took to the 
streets over the issue of constitutional reform. 
11. Traditional respect for political authority was severely diminished by these social 
conflicts mentioned above (Lee, 1989). Until recently Korea did not seem an exception 
to the rule that elites in hierarchical systems do not value political participation as a goal 
in itself. Public participation, in fact, can undermine their power. 
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elected bureaucrats, have performed multifunctional roles controlling the private sector 
such as industries and financial markets for many years. Their discretion in policy- 
making was rarely subject to any form of public accountability. 
These excesses of the statist era have faced serious challenges since 1980. A 
wave of changes has emerged since the replacement of President Park in 1979 who had 
led the economic development for eighteen years. The people started to show distrust 
of the policies and the rhetoric (such as 'government-led', 'export-oriented' and 'human 
resource-based') which had characterised the past decades. Government was often said 
to be over-loaded (Cotton, 1991, Foster-Carter, 1992), and thus not able to deal with 
administrative and econon-dc affairs efficiently. While the private sector had introduced 
innovations in its management styles as a response to the changing environment, the 
government had lost its relative superiority of managerial competence. Government 
elites came to be regarded as inferior to those of the private firms both in ability and in 
motivation. The diverse demands of society could not be met by the traditional 
administration and this failure largely eroded government authority. Many alternative 
measures were suggested for reform. The suggestions included privatisation (EPB, 
1988,66), cut-back management of public budget (KDI, 1991,20) and the introduction 
of a local self-government system. Particularly, the ideal of 'self-government' in local 
affairs was expected to provide a comprehensive solution to the existing problems. It 
was given the first priority amid enormous public support. 
Apparently, the problems of 'over-loaded' government in the administrative 
sphere were mixed with the rise of social militancy for more democratic participation in 
the political domain. The common ground between the political and administrative 
arguments was to bring the state back in and to put the locality forward. High 
expectations were held for various goals such as efficient administration, citizen 
involvement, further economic growth and, ultimately, unification. In a sense, the 
democratic values of local government seemed to be exaggerated, and social demands 
for change were channelled towards decentralisation by the opposition party and 
intellectuals. A variety of problems found in Korean society were thought to be best 
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cured by the adoption of local self-government practices. As a consequence, 
decentralisation became a major target of oppositions and intellectuals in an era which 
elsewhere saw the rise of a new centralism 12. 
6.4. PROCESS OF 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM 
Process of the 1991 Local Government Reforms 
As noted above, opposition parties recognised that decentralisation would be a 
way of breaking up the centralised power. Decentralisation was expected to provide 
another strategy for at least sharing political power. Opposition groups have since 
adopted local government reforms as one of their main strategies in their attempt to 
'start from the bottom'. 
12. To be more precise, no single trend can be found in Western local governments 
although a universal language of reforrn does seem to recur in all the countries 
(emphasising efficiency, choice, responsiveness and accessibility). A radical 
centralisation in Britain was explained in chapter Two of this volume, and a relative 
centralism can be identified in Japan as well (Elliott, 1989,75). On the other hand, 
reforms favour decentralisation in the centralised states which had only one direction to 
go like Portugal, Spain and perhaps France (Batley and Stoker, 1991,210). Current 
reforms in Germany, the Netherlands and Italy are more narrowly directed to new forms 
of service delivery often in response to financial cuts. Batley notes that the search for a 
new relationships between citizens and central governments is widespread though 
usually less urgently pursued than in Britain. 
Nonetheless, a dominant theme in the adn-dnistrative field is that many modern 
industrial democracies are subject to the trend of 'new centralisation'. The trend of new 
centralisation seems to be accelerated mainly by the press of managerialist needs 
supported by advances in technology. The necessity for adn-dnistrative coordination in 
politics has come to be met by technological developments such as computers, 
communication facilities and so on (Crouch and Marquand, 1989). As Smith (1985, 
193) states, it is a ubiquitous feature of contemporary states. 
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Facing die-hard pressure from the opposition parties, the government party 
occasionally admitted the necessity of decentralisation. In the early part of 1987, the 
main party and government could not help promising to introduce more local autonomy. 
Reforms were agreed by the government as the price for securing political stability. In 
April 1987 President Chun Doo Hwan instructed the cabinet to work out ways to 
implement a system of local autonomy13. In June of the same year, Chairman Roh 
Tae-woo of the ruling Democratic Justice Party proposed to reform the Constitution and 
to institute local autonomy 14. For the protagonists of reform, these pledges represented 
a big leap toward designing a more responsive government. 
In reality, however, the main party retained a deep emotional objection both to 
the 'disintegration' of the country and to the diffusion of political power. The 
underlying intention of the government towards decentralisation was hostile, and 
decentralisation was taken by them to mean further delegation of administrative affairs 
from the centre to locality. Little had been done for decentralisation under the Fifth 
Republic (1980-February, 1988) in terms of political power. Kihl (1990) makes the 
point that: 
Determined to contain this political force that openly advocated an overturning 
of the system, the Roh government walked a tight rope between upholding law 
and order and encouraging democratic reform (Kihl, 1990,67-68). 
A new momentum to decentralisation was given by the National Assembly 
election of April 26,1988. A total of 19,853,890 out of 26,198,205 eligible voters, or 
75.8 % cast their ballots. The results stunned many who had predicted the government 
party's victory. Yoso Yadae (small government party and large opposition) 
phenomenon appeared in this election. Contrary to predictions, the government party 
(DJP), for the first time since 1950, failed to capture an overall majority of seats in the 
Assembly (Kim, 1989,480). As the voters handed the DJP a serious set-back, the two 
13. The Korea Herald, April 15,1987. 
14. The Korea Herald, June 29,1987. 
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major opposition parties, the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) and the 
Reunification and Democracy Party (RDP) came to control a large number of 
constituencies. While the DJP won 87 seats of the nation's 224 constituencies, PPD 
15 won 54 seats and RDP won 46 seats 
This Yoso Yadae led to the wholesale acceptance by the government party of the 
oppositions' demands. In March 198916 an amendment was made to the Law on Local 
Autonomy, under opposition sponsorship, to elect local councillors in 1989. This 
amendment bill was vetoed by the President two weeks later and in May of the same 
year the opposition parties initiated an attempt to introduce an amendment bill again. 
The initiative of opposition groups was succinctly described by The Korea Times in 
May 25,1989. 
The rival political parties yesterday neared an agreement to fully implement 
local autonomy across the nation by 1991 ... The opposing camps came to terms during the conference of the senior politicians from the four major parties ... the 
opposition camp7proposed the two-stage plan to win the broad agreement of 
the ruling party . 
In the end, local elections took place for basic-tier councils in March 1991 and 
the large-tier election followed in June of the same year. In the basic-tier election, 55 
per cent of the 28 million eligible voters cast ballots in the polls. The turn out was 
slightly higher than this in the June election to inaugurate councils in the large-tier local 
authorities (58.9 %). Average turn-out ranged from 74.7 in Cheju to 52.4 in Seoul. As 
in many other countries, this turn-out was lower than at national elections. 
Surprisingly enough, the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) clinched 
victory in the large-tier local council elections18 in which candidates could have party 
membership. The DLP gained 83% of the seats while the main opposition New 
15. NDRP won 27 seats and Independents won nine seats (Kim, 1989,486). Several 
explanations can be offered for the DJP's set-back including the single-member district 
system (Yomiuri Shimbun, April 28,1988). 
16. The Korea Times, March 25,1989. 
17. The Korea Times, May 25,1989. 
18. Korea Newsreview, June 29,199 1. 
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Democratic Party (NDP) won only 19 per cent - leaving the rest to other small parties. 
Official results showed that the government party gained 564 of the 866 seats 
nationwide and the main opposition NDP won 165 seats. The ruling party led in almost 
all parts of the country, by winning a comfortable majority of seats in 11 of the 15 
newly formed local councils, except the south-western Cholla areas. The NDP led by 
Kim Dae-jung secured most of the seats in its stronghold of Kwangju and adjacent 
Cholla provinces, but fared poorly in most other areas. Independents, who amounted to 
one-third of the total candidates, fared unexpectedly well, and garnered 115 seats. 
'Me main reason why the result was an apparent victory for the ruling party may 
be found in the changes of political parties. There was a inter-party coalition between 
the previous ruling party DJP and two opposition parties, RDP and NDRP, during the 
process of reforms. These three parties were united into a single ruling party (DLP) in 
January 1990. As a result, inter-party boundaries have largely changed since January 
1990. Also, what emerged in the end was heavily influenced by party political 
considerations and other vested interests of advantaged groups. The general public 
seemed to be fed-up with the political bargaining and recognised the limits of 'local' 
reforms from their point of view. 
Main Issues in the Local Government Reform 
In general, decentralisation has conventionally been taken as a matter of 
adn-dnistration in many textbooks. However, in Korea, the decisions that needed to be 
made about decentralisation were political rather than technical. As Sn-dth (1985,201) 
has put it, decentralisation was rather the result of political forces in conflict, 
particularly between the major political parties. In the following section the detailed 
issues which were in dispute during the reforms will be considered. 
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At least in principle, given such a consensus, the protagonists of reform did not 
face any fundamental resistance either from the public or from the government party. 
No social and political group could deny the necessity of decentralisation, albeit with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm. But serious difficulties arose when detailed measures 
were chosen to implement decentralisation. It seemed that rhetoric provided 
momentum but failed to give detailed alternatives for reform. The debate over reform 
was moving away from rhetoric alone to a fuller appreciation of the political and 
administrative implications of the reforrns. 
During the period of debate, local government had been assailed by a variety of 
suggestions. A source of models was sought from the experiences of Britain, France, 
U. S. and Japan. What was often discussed were the powers granted to local authorities, 
functions to be delegated and working mechanisms within local authorities. Many 
competing options had been suggested by political parties, academics and senior 
bureaucrats. All in all, the debate has centred around the following four issues: 
1) The number of tiers in local authorities; 
2) Financing service provision in local government; 
3) Popular vote versus the central government; 
appointment methods for local Vice-Chiefs 
4) The range of party membership permitted to 
local councillors. 
The very nature of the first two issues was adn-dnistrative and technical and, in 
fact, these issues were discussed mainly among academics and bureaucrats. The 
rationale for each argument revolved around the principle of managerial competence 
and administrative efficiency. For one thing, the debate between advocates of single- 
tier and two-tier local government was conducted within an atmosphere in which the 
relative merits of the different systems are stressed for their value of administrative 
efficiency. The advocates of the single-tier system viewed the existing multiple tiers 
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the local hierarchy as overlapping and wasteful. It was argued that local government 
would be able to relate all its policies to coherent objectives in its area considered as a 
whole. The single-tier system was admired as being the simplest and most economic 
form by its advocates. However, the moves towards a single-tier structure were 
accompanied by considerable controversy as the costs of such a system were pointed 
out by the advocates of the two-tier system. They stressed the needs of major 
metropolitan areas for overall planning agencies. As a result, the traditional two-tier 
system remained as a creature of tradition in the end. In this debate, the acaden-dc 
specialists played a vocal part by stressing the significance of adn-dnistrative efficiency 
in the reforms. Armed with pluralist rationales for decentralisation, they argued for 
economic rationality in the dispute surrounding the reforms. 
In contrast, the political parties adhered to the politics of decentralisation. They 
were interested solely in the political rewards which could be derived from the reformed 
system. Of the four main issues listed above, the political parties gave most weight to 
3) and 4). Opposition parties applauded the popular vote method for local Vice-Chiefs 
and party membership for all local councillors. On the other side of the divide were the 
government and the main party in office who worried about the possibility of the 
politicisation of local government eroding their authority in several localities. 
Interestingly, the fidelity of the opposition parties became very much weakened 
in negotiations. Since MPs were afraid that their authority would be eroded by the 
establishment of representative bodies through direct election at local levels, they were 
not anxious to speed up the negotiations. After drawn-out proceedings, a compromise 
was made to allow party membership only to large-tier councillors, and decisions on the 
local Vice-Chiefs were postponed. As a result, the only notable reform was confined to 
the establishment of local councils which were directly elected by the people both at 
basic- and large-tier local authorities. 
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Structure and Function of Local Government 
The local government system in Korea has been affected by various experiments 
in constitutional development. Different names have even been given to localities at 
times. Nonetheless, the fundamental framework of the contemporary system had not 
changed during the six Republics before the 1991 reforms. Figure 6-3 gives a general 
picture of the contemporary local government system in Korea. The figure includes the 
changes made by the reforms in 1991. A major change which has resulted from the 
1991 reforms is the emergence of local councils. Except for local councils, the present 
local government system is similar to the traditional structure. Basically the local 
government system in Korea is characterised as a unitary system, in which the political 
and administrative functions are highly concentrated in central government. 
The organisational arrangement of local government can be described as a two- 
tier structure. The large tier consists of one special city (Seoul), five direct control 
cities and nine provinces. Whereas Seoul is under the control of the Prime Minister, the 
five direct control cities and nine provinces are answerable to the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MHA). But because administrative power is concentrated in central 
government, all these authorities have adn-dnistrative responsibilities, directly and 
indirectly, not only to MHA but also to every department of each ministry in the centre. 
This central power is checked and balanced by the National Association of Local 
Authorities (NALA). NALA was organised by the Chairmen of Local Councils after 
the 1991 reforms and represents local authorities' interests in the political sphere. 
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<Figure 6-3> Local Government System in Korea 
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The prime functions of each tier of the local hierarchy can be identified in the 
provision of goods and services. As in other couriffies, the functions of local authorities 
are far-reaching. For instance, large tier local authorities are responsible for regional 
development, highways, primary and secondary education, housing, and environmental 
health. Personal social service, refuse collection are functions of si-nall-tier local 
authorities. The provision of libraries, museurns, art galleries and parks depends on 
local arrangements and can be administered either at large- or small-tier level. 
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6.5. MAJOR CHANGES AFTER THE REFORMS 
The significance of the reforms cannot be confined to the institutional re- 
arrangement of the conventional structure. Changes in the institutional structure have 
inevitably brought considerable changes at local level. Although differences exist in the 
precise weighting given to these changes, it is not in dispute that they contain significant 
implications regarding the politics of local government. Five changes are described in 
the remaining section of this chapter. All these changes seem to be directly related to 
the emergence of local councils in 1991. 
Politicisation of Local Government 
Prior to the launch of the new local government system in 1991, policy-making 
powers were mostly in the hands of central government. As explained above, the 
central authorities exercised final authority in regulating the conditions of local 
government. An analysis of academic research shows that concern had been given 
mostly to the compliance of local authorities in the implementation of central policies 
until 1991 <see Appendix 4>. 
However, local government is being highly politicised under the new system. 
What is denoted by the term politicisation here is three-fold: de-bureaucratisation of 
local policy-making, increasing competition between political parties surrounding local 
affairs and polarisation between policy actors. First, decisions on local affairs are 
becoming more and more open to the public and elected members. This means that 
local policy-making is increasingly susceptible to the influence of bodies other than 
professional officials, such as local groups, constituencies and councillors. Second, 
local affairs attract increasing concern from Major political parties. The major political 
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parties contest local elections on party lines and local government is coloured to a great 
extent by party-directed patronage. Political parties are also deeply involved in the 
management of local authorities through the formation of party groups for the 
predetermination of local issues. An increasing number of local authorities are expected 
to be organised on party political lines in the near future. Finally, as a consequence of 
party politics, polarisation becomes apparent in the management of local authorities. 
Polarisation refers here to an extremity of political and administrative stances in which 
politicians conduct themselves, excluding minority groups from the opportunity to 
influence decisions. This often results in remarkable tensions surrounding policy- 
making, and local decisions therefore become time-consuming and less effective. 
To a certain extent, politicisation of local government is welcomed by 
commentators since local policy-making becomes more open to the public and 
increasingly democratic. However, it is deplored by the general public in many cases. 
The general public has emotional antipathy towards politicisation since they believe that 
public affairs should not be, put at risk by an increasingly intense political style. It is 
criticised on the ground that local authority management deteriorates under the impact 
of party politics. 
Increasing Concern about Social Policies 
Another consequence of the reforms is the increasing concern about social 
policies directly related to the local residents' well-being. Compared to the previous 
system, local authorities are giving much More attention to resident-related policies 
such as cleaning, road works and water supply. This change seems to be a reflection of 
the political orientation of elected members. The results of empirical surveys show that 
councillors are apparently oriented towards social policies in local government. Their 
priority is more skewed towards the social policy area than any other main policy actor. 
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This feature seems to originate from the fact that councillors are directly elected by the 
local residents. Close contact with the public is also likely to affect councillors' roles in 
local policy-making. This point is discussed in more detail in chapter Eight. 
Tension between Local Executive and Councillors and between Local 
and Central Governments 
Another notable change, which is only just emerging, is the increasing tension 
between the local executive and the local council, and between the local council and 
central authorities. This is a consequence of the diffusion of political power since the 
1991 reforms. 
As noted above, the diffusion of power has contributed to the opening and 
dernocratising of local authorities in practice. On the other hand, it has adverse effects 
on the relations between councillors and officials, and between the local councils and 
central authorities. Increased tension often leads to a culmination of conflicts 
surrounding the management of local government. For one thing, most local authorities 
have experienced tension and conflict between the Local Minister and the local council 
since the emergence of local councils in 1991.32 cases of conflict have been reported 
over the period from March 1991 to October 199219. This is partly because there are 
no rules or traditions which regulate the responsibilities and rights of councillors. The 
lack of pre-existing traditions and experience causes serious confusion over role 
expectations between policy actors. An interviewee in Kyonggi (December 19,1991) 
made the point, and his view seemed to be shared by many other officicals: 
There are, I suppose, certain difficult questions to ask about councillor's roles. 
Their legal rights and responsibilities are not clear... Sometimes they put the 
case for policies which are questionable from our perspectives. I am not 
denying they have political right to make certain decisions, in fact mostly from 
19. Chosun Ilbo, October 30,1992. 
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resident-related programmes. But it is unrealistic to expect that we should 
comply with all the policies pursued by members. 
145 
Another reason may be that officials adhere to their vested interests and mistrust 
councillors' competence in the management of local affairs. 'Mis view is supported by 
a case which was sent to the court in September 199220. In Chongju local government, 
the local council requested a release of adn-dnistrative information and was refused by 
the executive branch. After more than two months of dispute, the case was sent to court 
by councillors. This Chongju case was a typical example in which officials show 
mistrust of the unpaid 'amateur' politicians adhering to their traditional inertia. As 
generally acknowledged, it is difficult for amateur politicians to meet the professional 
expert on anything like equal terms: knowledge of particular areas, length of service and 
so on. They are unable to grasp much of the complexity of local business, and 
inescapably rely on officials' advice to a great extent. 
A more recent development is the increasing tension between local councils and 
central authorities. In August 1991 a national association of chairmen of local councils 
was constructed. This association has frequently been mobilised to confront central 
intervention since that time. Quite recently, the members of this association had an 
emergency rally and agreed to refuse the annual inspection by the National 
Assembly2l. This decision had serious implications since the National Assembly 
conventionally had the power to inspect local authorities every year. During the 1992 
inspection period, notable conflict took place in many localities. The strategy of 
councillors was to pre-occupy inspection sites and to convene related officials for 
advice. Councillors' arguments were that 'local adn-dnistration should be responsible to 
the locally elected bodies'. 
20. Chosun Ilbo, September 30,1992. 
2 1. Chosun Ilbo, October 17 and 18,1992. 
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'An Admission Valve' for the Local Elite 
It was the local elites who were most interested in local elections throughout the 
process of reform. Though the interest of the general public decreased during the inter- 
party bargaining process (55 per cent tum-out in the basic-tier and 58.9 per cent in the 
large-tier elections), considerable interest had been shown by the local elites who 
basically wished to participate in the management of public affairs. In particular, those 
who were willing to enter national politics but did not have enough resources became 
the candidates in local elections. Table 6-3 lists the occupational background of local 
councillors elected for large-tier authorities in June 1991. The table indicates that local 
councillors are mostly from an upper class background and that the local councils are 
composed largely of local business interests. Apparently, the interests of Botong Saram 
(ordinary people) are under-represented in the composition of local councils. In this 
vein, commentators argue that the future of the reforms is partly clouded by the interests 
of local bourgeois, and Botong Saram seem to be estranged from the councillors they 
voted. 
--ýTable 6-3> Occupational Backgrounds of Elected Members 
Rank Category N Percentage 
1. Commercial Business 151 17.4 
2. Agriculture 108 12.5 
3. Construction Industries 107 12.4 
4. Manufacturing Industries 74 8.5 
5. Politicians 67 7.7 
6. Transport Companies 42 4.9 
7. Salariat 27 3.1 
8. Fisheries and Marine Product 
Industries 20 2.3 
9. Mining Industries 9 1.0 
10. Education 6 0.7 
11. Non-Profit Corporation 6 0.7 
12. Lawyer 4 0.5 
13. Publishing Companies 3 0.4 
14. Others 169 19.5 
Total 866 100 
Source) Central Election Management Committee, Election Management, vol 37,1991, 
p. 69. 
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Local Offlcials' Assessment 
Finally, what follows is local officials' assessment of the 1992 reforms. The 
intention is to evaluate the changes taking place in local authorities through the eyes of 
policy actors who are working at the cross-roads of policy-making. This would be 
another vantage point from which to assess the working practices of local authorities 
after the reforms. During the empirical survey period for this study, an open-ended 
question was given to 235 local officials asking their opinion on the 1991 reforms. An 
open-ended item is one to which the respondent is free to respond in his or her own 
words (de Vaus, 1991,87). The question supplies a frame of reference but puts a 
minimum of restraint on the respondent's answer. The point of this open-ended 
question method is its flexibility. The respondents can present their views as they 
emerge without being constrained by the need to adhere rigidly to previously set items 
and scales. 
Understandably, in this study, the response rate to the open-ended question was 
much lower than to closed questions. 56.2 per cent of respondents (132 out of 235) gave 
their views on the changes resulting from the reforms. Table 6-4 summarises the 
responses given by the local officials. From their views it is possible to see what 
consequences the reforms have had for local government. 
The table seems to encompass a wide range of opinions. There is an interesting 
pattern to be seen in the responses of local officials. It seems that slightly more than 
half of the respondents (79) regard recent changes as desirable and 53 lament the by- 
products of the reforms as they appear in practice. Positive responses are made by the 
officials who have political values foremost in their mind and negative assessments are 
given by the officials who stick to the questions of practicality. First, a lot of officials 
call attention to the fact that the local reforms have positive implications for political 
values such as democratic control and responsiveness. For instance, "citizens' voices 
are heard in the budgetary process", "more concern is given to the regional affairs" 
"higher priority is drawn to welfare issues" and "increasing significance of policy 
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effectiveness is recognised". Even when the respondents say that "unnecessary 
spending is prevented and rationality increased", the term rationality is used to refer to 
political rationality rather than cost-effect rationality. 
<Table 6-4> Responses to Open-Ended Question 
Rank Order Responses N 
1. Expenditure process complicated and more work burden 26 
2. Citizens' voices heard in the budgetary process 19 
3. More prudence in budget-making 12 
4. Increasing concern on the effectiveness of policy 10 
5. Higher priority on welfare policies 9 
6. Harmony between administrative professionalism and political control 9 
7. Equal distribution of resources between regions 8 
8. Increasing difficulty because of councillors' 
insufficient competence 8 
9. Unnecessary spending prevented and rationality 
enhanced 7 
10. More time-consuming 5 
11. More consideration of the local circumstances 5 
12. Councillors' wishes to be a privileged class 4 
13. Budget cutting by the councillors regardless of the policy goal and size 4 
14. No councillors' activity found outside the council meetings 4 
15. No change found 2 
Total 132 
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On the contrary, almost all the negative evaluations made by officials are 
concerned directly with either their increased work burden or with the councillors' 
activities. It may be that the officials' lamentation on their increased work burden is 
closely related to their criticisms of councillors. More than anything else, councillors 
come under criticism for their alleged inefficiency and profligacy. Councillors exert 
pressure on the departments by asking for "unnecessary advice" and "cutting the 
necessary budget of departments" "without professional knowledge of policy goals and 
size". The same kinds of thought are put forward by interviewees, which win be 
discussed in chapter Eight. Last, some scepticism is voiced by respondents about 
councillors' self-interested activities. For example, "no individual roles are found 
outside the council meetings" while "only wishing to be a privileged class" in the local 
community. 
6.6. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this chapter was to depict the background of the 1991 local 
government reforms in Korea. The social and political context of decentralisation was 
explained and several changes which resulted from the reforms have been exan-dned. 
The chapter consisted of two parts. The first section described the general environment 
which had accelerated decentralisation during the period of the last three decades. 
Korean local government was placed within the context of the society in which it 
operates. The historical seeds of decentralisation were traced back to the 'development 
era' and more details were examined from the viewpoint of political democratisation 
movements and administrative overload. The second part of the chapter reviewed the 
1991 local government reforms in terms of the process of decentralisation, main issues 
of the reforms and the changes and continuities after the reforms. Finally efforts were 
made to evaluate the consequences of the 1991 reforms through the eyes of local 
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government officials. Overall, there is an interesting pattern to be seen in the evaluation 
of recent changes by local officials. The changes resulting from decentralisation 
seemed to be admired in political terms but partly criticised in terms of their effect on 
administrative practices. Tensions appeared in the ambiguity of local councillors' roles 
and responsibilities. However, the main source of problems may be a result of the lack 
of pre-existing traditions and experiences. Therefore, local authorities in Korea are 
likely to serve better not only political democratisation but also administrative 
efficiency in the future. Local policy-making will be explored in more detail in the 
following chapters by analysing policy variations between localities. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: OUTPUT ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL POLICIES 
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Five has already developed a two-stage approach to analysing local service 
distribution. This chapter, as the first part of the two-stage approach,. aims to analyse 
the outputs of Korean local expenditure decisions, particularly concerning social 
policies. It provides an analysis aimed at identifying how the outputs of local service 
distributions vary. This output analysis is of importance for several reasons. It will not 
only provide comparable information on the variation of service distribution between 
local authorities but will also clarify the ultimate effects of procedural factors on policy 
outputs. In addition, in this study, the output analysis will be used to select two local 
authorities which will go forward for intensive study at the second stage. The output 
analysis, therefore, can be the starting point of a cross-sectional analysis of local service 
distribution. 
Before proceeding to the determinants of local service variation, it is necessary 
to identify the general extent of variations of local expenditure. Table 7-1 illustrates 
some basic statistics for spending variations across the localities in 1992. Only a glance 
at the table is sufficient to show how total and social expenditure vary between different 
localities in Korea. Since the absolute amount of total and social spending is not very 
helpful for comparison (Hoggart, 1989,35), total and social expenditure is presented as 
a percentage of the local budget. There are noticeable variations from locality to 
locality, for instance, with a variation coefficient of 2.909 in environment. The figures 
for the coefficient of variation (c. v. ) in the first column show the extent to which social 
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expenditure clusters around the same level between localities. C. V. is S (s. d. ) divided 
by I. So the lowest value of c. v. is 0 and thereafter a lower c. v. indicates greater 
similarity in social spending. 
As can be seen in Table 7-1, variations in the social policy area between 
localities in 1992 are larger than in other policy areas. Four distinctive trends emerge 
from the table. First, variations in the social policy area range from 0.237 to 2.909. 
Apparently this spread is wider than those of other policy areas such as regional 
development and general adn-dnistration expenditure. This indicates that social policy 
expenditure is decided with more diversity between local authorities. 
<Table 7- 1> Variations in Local Expenditures (%) 1,1992 
Cv. StdDev Mean S. E. Mean 
DIVI SOPO 
SOCI 0.348 3.582 10.302 0.925 
INDISOPO 
HEAL 0.652 1.941 2.977 0.501 
ENVI 2.909 1.696 0.583 0.438 
CULT 0.536 1.188 2.217 0.307 
EDUC 1.215 3.125 2.573 0.807 
SPOR 0.450 0.648 1.297 0.167 
FIRE 0.237 0.704 2.975 0.182 
COUN 0.472 2.079 4.407 0.537 
GENE 0.473 4.254 8.997 1.098 
INDU 0.662 13.405 20.253 3.461 
REGI 0.305 7.876 25.844 2.033 
OTHE 0.451 9.645 21.383 2.490 
Note) DIVI SOPO: Divisible Social Policy, INDI SOPO: Indivisible Social Policy, 
SOCI: Social Service, HEAL: Health, ENVI: Environment, CULT: Culture, SPORT: 
Sports, EDUC: Education, COUN: Local Council, GENE: General Administration, 
INDU: Industrial & Economy, REGI: Regional Development, OTHE: Others. 
Source: MHA, 1992. 
1. Policy areas are basically categorised upon the official classification of Korean 
government. In terms of expenditure, which is the focal point of this study, local 
policies are officially categorised into six groups in Korea: Local Council Expenditure, 
General Administration Expenditure, Social Welfare Expenditure (including Culture, 
Sports and Fire Expenditure in this study), Industrial and Econon-dc Expenditure, 
Regional Development Expenditure, and Others. 
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tFigure 7-1: - Variations In Local 
Expenditures, 1992 
C. V. 
3- . ............................................... ........................................................................................................ 
......... .... .. ....... .................................................................................................... 
2....................................... ................. ... I ........................................................................................... 
2 
1.6 .... 
............................. 
.... ...................... ý91bý ...................................................... 
.... .......................... ..................................... .......................... ........................................... 
0.6-"' 
a- 
zZ 
S881 HEAL EýVl C6LT ED'UC SP'OR FIRE 
-M Coeff. of Variation 
Second, within the social policy area, the variations in divisible service2 (social 
service) are far narrower than in indivisible social policy sectors. The c. v. in social 
service which is the single divisible social policy is 0.348. This c. v. is second only to 
the fire service (0.237) within the whole social policy area. This implies that all the 
local authorities spend a similar percentage of their budgets on divisible social policy. 
The reason may possibly be that the central government influences the distribution of 
divisible social services by imposing general standards of provision. This result could 
mean that the overall variations in local policy areas cannot be seen as evidence of local 
autonomy3. 
2. The distinction between divisible and indivisible services was discussed in chapter 
Four. Indivisible services refer to the collective services whose costs and benefits are 
city-wide, and available to any person or resident who wishes to make use of them. In 
this study, what are termed indivisible services include education, environment, fire, 
parks, library services. 
3. It is a specific policy sector, for example social service within the social policy area 
in the case of Korea, that the central government attempts to ensure certain standards of 
service provision in local authorities. Therefore, the overall extent of service variation 
says little about the extent of central intervention. 
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Third, a huge difference is found between the highest and the lowest spenders 
within the indivisible social policy area. Environment records the largest variance in 
local budgets at 2.909 and education the second largest at 1.215. The high c. v. in these 
two services indicates more diversity in the provision of these two services between 
local authorities. In other words, environment and education are less standardised than 
any other social policy sector which is publicly provided by local authorities in 1992. 
At the other end of the scale is the fire service among indivisible social policies. It 
follows that the fire service has the strongest tendency to cluster around the average 
level with the smallest inter-local disparities. 
Fourth, the mean score appears highest in the social services sector within the 
social policy area accounting for more than 10 percent of the local budget on average. 
Nearly half of the social policy budget goes on the social services which are basically 
provided for people in extremely difficult physical and financial situations. In contrast, 
only 0.583 percent of the local budget is distributed to environmental services including 
parks and green space. 
The following section of this chapter examines the sources of variation in policy 
outputs in Korean local government. Basically, the political process is left for the 
process approach of the next chapter, and the independent variables are categorised into 
four groups here for the output analysis: financial sources, socioeconomic variables, 
urban hierarchy theory and incrementalism. 
7.2. EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL SOURCES 
Variations in Financial Sources 
The source of finance usually exan-dned in output analysis has been central 
grants. Research in this area has investigated the inter-relationships between local 
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expenditure variations and the central grant (Gibson, 1982,17; Boyne, 1990,218). Changes 
in central grant are assumed to create corresponding changes in local autonomy. More 
specifically, it has been argued that the central grant is the main mechanism of central 
intervention and, therefore, variations in local expenditure could be evidence to prove the 
absence of central control and vice versa. Based on this assumption, there have been a lot of 
pro- and counter-arguments in the tradition of the agent-partnership debate. However, the 
conventional wisdom of this debate has merely produced a conventional critique failing to go 
beyond the rather limited parameters of agency and partnership (Duncan and Goodwin, 
1988,31). The myth of central grant has masked not only the impact of other financial 
sources but also different spheres of central-local relationship such as constitutional, legal 
and political initiatives. The assumption that the variations in local spending can be taken as 
evidence of the absence of central control itself seems also highly questionable. 
Basically, the financial resources which local governments allocate for their policies 
come from five sources in Korea: local tax, non-tax revenue, central grant, transfers and 
subsidies. As in Britain, the local tax and non-tax revenue are locally raised finance whereas 
the central grant and subsidies are both provided by the central government. In this case, the 
only difference between the last two is that while the grant is included in the general 
accounts the subsidies are classified as special accounts which are designated for specific 
policy objectives. 
Table 7-2 summarises the regional variations (coefficient of variation) in financial 
sources as of 1992. Coefficient of variance indicates standard deviation divided by the 
mean and thus a lower c. v. indicates greater similarity in expenditure patterns on social 
policies. The standard deviation in the table is calculated from the s. d. (S) = NrV-Tx Tance 
(S2) indicating the range of dispersion between localities. The mean score refers to the 
average percentage of each financial source in the local budget. As can be seen, the largest 
part of the local budget comes from local tax which accounts for 41.925 percent of the total 
local budget on average. The non-tax revenue is second only to the local tax showing a 
mean score of 20.393 percent. The subsidies which are specified for a certain policy 
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programme by central government rank as the third most important financial source for 
local government (19-911 %). However, in the case of cross-regional variation, transfer 
payments record the highest c. v. at 3.874 implying that the ratio of transfers is widely 
different from locality to locality at its face value. The c. v. of transfers seem to be 
exaggerated because they only account for an extremely small portion of the local 
budget, as indicated by the mean score of 0.388 percent. An extravagant difference 
(20.720 %) is identified in local tax albeit it has low c. v. at 0.494 percent. 
<Figure 7-2> Regional Variations in 
Financial Sources (%), 1992 
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<Table 7-2> Regional Variations in Financial Sources (%), 1992 
C. V. StdDev Mean S. E. Mean 
LocalTax 0.494 20.720 41.925 5.350 
Non-tax Rev 0.487 9.930 20.393 2.564 
Cent Share Tax 0.848 15.290 18.029 3.945 
Transfer 3.874 1.503 0.388 0.388 
Subsidies 0.670 13.928 19.911 3.596 
Source: 1992 Chibang Chach! Tanche Yesan Kaeyo (Summary of the 1992 Local Government Budget), Ministry of Home Affairs, Korea, 1992. 
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The next table, Table 7-3, illustrates the correlationS4 between financial sources 
and social policy spending. Divisible social policy is positively correlated with 
subsidies and central share tax. The table shows correlation coefficients of . 8375 with 
subsidies and . 7412 with central share tax respectively. Divisible service is notably 
associated with the financial sources provided by the central government in Korea. This 
result seems to be in line with the previous result on the small variation in the divisible 
social policy sector. This evidence supports an extended interpretation that divisible 
social policy is fairly dominated by central standards and financed mainly by central 
government. On the contrary, a negative relationship with divisible social policy is 
found in relation to local tax. Table 7-3 shows a correlation coefficient of -. 8365 
between the two. There is an exactly reverse relationship between the local tax, and the 
subsidies and central share tax <see Table 11-7 in Appendix 1>. This implies that those 
local authorities which do not have enough financial sources are supported by the 
central budget to meet the minimum standard on divisible service provision. 
<Table 7-3> Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Social Policy Expenditures and 
Financial Sources, 1992 
LOTX NTR CSTX TRAN SUBS 
DIVI SOPO 
SOCI -. 8365** -. 5755 . 7412** -. 1670 . 8375** 
INDISOPO 
HEAL . 5998* . 0363 -. 3978 . 1244 -. 5248 ENVI . 2689 . 3817 -. 2369 -. 0951 -. 2863 CULT -. 2841 . 1133 . 3071 -. 4578 . 0746 EDUC . 8759** . 4617 -. 7740** . 4786 -. 7942** SPOR . 1687 . 7570** -. 3212 -. 2296 -. 4093 FIRE -. 1380 -. 3517 . 3421 -. 2102 . 1011 
Note 1) NTR: Non-Tax Revenue, CSTX: Central Share Tax, TRANS: Transfer, SUBS: 
Subsidies. 
Note 2) 1-tailed Signif. * indicates significance at. 01 and ** at. 001. 
Source: MHA, 1992. 
4. Pearson correlation is a typical technique which is used to identify the strength of 
relationship among parametric data (Selkirk, 1979). Like the concept of association, 
correlation involves both a relationship and the concept of quantification of the strength 
of relationship (Graft, 1985,75). 
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In the case of indivisible social policy, education and health show highly 
positive associations with local tax. Education spending has a correlation coefficient of 
. 8759 and health has that of . 5998 in relation to local tax. This means that 
decision- 
making in education and health is strongly affected by the local tax in Korean local 
governments. 
On the other hand, negative correlations with education are found in relation to 
subsidies (-. 7942) and central share tax (-. 7740). It constantly appears that the local tax 
is closely related where the subsidies and central share tax say little about service 
variation. 
OLS Regression Analysis 
The effects of financial sources on local spending are now exan-dned by stepwise 
OLS regression analysis. Regression analysis makes it possible to identify the relative 
explanatory power of a set of dependent variables on a single independent variable. It 
quantifies the direction of causality (Graft, 1985,75; de Vaus, 1991,184) between 
related factors5. Table 7-4 lists the results of regressing the financial sources on the 
seven social policy areas. What the raw figures (regression coefficients R2) mean here 
in the following table is the percentage of the variance in social expenditure explained 
by each financial source. Comparisons are made between divisible and indivisible 
social policies. For the purpose of extended comparison, regression is also conducted 
on the other five policy areas: council expenditure, general expenditure, economic and 
industrial expenditure, regional development expenditure and other spending. 
First of all, within the social policy area, the expenditure variations in divisible 
social policy are explained slightly better than indivisible social policies by the variation 
5. Regression can be used when both the independent and dependent variables are 
interval measurements. It should be bome in mind that it cannot be used to measure the 
strength of a relationship. 
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in financial sources. The results of regression analysis suggest that financial sources 
explain around 70 percent of the variations in social services and from 35.9 up to 76.7 
percent in indivisible social policies. More detailed observation indicates that the 
explanatory power of financial sources comes mainly from the effects of subsidies in 
the case of divisible social policy sectors. Central share tax, which appeared to be 
important in the previous correlation analysis, is excluded here because of the problem 
of multicollinearity6. Within the field of indivisible social policy sectors, the 
expenditure variations in education are highly influenced by variation in financial 
sources. Education is the social policy sector whose variation can best be explained by 
financial sources in local government. R2 records . 76723 in education indicating that 
around 77 percent of variances are explained by the financial sources in that policy area. 
The variable which is included in the equation <see Appendix 3> is the local tax. This 
confirms again what emerged from the previous correlation analysis. Both results imply 
that the main financial source for education spending is local tax. 
Secondly, no statistical correlation is found between expenditure and source of 
finance in three services: fire, environment and culture. The variability in these three 
services is not linked to the differential incidence of the financial sources. One 
plausible explanation is that fire, environment and culture are very much standardised 
across the localities and provided by public authorities regardless of the different 
composition of financial sources. Table 7-1 supports this explanation by showing little 
variance between different localities in the case of fire (c. v. 0.237) and culture (c. v. 
0.536). These C. V. s are much lower than those of education (c. v. 1.215) and 
environment (c. v. 2.909). Expenditure variations in these policy areas must be 
explained by factors other than financial sources in local environments. 
Thirdly, compared with the industrial-economic policies, the variation in social 
policy spending appears to be less influenced by financial sources in local government. 
6. Multicolliniarity exists where a subset of the independent variables is almost linearly 
dependent. Its main effects are a) a loss of precision in the estimates b) sensitivity to 
particular sets of observations- a little more information might lead to a dramatic 
change in the value of the coefficient (Reason, 1983,50). 
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Table 7-4 displays the percentages of variation in industrial-economic policies which 
can be explained by financial sources. The strongest impact of financial sources is 
found in the industrial-economic policy (with the regression R2 of . 91957). More than 
90 percent of variation in industrial-economic spending is accounted for by financial 
sources. The average variation in spending on social policies explained by financial 
sources generally remains far lower than this. For example, education which records 
the highest R2 (. 76723) in the field of social policies, is explained by the financial 
sources 15.2 percent less than in industrial-economic policies. It follows that policy 
variations in the social policy area are less influenced by financial sources than those in 
the industrial-economic policy area. 
<Table 7-4> Results of OLS Regression: Percentage of the Variance (R2) in Social 
Policies explained by Financial Sources, 1992 
Expenditure Area Multiple Regression R2 
DIVI SOPO 
Social Service . 70149 (. 0001) 
INDI SOPO 
Health . 35973 (. 0181) Environment * (p>. 05) 
Culture * (p>. 05) 
Education . 76723 (. 0000) Sports . 57305 (. 0011) Fire * (p>. 05) 
COUN . 63463 (. 0004) GENE * (P>. 05) 
INDU . 91957 (. 0000) REGI . 56516 (. 0012) OTHE . 50706 (. 0029) 
Note) * refers to the cases in which PIN reached 0.050 lin-dts in stepwise regression. 
For the variables in the equation, see Appendix 3. 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the effects of financial sources are 
apparent on social policies in Korean local government. In particular, subsidies have a 
noticeable influence on social services, which is the only divisible social policy, and 
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local tax on education which is an indivisible social policy in Korean local government. 
In addition, spending on sports is closely related with non-tax revenue, and health 
expenditure is slightly correlated with non-tax revenue. The local social policies whose 
expenditures are not associated with financial sources are fire, culture and environment. 
In the case of fire, the level of service provision is more or less standardised (c. v. 0.237) 
regardless of financial sources. However, despite the huge variation between localities, 
environment does not show any notable relationships with financial sources. It seems 
that environmental policy is more strongly influenced by other variables in Korean local 
authorities. 
Finally, the major findings outlined above can be illustrated graphically here. In 
chapter Four, a hypothetical model was introduced (Figure 4-1). It win be useful to use 
this model to explain the major findings of this empirical analysis. Figure 4-1 should be 
amended and extended to incorporate the linkages between financial sources and 
expenditure area in Korean local government. Figure 7-3 below shows the linkages 
which emerged from the analysis of relationships between financial sources and 
spending areas. In the figure the vertical axis is allocated to the local tax element since 
the local tax is often taken as the most serious element in local financing-spending 
decisions, especially when local government is treated as a corporate entity like in this 
study. 
In Figure 7-3, the demand for expenditure (Ed) illustrates the inverse 
relationship between central subsidies and local tax. This indicates that central 
subsidies are mostly distributed to the localities which do not have financial resources 
for nationally imposed policy programmes. On line ES NTR is a locally raised finance 
which differentiates the gap between the line Ed and Ed' in the figure. An increase of 
NTR leads to an increase of service provision with a same level of local tax t. 'Me 
figure demonstrates some relationships between financial source and local service 
provision in Korea. An increase of SUBS and/or CSTX is positively related to the 
increase of social service expenditure. Similar relationships are presented by the figure 
between NTR and EsP and between local tax t and Ee and Ek 
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<Figure 7-3> An Extended Model on Financing-Spending Relationships in Local 
Government ofKorea 
Local Ed' 
Tax 
Ed 
Es 
NTR 
t 
SUBS + 
CST 
!X- 
0 1., Ess Ee Expenditure 
ESP 
Eh 
Where; 
NTR non-tax revenue 
SUBS Subsidies 
Es the supply of expenditure 
Ee expenditure on education 
Eh expenditure on health 
CSTX central share tax 
TRANS transfers 
Ed the demand of expenditure 
ESP expenditure on sports 
Ess expenditure on social service 
7.3. IMPACTS OF SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Socioeconomic Variables 
In this study, nine socioeconon-dc variables are selected. The explanatory power of 
these nine variables is exan-dned in the output analysis of local service distribution in Korea. 
All these variables are found most often in the output analysis of local service 
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distributions as listed in chapter Three. They are typical examples of the socioeconon-dc 
variables most commonly employed in the socioeconomic analysis of local service 
distributions. The following table shows the independent variables which are used to 
explain budgetary decision-makings in this study. First of all, nine variables are 
illustrated with their regional variations. Again the coefficient of variation (c. v. ) 
indicates the extent to which social expenditure clusters around the same level between 
localities. A lower c. v. implies greater similarity in a given socioeconomic variable and 
vice versa. Population density shows the highest level of variation from locality to 
locality (c. v. 1.681). The second largest variation is found in Democratic Party control 
(1.543) and the third in Independent Party control (c. v. 0.862). The c. v. of saving is 
0.850 and that of Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) control is 0.554 respectively. On the 
other hand, regional variations are extremely small in the case of school-aged 
population (c. v. 0.064) and turnout in election (c. v. 0.113) indicating few differences 
between localities in these variables. 
<Table 7-5> Regional Variations in selected Variables, 1992 
C. V SteDev Mean S. E. Mean 
Pop Density 1.681 4699 2795 1213.392 
% Elderly 0.288 3.470 12.601 0.896 
% School-aged Pop 0.064 1.872 29.067 0.483 
% Car ? wnership 0.480 11.351 23.651 3.423 
Saving 0.850 3618 4254 934.277 
Tumout 0.113 6.977 61.840 1.801 
% DLP 0.554 33.534 60.520 8.658 
% DP 1.543 35.571 23.053 9.184 
% INDP 0.862 14.075 16.327 3.634 
Note 1) Korean Won (Thousand). 
Note 2) Pop: Population, DLP: Democratic Liberal Party, DP: Democratic Party, INDP: 
Independent Party. 
Source: Chiyok Tongkye Yonbo (Regional Statistics Year-book 1992), Bureau of 
Statistics, Korea, 1992; Management of Election, Central Council of Election 
Management, Korea, 1991. 
4W 
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The next step is to correlate the selected socioeconon-dc variables with the sub- 
areas in social policy7. Table 7-6 contains twenty seven correlation coefficients 
between the socioeconon-dc variables and social policy sectors. The first feature of 
Table 7-6 to be noted is that expenditure variations in social services are negatively 
correlated with three variables; the percentage of car-ownership, the population density 
and the relative proportion of council seats occupied by DLP. This comes, more than 
anything else, from the fact that social services in Korean local government are mainly 
divisible services provided for those in difficulty. Therefore, social services are less 
needed in better-off localities and in highly populated areas which have benefited from 
urbanisation in Korea. This inference is again supported by the fact that a highly 
positive correlation appears between social services and the proportion of elderly 
people. Elderly people are the main beneficiaries of the divisible social services in local 
authorities of Korea. Secondly, health and environment spending similarly exhibits 
positive correlations with the population density, the per capita saving and the 
proportion of car-ownership. This means that the more affluent the residents of an 
authority, the more likely they are to spend on such things as health and environment. 
Needless to say, health and environmental services are indivisible services provided 
collectively by local government. Thirdly, education seems to be positively correlated 
with saving and the proportion of car-ownership while having a negative relation with 
election turnout and the proportion of elderly people. What is meant by this is that 
education is given a higher priority in more affluent localities. This result is in line with 
7. Correlations between these socioeconomic variables are presented in Appendix 1 
(Table 11-8). Eight correlations appear significant in the table. The variable 'saving' 
shows positive correlations at extremely high levels in relation to 'population density' 
(. 9372) and 'car ownership' (. 8051). (There is the problem of multicolliniarity in 
multiple regression analysis between those variables. ) Those localities which are highly 
populated seem to be econon-dcally prosperous, and the variable of car ownership can 
be taken as a good indicator of the living standard. Another positive correlation is 
found between 'turnout' and 'proportion of elderly people' and between 'control of 
independent' and 'turnout'. These results are in line with the negative correlations 
appearing between 'car ownership' and 'proportion of elderly people' and between 
'turnout' and 'car ownership'. Car ownership was mentioned above as a good indicator 
of the living standard. Therefore, it follows that those localities which have a high 
percentage of elderly people are economically worse-off but politically participant at 
least in electoral events. The wealthier a locality is, the less interests the residents of the 
locality have in local elections. 
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the analysis of financial sources where education spending was closely associated with 
locally-raised revenues. Fourthly, culture and sports are the policy sectors in social 
policy which do not show a relationship with the selected socioeconomic variables in 
Table 7-6. 
Three main points emerge from these results. Not surprisingly, population 
density shows an extremely high correlation with health and environment expenditures. 
As can be seen in the table, the correlation coefficients are . 9666 and . 87 11 respectively. 
Secondly, of much greater significance, is the fact that political party control appears to 
emerge as being a weak variable. This feature contrasts sharply with the British 
evidence which shows that party politics makes a difference to local spending (Alt, 
1971; Hoggart, 1987; 1989). Almost all studies of budgetary outputs in the U. K. have 
found local expenditure on service provision to be related to party control. For instance, 
the strength of relationship obtained by Hoggart was always a strong one (R2 
coefficients were almost invariably over 0.90). Alt (1971) also concludes that Labour 
authorities spend more than Conservative ones in such areas as housing, education, and 
health and less on the police service. In Korea, party control does not show any 
systematic effects. This may be because parties offer no channel through which social 
groups can organise their political demands. Bureaucrats are instead likely to play the 
role of interest articulation on behalf of political parties. 
Thirdly, the only correlation is found between DLP and social services. The 
presence of DLP is accompanied by a decrease of local spending on social services (- 
. 7180). In other words, the more seats DLP has in a local council the smaller the budget 
likely to be allocated for social services. Here it is necessary to bear in mind that local 
authorities have little room for manoeuvre particularly in social services. This suggests 
that those localities in which DLP holds office are relatively well-off compared with 
other localities (See correlation matrix in Appendix 1). 
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OLS Regression Analysis 
Table 7-7 lists the results of regressing the selected socioeconon-dc variables on 
each policy sector. The figures in the table are the R2 showing the percentage of the 
variances explained by the selected socioeconomic variables. The table indicates that 
the impact of the selected socioeconomic variables is extremely high on expenditure 
variations in social policy. For example, more than 95 percent of variance in health, 
environment and education can be explained by the selected socioeconomic variables. 
More than 83 percent of spending variance between localities can be explained by those 
variables also in social services. Sports is the only social policy sector that shows no 
significant correlation in the social policy area. Spending on sports proved to be highly 
correlated with the financial source of non-tax revenue in the previous section. 
<Table 7-7> OLS Regression Results: Percentage of the Variance (R2) in Social Policy 
Expenditures explained by selected Variables, 1992 
Expenditure Area Multiple Regression R2 
DIVI SOPO 
Social Services . 83344 (. 0008) 
INDI SOPO 
Health . 98773 (. 0000) Environment . 97185 (. 0000) Education . 95905 (. 0000) Fire . 48055 (. 0180) Culture . 44409 (. 0252) Athletics * (P >. 05) 
INDU . 81254 (. 0012) COUN . 71753 (. 0010) OTHE . 67814 (. 0018) GENE . 56144 (. 0079) REGI . 43583 (. 0271) 
Note 1) * refers to the cases in which PIN reached 0.050 limits. in stepwise regression. 
For the variables in the equation, see Appendix 3. 
In sum, four distinctive features emerge from the output analysis of local 
expenditure variations and socioeconomic variables in this study. First and foremost, 
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party control has no effects on spending variations between localities. This may be 
attributable to the lack of ideological differentiation between political parties. Second, 
living standards appear to be positively correlated with health, environment and 
education whilst negatively related to social services. What is meant by this is that the 
expenditure levels in education, health and environment continue to be higher in better- 
off localities. On the other hand, poorer localities are likely to concentrate their efforts 
on social services. Thirdly, population density shows extremely high correlations with 
both health and environment expenditure. Population density seems to exercise a 
noticeable impact on health and environment spending. Finally, it is worth noting that a 
high positive correlation appears between social services and the proportion of elderly 
people. It may be that social services are mostly distributed to the aged people in 
Korean local government. 
To conclude, the explanatory power of the selected socioeconon-dc variables is 
higher than that of financial sources in this study. It is not surprising that most of the 
traditional output studies have attached more importance to socioeconomic environment 
rather than procedural politics within local government (Boyne, 1985b). 
7.4. URBAN HIERARCHY EFFECT 
Variables of Urban Hierarchy 
In chapter Three, four sorts of urban hierarchy were identified in theoretical 
discussion. They were: 1) ecological hierarchy; 2) adn-dnistrative hierarchy; 3) 
economic hierarchy; and 4) urbanity. Ecological hierarchy is extremely difficult to 
evaluate for present purposes since this study concerns a much larger locality than a 
single city. As explained earlier, ecological hierarchy is mainly about the hinterland 
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population. This concept would be appropriate when the unit of analysis is a city which 
has clear boundaries in relation to its hinterland. However, in this study, the unit of 
analysis includes several cities and this hinterland at the same time. As a result, the 
daily movement of people is mostly taking place within each locality except for special 
cases. Therefore, this study limits its scope to the other three concepts of urban 
hierarchy, namely administrative hierarchy, economic hierarchy and internal urbanity. 
Administrative hierarchy merely refers to the status of the locality (like special city, 
direct control city and ordinary province 'Do' in Korea). Economic hierarchy means 
the level of centrality in economic activities. As mentioned in chapter Three, it is based 
on the location of the headquarters of the largest business corporations. As of 1990,77 
percent of the 418 largest corporations in Korea had their headquarters in Seoul, 6.94 
percent in Kyonggi, 5.02 percent in Pusan, 3.34 percent in Kyongnam, 2.87 percent in 
Inchon, 1.2 percent in Taegu and so on down the urban hierarchy8. The 15 localities 
are ranked, on the basis of economic hierarchy, according to the number of their 
corporation headquarters. Finally, urbanity9 is conceptualised mainly in terms of 
population density in this study. The differing notions of urbanity have created 
enormous difficulties of measurement. In this study, the concept of urbanity refers to 
'the relative degree of internal service needs generated in highly populated cities' as 
mentioned in chapter Three. The other important notions of urbanity are reflected in 
the other concepts of urban hierarchy such as administrative hierarchy and econon-dc 
hierarchy. For instance, industrial features are reflected in the notion of economic 
hierarchy. Thus, this study focuses on the notions of habitational characteristics, that 
is demographic features in the internal world of local community. Here 
8. Sanjang Hesa Survey (Survey on Listed Companies), Daewoo Securities, Seoul, 
1991. 
9. Despite arbitrary definitions (Johnson, 1990,4) the concept of urbanity has often 
been invoked in the area of planning. It is variously defined according to the emphasis 
of research. The concept includes three notions such as: (1) inhabitants (Bibby and 
Shepherd, 1990) (2) industrial structure (Ronnas, 1984,9) and (3) social and cultural 
characteristics with an emphasis on the mode of living (Johnson, 1990,5). For more 
details see Appendix. 
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population density is taken as an important measure of urbanity which indicates the 
level of internal service needs. 
Table 7-8 lists the correlations between the rank-order in the urban hierarchy 
and the rank-order in service variation. The central concern of the table is to test the 
proposition that the higher the rank of the locality in the national pyramid, the greater 
local government expenditure is likely to be on certain services. This approach focuses 
on the ordinal features of service distributions found in localities. In other words, the 
ordinal formats of related data are more relevant to the original intentions of urban 
hierarchy theory than parametric formats of the data. For this purpose, the levels of 
service provision need to be transformed into a rank order. All the data used in this 
section were transformed into an ordinal scale which refers to the rank-ordering of 
selected localities in Korea. This ordinal feature (Graft, 1985,90) of non-parametric 
data is accompanied by the use of Spearman's rho in analysis (Selkirk, 1981,22; de 
Vaus, 1991,187). 
Turning to Table 7-8, several correlations are shown between the rank-orders of 
urban hierarchy and service provision. First of all, a glance at the table suggests that 
very constant relationships exist among the three measures of urban hierarchy. All of 
the social policy areas constantly show + or - correlation coefficients in relation to the 
three measures. This implies that there is a systematic linkage among the three 
measures of urban hierarchylO. 
There is no discernable difference observable in the distinction between 
divisible and indivisible social policy sectors. The only point that is worth noting is the 
fact that, unexpectedly, social service uniformly shows a negative correlation in relation 
to all the indicators of urban hierarchy adopted in this analysis. The urban hierarchy 
theory basically concerns the inidivisible social policy sectors. However, analysis 
shows that the high-ranking local governments in Korea spend less on social services 
which are basically divisible services for those in poverty. It may be that fewer 
10. Among the three measures of urban hierarchy, each measure of urban hierarchy is 
strongly correlated with the others. 
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beneficiaries of social services live in the localities ranked high in terms of urban 
hierarchy. Like Western industrial countries, there is a problem of econon-dc inequality 
between urban and rural areas in Korea. However, the existence of the inequality 
problem is usually the other way around in Korea. Urban areas have been benefited 
much more than rural areas from econon-dc growth over the last decades. 
<Table 7-8> Spearman's rho between Urban Hierarchy and the Percentage of Service 
Expenditure in Local Budget, 1991 
ADWE HIERARCHY NCH URBANITY 
DIVI SOPO 
Soc Service -. 77942** -. 73651** -. 81071** 
INDI SOPO 
Health . 60622* . 26175 . 53571* Environment . 33605 . 16516 . 20423 Culture -. 27630 -. 32312 -. 19643 Education . 86603** . 61195* . 86429** Sports . 28068 . 03162 . 20733 Fire -. 33404 -. 13900 -. 27500 Park . 62121* . 30986 . 63271* Museum . 45068 . 04455 . 23202 Library -. 56961* -. 17164 -. 50402 
COUN -. 66395** -. 68957** -. 75714** GENE -. 21670 -. 50048 -. 33423 INDU -. 81119** -. 63045* -. 79212** REGI . 67220** . 72567** . 77143** 
Note 1) ADIVE HIERARCHY: Administrative Hierarchy, NCH: Number of 
Corporation Headquarters. 
Note 2) ** at 0.0 1; * at 0.05 
Among the indivisible social policies, education appears to be positively 
associated with all three measures of urban hierarchy. The higher a locality is in the 
urban hierarchy, the larger the proportion of its budget is spent on education. Parks' 
11. Here the use of this concept is based on the terminology adopted in the official 
publications. When the public authorities make a functional classification of local 
expenditures the parks cover a broad range of what may be called 'recreation'. In this 
study, the usage of the word also covers not merely the green space parks but also 
recreation facilities provided by the local authorities. 
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and health are also positively correlated with administrative hierarchy (. 62121 and 
. 60622 respectively) and internal urbanity (. 63271 and . 53571 respectively). The higher 
a locality is in the administrative hierarchy or urbanity, the larger the proportion of its 
budget that is distributed to parks and health. Overall, administrative hierarchy seems 
to explain more than economic hierarchy and internal urbanity. It is positively 
associated with education (. 86603), health (. 60622) and parks (. 62121) whilst it has a 
negative correlation with social services (-. 77942). 
OLS Regression Analysis 
Table 7-9 presents the percentage of spending variance in social policy sectors 
explained by the urban hierarchy. The table lists the results of regressing the rank- 
orders in the urban hierarchy on the rank-orders in the proportion of service spending in 
the local budget. Education (. 74699) and social service (. 65726) are well explained by 
the urban hierarchy theory. Around 74 percent of variations in education spending is 
explained by the urban hierarchy theory. On the other hand, no statistical significance 
is found in six social policy sectors (environment, fire, sports, museum, public library, 
and culture). In those social policy sectors, the results do not accord with the claim of 
urban hierarchy theory that a locality's national position affects its spending patterns, 
especially in what are termed indivisible services like parks, libraries, fire, police, 
sewage, highways, and planning. These services are named collective services by 
Hansen (1984,344) because their costs and benefits are city-wide, and available to any 
person or resident who wishes to make use of them. 
Tbree reasons why the urban hierarchy approach does not hold up in those social 
policy sectors can be suggested in this study. First of all, this may be attributable to the 
fact that local expenditure in each service area was based on the percentage of each 
sector's spending in the total local budget. The relative proportion shows relative efforts 
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of local authorities but may be muting the absolute size of local expenditure. If the data 
are based on per capita spending rather than the relative percentage in the local budget, 
the indicators of the urban hierarchy approach can explain more about the distribution 
of social services within a locality. Secondly, it may be partly due to the fact that 
certain services depend heavily on the private market in Korea. For instance, much of 
the library and museum services are provided by the private sector. The private 
provision of these services can distort the urban hierarchy effects reflected in the public 
budget. 
<Table 7-9> Results of OLS Regression: Percentage of Variance (R2) in Social Policies 
explained by Urban Hierarchy 
Expenditure Area Multiple Regression R2 
DIVI SOPO 
Social Service . 65726(0002) 
INDISOPO 
Health . 38933 (. 0129) Environment * (P>. 05) 
Culture * (p>. 05) 
Education . 74699 (. 0000) Sports * (p>. 05) 
Fire * (p>. 05) 
Park . 41229 (. 0099) Museum * (P>. 05) 
Public Library * (P>. 05) 
COUN . 36981 (. 0162) GENE * (p>. 05) 
INDU . 67228 (. 0002) REGI . 43302 (. 0077) 
Note 1) For the variables in the equation, see Appendix 3. 
Lastly, the other possibility is that the effects of fast growing cities exceed the 
effects of urban hierarchy. Growing cities may have lower per capita spending than 
stable or declining cities if their resources lag behind the need for expenditure on urban 
infrastructure and if grant formulas lag behind changing circumstances (Aiken et al., 
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1987,35 1). Declining population is not necessarily accompanied by declining spending 
needs on infrastructure and social services 12. 
7.5. INCREMENTALISM AS OUTPUTS 
Magnitude of Change 
Incrementalism has long been one of the familiar theories in budgetary analysis 
(Wildavsky, 1974; Rubin, 1989,78). It is too often adopted in describing the politics of 
budgeting and sometimes in prescribing an alternative to the conflicts of the budgetary 
politics. Chapter Three has examined four differing definitions of incrementalism used 
by incrementalists. 'Ibis surfeit of definitions makes incrementalism one of the most 
confusing themes when applied in empirical analysis. Chapter Three showed how 
different writers use the term to refer to different budgetary phenomena such the 
magnitude of budgetary change, the regularity of change, political adjustment and 
bounded analysis. The first two views appear in output analysis whereas the last two 
12. To conclude, the empirical findings presented in this chapter suggest that the urban 
hierarchy approach is influenced by many factors. One of the factors may be the 
public/private distinction in a country. The results of this study did not accord with the 
claims of urban hierarchy theory in six policy sectors, such as environment, fire, sports, 
museum, public library and culture. Some of these services depend heavily on the 
private sector in Korea and this might distort the urban hierarchy effects reflected in the 
public budget. Second, the type of cities should also be considered influential in the 
provision of public services. Usually there is a kind of functional differentiation 
between cities within a horizental dimension. It would not be appropriate to compare 
all the localities without giving consideration to their specific types. For instance, a 
resort place is likely to be different from an industrial city in its expenditure patterns. 
Third, what is more important is that urban hierarchy theory seems to be another version 
of output analysis on socioeconomic factors. Most variables which are considered 
crucial in urban hierarchy thoery have been used by the socioeconomic approach in the 
tradition of output analysis. They include such factors as population movements, 
urbanisation, industrial structure and so on (see Table 3-1 in chapter Three). These 
socioeconomic variables are expressed as ordinal ranks in urban hierachy theoy. The 
concept 'urban' reflects the socioeconon-dc factors surrounding a certain locality and the 
term 'hierarchy' refers to the transformation of selected variables into rank-orders in a 
holist sense. These points limit the theoretical value of the urban hierarchy approach in 
explaining policy variation in local government. 
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can be seen in the process approach. In this chapter, incrementalist features of local 
expenditure in the social policy area are examined in terms of 'incrementalism as 
output'. Incrementalism as process will be explored in the next chapter. 
Ile data to be analysed are derived from the changes in the ratio of social policy 
expenditure to the total local budget. In analysing incrementalist features of policy- 
making, the choice of the unit of analysis is of great significance (Sharpe and Newton, 
1984,93). Smaller sub-service units are likely to experience sweeping changes and 
therefore incrementalism is scarcely observed. On the other hand, incrementalist 
features show up very well in large service units. Aa a hypothetical example, in this 
study, the choice of the whole local budget would show more incrementalist features 
than the budget of a sub-agency within the social policy area. This is because a large 
unit of analysis itself tends to obscure variations within a service category. By contrast, 
small agencies within a department are likely to show non-incremental changes in their 
budgets. 
<Fable 7- 1 O> Magnitude of Change in Social Policies 
Locality 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89 
Seoul 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.55 
Pusan 0.25 0.31 0.58 0.35 
Taegu 0.55 0.43 0.37 0.43 
Inchon 0.70 0.21 0.47 0.43 
Kwangju 0.43 0.71 0.57 
Taejon 
Kyonggi 0.40 0.41 0.28 0.15 
Kangwon 0.07 0.46 0.23 0.08 
Chungbuk 0.31 0.42 0.19 0.15 
Chungnam 0.47 0.57 0.23 -0.14 Chonbuk 0.35 0.51 0.17 0.26 
Chonnam 0.07 0.53 0.15 0.20 
Kyongbuk 0.40 0.54 0.19 0.12 
Kyongnam 0.35 0.65 0.27 0.19 
Cheju 0.63 0.18 0.37 0.12 
Note) * refers to the case wherein the adn-dnistrative status of the local authorities was 
different. 
Source: Kyongie TongAye Yonbo (Econornic Statistical Yearbook), EPB, Korea, 1991. 
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It follows that the selection of the unit of analysis is vital in the incrementalist 
approach. Neither total expenditure nor too small a sub-category is desirable. An 
extremity in the unit of analysis may lead to a pre-detem-lined conclusion. Therefore, 
this study adopts an intermediate category as the unit of analysis rather than an 
individual social policy sector or the total local budget. The data are presented mainly 
for the social policy area here. 
To take the magnitude of change as a starting point, Table 7-10 presents an 
analysis of the budgetary outputs in the social policy area. The figures presented in the 
table cover the period between financial years 1986 and 1989. The figures represent the 
magnitude of change (MC) which is the size of change (AC) in a given year's 
expenditure (Et) divided by the previous year's expenditure (Et_, ). It goes, therefore, 
MC = AC/ Et- 1. = Et-Et- l/Et_ 1. The results of analysis range from -0.14 (Chungnarn in 
1988-89) to 0.70 (Inchon in 1985-86) in the table. Here -0.14 means that expenditure 
on social policy area experienced a decrease of 14 % in a given year; 0.70 refers to an 
increase of 70 % in expenditure on the social policy area. 
Attempting to interpret these figures again poses a fundamental problem with 
incrementalism: namely, the arbitrariness of deciding whether a result is incremental or 
non-incremental. A lot of previous studies suggest that the use of highly subjective 
criteria is unavoidable. This is one of the fundamental limits which have recurrently 
appeared in most incrementalist studies. In fact, Wildavsky (1974,14) has set the 
parameter by asserting that any change is 'incremental' if it is within the range ± .3 
ALLOt-1 (that is, the allocation level in year t_l). This was further narrowly 
operationalised by Danziger (1976a, 338) into three categories where 0.05 to 0.15 
ALLOt_l is 'incremental', 0.16 to 0.30 ALLOt_I is 'relatively incremental' and 0.30 to 
0.90 is 'non-incremental'. If we follow Danziger's operationalisation of incrementalism 
in this table, most changes in the social policy area fall into the classification either of 
tnon-incremental' or 'relatively incremental'. 
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Secondly, incrementalism in terms of regularity of changes can be seen again 
from the output analysis of local expenditure histories. Regularity of change refers to 
4constant rate' of budgetary changes over the years in this study 13. In order to compare 
the regularity of changes, variations of the change over years were expressed with the 
coefficient of variation (c. v. ). C. V. is S (s. d. ) divided by the mean value nx . It is 
calculated from the data presented in Table 7-10. Here 0 refers to the case in which the 
rate of change is perfectly constant and incremental. A higher c. v. indicates greater 
difference in the regularity of change, and means non-incremental change in budgets. 
From this perspective, Table 7-11 shows that Taegu has had most incremental changes 
during the fiscal years form 1985 to 1989. Its c. v. records the lowest point (0.18) out of 
fourteen localities. Taegu is followed by Kwangju (0.25) and Pusan (0.38) in a row. At 
the other extreme is Kangwon Province showing the highest c. v. at 0.86. Chonnam and 
Seoul also show fairly high c. v. at 0.83 and at 0.73 respectively. 
Table 7-11 presents a time-series analysis within each locality. In addition to 
this, another interpretation can be made based on the cross-sectional analysis at a given 
year. Table 7-12 shows the results of a cross-sectional analysis at each fiscal year from 
1985 to 1989. The time-series analysis (Table 7-11) within a certain locality seems to 
display larger variations in c. v. than the cross-sectional analysis at a given year (Table 
7-12). The cross-sectional analysis on the regularity of changes shows no single 
incremental case when judged by Danziger's standards. In this study, incrementalism is 
observed in the time-series analysis rather than in the cross-sectional analysis. This 
suggests that social policies of local governments may be sin-dlarly subject to 
4 situational contingencies' like economic growth and recession in a given year. 
13. The term regularity of change is sometimes used to refer to the 'fair share' model in 
the empirical study of incrementalism. Its main message is that all related departments 
are likely to experince the same amount of increase or decrease in their budgets at a 
given year because of power balance and expectations. Whilst the constant rate model focuses on the time-series analysis of a departmental budget, the fair share model 
stresses inter-departmental comparison in a given year. 
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<Table 7-11 > Regularity of Change: Time Series in Each Locality 
Locality C. V. Std Dev Mean Rangel 
Seoul 0.73 0.19 0.26 0.40 
Pusan 0.38 0.14 0.37 0.33 
Taegu 0.18 0.08 0.45 0.18 
Inchon 0.44 0.20 0.45 0.49 
Kwangju 0.25 0.14 0.57 0.28 
Taejon 
Kyonggi 0.39 0.12 0.31 0.26 
Kangwon 0.86 0.18 0.21 0.39 
Chungbuk 0.44 0.12 0.27 0.27 
Chungnam 0.57 0.20 0.35 0.71 
Chonbuk 0.47 0.15 0.32 0.34 
Chonnam 0.83 0.20 0.24 0.46 
Kyongbuk 0.61 0.19 0.31 0.42 
Kyongnam 0.54 0.20 0.37 0.46 
Cheju 0.70 0.23 0.33 0.51 
Note 1) Range is the difference between the maximum and the minimum in observed 
values. 
Source: see Appendix 1. 
<Table 7-12> Regularity of Change: Cross-Sectional Analysis in Each Year 
85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 
e. V. 0.58 0.37 0.54 0.63 
Std Dev 18.27 15.14 16.91 16.74 
Mean 31.46 41.43 31.36 26.71 
The next step is an analysis on the explanatory power of the previous year's 
share of this year's budget. Equation 7-1 lists the results of regressing the 1991 share of 
the social policy budget on to that of 1992. The share of social policies is the 
percentage of those policies in the total local budget in a given year 14. The result of 
analysis show R2 at. 65135 (. 0003) and Beta weight at. 80706. It follows, therefore, 
14. However, in most empirical analyses, the budgetary data which are employed to 
establish the extent of incrementalism tend to be absolute budgetary figures. Such 
absolute figures, whether they are about the per capita expenditure or the share of a 
certain policy area, seem to be misleading. If this study adopts the absolute budgetary figures of social policies, the impaqt of the 1992 share is exaggerated a lot. A much higher effect is produced with RI at . 99746 (. 0000). In this case, the budgetary equation is LESOt = -7759.03 + 1.1779 * LESOt-l, where LESOt is local expenditure 
on social policies at year t. 
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that Equation 7-1 explains around 67 percent of the 1992 budget on social policies in 
Korean local government15. 
Equation 7- 1> LESOt = 9.8183 +. 68713 * LESOt-1 
where, LESOt is the percentage of social policy spending at a given year and 
LESOt-l is the percentage of social policy spending in the previous year. 
7.6. CONCLUSION 
An output analysis has been conducted in this chapter. I'lie starting point for the 
empirical component of the chapter was an assessment of policy outputs as an 
explanation for inter-local variation in the social policy area. Expenditure variations in 
social policy sectors were examined using a more appropriate conceptual framework 
than is conventionally used to measure their effects on local policy variations. Four 
dependent variables were employed in this part including financial source, 
socioeconomic environment, urban hierarchy theory and incrementalism. The 
15. Again, the analysis of incrementalism in this study addresses itself to two 
fundamental questions. The first is how incrementalism can be measured empirically. 
This question is about the difficulty in setting up the standards with which 
incrementalist features can be differentiated from non-incrementalist ones. It has been 
recognised as a highly subjective task by many researchers. As long as the judgement is 
highly subjective, any conclusion from future studies in the incrementalist tradition will 
unavoidably remain questionable. The second concerns the unit of categorisation in 
empirical analysis. Small size of service areas is subject to dramatic shifts of 
programme while the massive stability in large service categories obscures variations 
within sub-policy sectors. The choice of the size of research unit tends to have a 
decisive influence on the research findings. There has been differential support for the 
incrementalist thesis across different levels of analysis. It follows that different 
categorisations of service area can produce different conclusions even in a same 
locality. 
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percentages of variation in local social policies explained by each variable have been 
displayed in each section. 
The next chapter first explores the politics of the policy process in local 
government. It will provide more information on the operating mechanism of local 
policy-making with some answers to questions of 'how' and 'why'. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: A PROCESS APPROACH TO TWO 
EXTREME CASES 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter conducted an output analysis of the social policies of local 
government in Korea. Policy variation in Korean local authorities has been analysed 
from the point of view of input and output relationships. After identifying expenditure 
variation between local governments, the previous chapter examined the socioeconomic 
constraints upon the local policy-making mechanism. The explanatory power of 
environmental variables were inferred from the end-products of expenditure decisions 
in local authorities. This chapter now attempts to explain the policy variation by means 
of a process approach. Efforts are made to explore the dynamics of policy-making 
giving particular emphasis to political factors. Based on the objective and comparable 
information produced in the previous chapter, the working mechanism of local 
government will be explored as a source of variation in local policy outputs. 
As noted earlier in the account of the research design, two local authorities are 
selected for a comparative case study in this chapter. One is Seoul which is the highest 
spending local authority in Korea; and the other is Kyonggi which is the lowest spender 
in social policy area. The comparison of these two extreme cases is expected to reveal 
contrasting features of the policy-making process which might otherwise be obscured. 
Without losing sight of the results of the output analysis, this chapter will explore 
questions of 'how' and 'why' in the process of policy-making in Korean local 
authorities. Procedural variables are deduced from the theoretical framework 
established in chapter Four and their relevance will be discussed with the results of 
empirical surveys. The framework consists of three dimensions: political leadership, 
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administrative process and social inputsl. Each dimension is reduced to the main 
policy actors who play crucial roles in social policy decisions in Korean local 
government. 
Since the output analysis has been conducted in chapter Seven, the main effort 
will be put into examining the interactions between policy actors in the process of 
policy-making. As the main participants in policy-making, policy actors will be 
approached to see 'HOW do the policy variations occur? '. To answer this question it is 
necessary to differentiate significant loci of explanation which are often neglected in 
policy studies. Three different loci of explanation are useful in capturing the important 
phenomena of policy-making in local government such as influence level, interest 
mediation and policy resources2: 
- Influence level refers to the amount of power exercised by a policy actor; 
- Interest medjtion means the policy orientation of main participants in local 
policy-making ; 
- Policy resources refer to the means through which policy actors translate their influence into actioOý 
1. The concept of each dimension was defined in chapter Four, and operational 
measures which will be used for the empirical study were also explained there. 
2. Policy studies mostly adopt one of these three loci of explanation : the level of 
influence (Cnudde and McCrone, 1969; Lewis-Beck, 1977; Schofield, 1978; Paddison, 
1983; Aiken et al., 1987), interest mediation or perception (Dearlove, 1973; Newton, 
1976; Young 1979; Laffin and Young 1985), resources and strategy (Wildavsky 1964; 
Judge, 1979; Stoker and Wilson 1986; Rhodes, 1988). An adoption of a specific locus 
of explanation can be vital to interpreting the results of empirical surveys. This is 
amply exemplified in the conclusion of this study concerning the explanations of the 
dual state theory. 
3. Interest mediation is labelled differently by different writers: Dearlove (1973,208), 
for example, refers to 'disposition. This suggests there is a perceptual screen 
(Dearlove, 1973,76) which is vital to deciding what is to be done. A policy actor, 
whether it is a person or a governmental institution, tends to be dominated by this 
perceptual screen stressing certain kinds of policies while giving antipathetic 
consideration to others. 
4. The possession of certain policy resources is closely linked to the adoption of certain 
strategies in policy-making. Strategy can be seen as a tactic and manner of behaviour 
employed by related actors who wish to increase the amount of influence on policy- 
making. The strategy is the link, according to Wildavsky (1974), between the intentions 
and perceptions of budget officials and the political system that imposes restraints and 
creates opportunities for them. 
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Unlike in output analysis, the political dynamics can be tackled only by 
approaching the conversion process of policy-making in local government. Since it is 
almost impossible to assess all the related policy actors, this study approaches the local 
officials who are working at the cross-road of local policy-making. Local officials' 
qualitative assessments are quantified using the questionnaire survey method in this 
chapter. This is to say that the dynamics of interaction between policy actors are 
detected through the eyes of local officials using of questionnaire surveys. The 
weakness and strength of the questionnaire survey method were examined within the 
context of output and process approaches earlier in the account of the research design. 
Since particular emphasis was placed on the comparison of two localities, the 
same number of survey questionnaires were distributed to each locality; Seoul (125) and 
Kyonggi (125). Of these 250 surveyed, 222 returned a completed questionnaire, giving 
a response rate of 88 per cent. The results of the surveys were analysed using the T- 
Test technique in an SPSSI computer programme. The T-test is useful for discerning 
the difference in means of paired samples in order to test the nun hypothesis that the 
difference in means is zero between the two localities (Bryman and Cramer, 1990,135). 
This chapter now explains the results of the T-Test analysis. It begins by outlining the 
overall picture of the survey results on decision-making in social policy expenditure in 
two local authorities. Ile general features are listed in Table 8-1 and 8-2 characterising 
each policy actor in terms of influence level, interest mediation and resources with 
mean scores. The mean values, together with their Standard Deviation and the number 
of cases, are listed. Firstly, public officials were asked to measure the relative degrees 
of influence exerted by each policy actor on a five-point scale ranging from I to 5 <Q 
1,2 and 3 in Appendix 6>. The scale point 1 refers to the lowest level of influence and 5 
to the highest. The standard deviation in the table indicates the extent to which 
responses cluster around the mean value in assessing each policy actor. 
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<Table8-1> Mean Scores and Variances 
Mean S. D. Cases 
A. Influence Level 
Inter-departmental competition 2.88 1.04 219 
Mayor (Local Minister) 3.44 . 98 220 Local Council 3.17 . 98 218 Central Government 3.44 . 98 221 Target Groups 2.37 . 92 218 
B. Interest Mediation 
My Department 3.53 1.22 218 
Mayor (Local Minister) 3.11 1.07 219 
Local Council 3.61 . 98 217 Central Government 2.26 . 91 220 Target Groups 3.65 1.13 219 
Here most important to the mean score is the fact that the Mayor (Local Minister 
in Kyonggi) and central government are the most influential policy actors in both Seoul 
and Kyonggi. In Table 8-1, these two policy actors show the same degree of influence 
at 3.44. On the other hand, the lowest score (2.37) is assigned to the social groups 
which are benefited from social policies5, implying that they exert the lowest level of 
influence on local expenditure decisions. This is followed by 'inter-departmental 
competition' which records a mean value of 2.88. 
Secondly, public officials were given a five-point scale on which to assess the 
interest mediation of each policy actor. The respondents were asked to assess the policy 
orientation of each policy actor in local policy-making <Q 4 in Appendix 6>. They 
were presented with a continuum on which one extreme referred to econon-dc policy and 
the other to social policy. A higher score indicated that the policy actor tended to 
emphasise social policy rather than econon-dc policy in local expenditure decisions and 
vice versa:. point 3 was the mid-point at which an equal level of emphasis was placed on 
social and economic policies. The results shown in Table 8-1 suggest that the target 
5. The beneficiaries of specific policies were defined as 'target groups' in chapter Four. 
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group and local council are the policy actors whose policy orientation is directed most 
towards social policy. Respondents assigned the highest mean value (3.65) to the target 
groups and the second highest mean value (3.63) to the local council. It is on this 
dimension of interest mediation that local government holds the primacy of democratic 
features as compared with central government6. Whilst target groups and the local 
council are apparently social policy oriented, central government appears to be mostly 
concerned with econon-dc policy. The lowest mean score was assigned to central 
government implying that central authorities give more emphasis to economic policy 
than to social policy. 
Thirdly, Table 8-2 describes the distribution of policy resources between policy 
actors. More than anything else, the lion's share of formal authority is possessed by the 
Mayor (Local Minister) while the smallest share was attributed to the target groups. 
Around 42.5 percent of respondents ticked Mayor (Local Minister) and 1.4 percent the 
target groups respectively. Not unexpectedly, the local council appears to have the 
smallest portion of information resource (mean score 2.6). Information resource is held 
by central government albeit with little primacy over the local department. Another 
striking point, contrary to expectations, is that central government seems to be dominant 
in political resource. Around half (48.4%) of the respondents believe that central 
government has various political means of influencing local decision-making on social 
policy spending. Finally, respondents seem to agree about the policy resource of 
professional expertise in expenditure decisions: 56.6 percent of respondents saw their 
own departments as being the largest share holder in professional expertise. Target 
group was ticked by only a few (0.9 %) respondents and local council by none (0 %). 
6. The first and the second results raise a question against the conventional wisdom that 
local policy is made in democratic mode as assumed in many prior researches like the 
dual state theory. Local policy-making does not appear to be more democratic, at least 
in decision-making mode, when compared with the central government. In order to see 
more democratic features of local policy-making it is necessary to approach from the 
sphere of interest mediation. 
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<Table 8-2> Distribution of Policy Resources (%) 
FA PO Fl IN PE 
My Department 6.8 8.1 6.3 31.2 56.6 
Mayor (LOMI) 42.5 19.5 17.2 7.7 2.7 
Planning Board 4.5 5.0 32.6 10.1 10.4 
Local Council 8.1 13.6 13.1 2.6 0.0 
Target Groups 1.4 3.6 1.8 7.7 0.9 
Central Government 33.9 48.4 27.1 36.2 25.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Note) FA: Formal Authority PO: Political Resource. 
FI: Finance IN: Information PE: Professional Expertise, LOMI: Local Minister. 
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These findings raise several questions for more detailed analysis. Which 
dimension of the policy process yields the most contrasting variation in the policy 
outputs between the two extreme cases? What sorts of policy orientation and resource 
are possessed by each policy actor? What is the role of the newly established local 
council in the decisions on social policies? To answer these questions, the following 
section of this chapter compares the survey results for Seoul and Kyonggi. 
8.2. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
When a locality is seen as a corporate political entity, its patterns of policy- 
making are likely to be decided by political leadership. The main factors which 
comprise political leadership in Korean local government are the local council and the 
Mayor (Local minister). Comparisons are made between Seoul and Kyonggi to see 
which kinds of policy variation can be attributed to these policy actors on the dimension 
of political leadership. 
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The most striking change to come about from the launch of the new local 
government system in 1992 was the new establishment of local councils that year. It 
may be of importance to examine the roles and policy orientation of the newly- 
constructed local councils. As for influence level, Table 8-1 pictured the local council 
as ranking third among the five policy actors. Table 8-3 below provides a cross- 
sectional comparison of the degree of influence exercised by the local councils in Seoul 
and Kyonggi as perceived by local officials. As can be seen from the table, the local 
councils in Seoul and Kyonggi seem to have a similar level of influence. The t value is 
non-significant with a two-tailed p (0.806). The mean scores in Seoul and Kyonggi 
appear to be almost the same (3.19 in Seoul and 3.16 in Kyonggi). Likewise, the 
comparison of cross-policy areas shows no difference of influence level between social 
and econon-dc policies. Table 8-3 reveals no difference in the councils' influence across 
localities or across policy areas7. 
The local council was also described by respondents as not exerting a notable 
influence on policy-making. Two public officials interviewed in Kyonggi (Dec. 14, 
1991) said, 'We understand that no strategic planning established by the executive 
branches of local government can be altered by councillors. ' The Director General of 
the Local Tax, Ministry of Home Affairs, (November 17,1991) also gave a sceptical 
view by saying that 'no noticeable changes have been introduced by the construction of 
local councils. Expenditure decisions are being made in almost the same ways as 
before. ' More criticisms were made by other interviewees in Kyonggi (December 14, 
1991). First of all, more complicated budgetary processes were lamented by public 
officials who came under heavier work because of the presence of councillors. A 
majority of respondents to the open-ended questionnaire added, 'Expenditure decisions 
7. The similar level of influence, however, does not rule out the possibility that the local 
councils may be the source of policy variation in expenditure decisions. Their 
difference in policy orientation will be explored in the following section. 
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have become complicated to make. This is mainly because councillors require 
duplicated data and unnecessary documents which results in waste of time' <see Table 
6-4>. In short, the local council's influence is relatively weak compared with other 
policy actors such as the Mayor, central government and local departments. 
<Table 8-3> T-Test Analysisfor Influence Level ofLocal Council 
(Pooled Variance Estimate) (Separate Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.10 1.59 
2-tailed 0.610 0.016 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p < 0.05) 
T-Value 0.25 - 1.40 
2-tailed 0.806 0.164 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
D. F. 218 193.92 
Mean 3.1930 3.1604 3.0777 3.2650 
StD. 0.958 1.006 1.091 0.865 
StE 0.090 0.098 0.107 0.080 
N. 114 106 103 117 
Mayor and Local Minister 
The first feature to be noted about the Mayor and local minister is that the local 
minister in Kyonggi exerts a stronger influence on the decision of social policy 
spending than the Mayor in Seoul. A T-Test8 indicates that a statistically significant 
8. As noted above, a T-Test technique is employed to compare two cases. T-test is used 
to detern-dne if the means of two unrelated samples differ (Bryman and Cramer, 1990, 
135). It does this by comparing the difference between the two means with the standard 
error of the difference in the means of different samples: t= (sample one mean - sample 
two mean)/ standard error of the difference in means. Since we do not know what the 
s. e. of the difference in means is of the population in question, we have to estimate it. 
How this is done depends on whether the difference in the variances of the two samples 
is statistically significant. The information is provided by the F test. 
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difference exists in the influence level of the Mayor in Seoul and the local minister in 
Kyonggi at the probability of 0.036 (p < 0.05). Public officials in Kyonggi perceived 
their minister as having more autonomy than public officials in Seoul. The mean score 
of the local minister in Kyonggi is higher by 0.2779 than that of the Mayor in Seoul. 
However, it seems that there is no notable difference in the Mayor and local 
n-dnister's influence between policy areas. In other words, there is no significant 
difference between social and economic policy areas. The T-Test results apparently 
remain outside the critical region of distribution by showing the probability of 0.299 (p 
0.05)9 between social and econon-dc policies. The mean scores show a negligible 
difference and this difference is not statistically significant when considered in relation 
to the standard error of the difference in means (StE). 
<Table8-4> T-Test Analysis for Influence Level of&yor and Local Minister 
(Pooled Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.32 1.14 
2-tailed 0.145 0.492 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
T-Value -2.11 1.04 
2-tailed 0.036 0.299 
Prob. (p < 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
D. F. 218 218 
Mean 3.3070 3.5849 3.5146 3.3761 
StD. 1.040 0.904 1.018 0.953 
StE 0.097 0.088 0.100 0.088 
N. 114 106 103 117 
9. Conventionally 0.05 is used at the critical point. A lower significance level means 
that the variations between the sample means are 'real'; they are likely to occur in the 
population (de Vaus, 1991,186). 
10. The use of estimate method is decided by the F test. In Table 8-4, for example, 
since the F test is not significant (i. e. has a probability of more than 0.05), the pooled 
variance estimate is used to calculate the t value. 
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Interest Mediation 
Having identified the influence level of political leadership, the process 
approach next explored the interest mediation of policy actors on the dimension of 
political leadership. Here the concept of interest mediation is used as a synonym for 
policy orientation. As an attempt to operationalise it, the following question was given 
to the respondents: 'If the functions of local government are simplified into economic 
and social policy, how would you say the following policy actor distributes its emphasis 
to both policy areasT This question was accompanied with a five-point scale for 
measurement. On the continuum of scale, the top anchor (5) meant social policy, the 
bottom (1) econon-dc policy, and 3 occurred in the middle. Therefore, the smaller the 
score assigned to a certain policy actor, the less emphasis is given to social policy by 
that policy actor and vice versa. 
Local Council 
Another T-Test is carried out to identify if significant differences exist in the 
policy orientation of the local councils between Seoul and Kyonggi. Table 8-5 indicates 
whether or not the local councils in Seoul and Kyonggi have different policy 
orientations. All in all, the local councils in both localities are highly comrnitted to 
social policies. In this sense, the council itself can be seen as operating within a 
political setting that gives a high profile to social policy issues. In so far as they wish to 
stay in office or to be re-elected, the members of local council cannot remain insensitive 
to the general public . They are compelled to be malleable to the public's desires with 
regard to social policies. 
A statistically significant difference (p=0.000) is found between the local 
councils' policy orientation in Seoul and Kyonggi. The local council in Seoul gives a 
higher priority to social policies than that of Kyonggi. Although the local council in 
Kyonggi also shows apparent inclination towards social policies (mean value 3.8509 in 
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Seoul and 3.3491 in Kyonggi), the local council in Seoul is clearly more wining to 
improve social services when compared with that of Kyonggi. However, unlike cross- 
sectional comparison, cross-policy comparison does not show any difference in the 
interest mediation of the local council between social and economic policies. Mean 
scores are very similar, recording 3.5728 in social policy and 3.6410 in econon-dc policy 
respectively. This means the respondents, regardless of their departments, feel that 
councillors tend to serve social policy areas. 
<Table 8-5> T-Test Analysisfor Interest Mediation ofLocal Council (Pooled Variance 
Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.10 1.43 
2-tailed 0.628 0.060 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
T-Value 3.92 - 0.51 
2-tailed 0.000 0.608 
Prob. (p < 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
D. F. 218 218 
Mean 3.8509 3.3491 3.5728 3.6410 
StD. 0.971 0.926 1.072 0.895 
StE 0.091 0.090 0.106 0.083 
N. 114 106 103 117 
One thing that deserves special mention is the fact that this difference in the 
councils' policy orientation is not related to party control. Seoul and Kyonggi are 
controlled by the same party (DLP) and therefore the policy orientation cannot be traced 
back to political features of the parties in office. These differences in the policy 
orientation of the local councils, despite the same party being in office, are interesting. 
The output analysis ( see chapter Seven) concluded that there was no ideological 
differentiation between political parties in Korea. However, the results of the process 
approach indicate that there is a differentiation in the policy orientations of the local 
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councils in Seoul and Kyonggi. Several responses which were given to the open-ended 
questionnaire concerning the roles of the newly established councils are worth quoting 
here. There was a consensus among interviewees that 'all the policy actors become 
more sensitive' not only to public opinion but also to local problems as a result of 
having a local council: 'While efficiency has been decreased democratic control was 
increased in expenditure decisions by the local council'. On the one hand, 'political 
validity of policy programmes is mostly examined, and on the other hand unnecessary 
budget is cut by the council'. In this procedure, 'regional representation by councillors 
is of great importance to local policy-making'. Sin-dlar views were also given by the 
respondents to the open-ended question (see Table 6-4). 
Mayor and Local Minister 
The results suggest that there are remarkable differences in policy orientation 
between the Mayor in Seoul and the local n-dnister in Kyonggi. As a matter of fact, this 
differing feature of Mayor and local minister is one of the few important findings of this 
survey. The Mayor of Seoul shows a lot more emphasis on social policy than the local 
minister of Kyonggi. The Mayor of Seoul appears to have a relatively lower degree of 
influence in the previous analysis but he is highly comn-iitted to social policies. The 
results presented in Table 8-6 clearly show that the interest mediation of the Mayor and 
the local minister is significantly different between Seoul and Kyonggi at the 
probability of 0.000 (p < 0.05). Whereas the Mayor of Seoul is highly interested in 
social policies, the local n-iinister of Kyonggi is relatively more committed to economic 
policies. 
nis difference may be explained in part by the Mayor's career. The present 
Mayor of Seoul had served as the Minister of Health and Social Affairs before starting 
his career as the Mayor of Seoul. One interviewee in Seoul (December 14,1991) said, 
'Tbe present Mayor is very much concerned with welfare problems of the general 
public and had considerable knowledge about them'. The immediate inference is that 
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the Mayor's inclination to social policy can account in part for the higher level of social 
policy expenditure in Seoul. 
<Table 8-6> T-Test Analysisfor Interest Mediation of Mayor and Local Minister 
(Pooled Variance Estimate) (Separate Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 
2-tailed 
Prob. 
1.23 
0.283 
(p > 0.05) 
1.64 
0.010 
(p < 0.05) 
T-Value 4.46 - 3.66 
2-tailed 0.000 0.000 
Prob. (p < 0.05) (p < 0.05) 
D. F. 218 192.03 
Mean 3.4123 2.7926 2.8350 3.3590 
StD. 1.079 0.973 1.172 0.914 
StE 0.101 0.095 0.116 0.085 
N. 114 106 103 117 
Resources and Strategy 
So far as the attributes of political leadership are concerned, three significant 
differences have been found so far. The Mayor of Seoul is different from the Local 
Minister of Kyonggi in terms of influence level, and the local councils in both localities 
are different on the dimensions of influence level and interest mediation. As noted 
earlier, different policy phenomena are captured by the different research loci such as 
influence level and interest mediation. 
This part now examines the policy resources with which each policy actor exerts 
influence on expenditure decisions. The Policy resources may be the practical means 
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through which policy actors translate their influence into action. This section explains 
the possession of policy resources by the attributes of political leadership. Firstly, the 
Mayor and the local minister have the lion's share of formal authority as policy 
resource. As for formal authority, the majority of local public officials (42.5%) feel that 
it belongs to the Mayor or the local minister in regard to social policy expenditure 
decisions. This response appears exceptional since a notably lower proportion was 
attributed to the Mayor and the local minister in the case of the other policy resources 
such as professional expertise (2.7 %), information (7.7 %), political resource (19.5 %), 
and finance (17.2 %). This suggests that the main source of influence is the formal 
authority of the Mayor of Seoul and the local minister of Kyonggi. Unexpectedly, 
professional expertise is the policy resource of which the least amount is possessed by 
the Mayor and the local minister. 
Secondly, concerning the local council as a policy actor accounting for political 
leadership, the first thing to be noted is the lack of professional expertise and 
information. No respondent ticked the local council in respect of professional expertise 
(0.0 %) and only a few in respect of information (2.6 %). The lack of professional 
expertise and information is an indication that the councillors are in a vulnerable 
position to threats from professional officials in policy-making. To the extent to which 
professional expertise is required, the councillors' activities are likely to be constrained. 
The results of interviews confirmed that the popular adage 'information is power' is 
current. In an interview with public officials in Kyonggi (Nov, 14,1991), an official 
pointed out that 'councillors' concern goes mostly for the numerical numbers instead of 
policy planning itself during the process of budgetary meeting'. He went on to say that 
tseveral points are raised by councillors only on the expenditure side, but nothing on the 
income side of the budgetary document. It is basically impossible to change 
expenditure planning without specific knowledge of income'. Another interviewee 
made a similar statement that 'it is a matter of technique to persuade councillors on 
expenditure plan. We have had a mimic question time in which good answers were 
prepared to any possible questions from councillors in an official meeting'. Councillors 
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are likely to face difficulties in finding out what knowledge and infonnation is crucial to 
policy-making in modem local politics. 
The main source of the councillors' initiatives is political (13.6 %) and financial 
(13.1 %) resources. They have various sorts of interactions with their constituents as 
representatives of the local residents. At the same time, councillors control the agenda 
in council meetings and this selection of policy programmes for discussion itself can be 
a considerable drive behind changes. Likewise, the threat of cutting budgets seems to 
be another major resource of local councils at the final stages of the budgetary process. 
8.3. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
The administrative process means the bureaucratic procedures which are taking 
place within and between organisations. The government bureaucracy cannot be seen 
as an 'essential unity' which is homogeneous (Allison, 1971; Cawson, 1985c, 224), nor 
simply as a disinterested servant of the public. Any explanation is unsatisfactory which 
sees the government as a unitary actor simply reflecting the political leadership. Such 
an approach neglects the diversity of perception, resources and interests within the 
public authorities. In this chapter, two aspects of the adn-dnistrative process are 
considered to be important in local policy-making; interdepartmental competition 
within local authorities, and central-local relationships. Comparisons are again made to 
see whether any differences exist between Seoul and Kyonggi in terms of influence 
level, interest mediation and policy resources. 
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Influence Level 
Inter-Departmental Competition 
In order to see the difference between inter-departmental relationships in Seoul 
and Kyonggi, local officials were asked to indicate the degree of inter-departmental 
tensions surrounding expenditure decisions on social policies <Q 3-1 in Appendix 6>. 
A five-point scale was used again, where the top anchor (5) refers to 'much 
competition', the bottom (1) means 'little competition' and 3 occurs in the middle. The 
results of the surveys are presented in Table 8-7. It contains both a cross-sectional and a 
cross-policy comparison of interdepartmental competition. A glance of the cross- 
sectional comparison indicates that there is no significant difference between Seoul and 
Kyonggi at the probability of 0.05. Mean score in Seoul records at a very similar level 
of that in Kyonggi, 2.8070 and 2.9623 respectively. This means policy variation cannot 
be attributed to the inter-departmental relationships either in Seoul or in Kyonggi. 
<Table 8-7> T-Test Analysisfor Interdepartmental Competition 
(Pooled Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.20 1.17 
2-tailed 0.352 0.408 
Prob.. (p > 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
T-Value -1.10 3.33 
2-tailed 0.272 0.001 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p < 0.05) 
D. F. 218 218 
Mean 2.8070 2.9623 3.1262 2.6667 
StD. 1.088 0.995 1.063 0.983 
StE 0.102 0.097 0.105 0.091 
N. 114 106 103 117 
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On the other hand, a cross-policy comparison yields an opposite picture of 
interdepartmental competition. The results of comparison between social and econornic 
policies show significant difference at the probability of 0.001. The mean value in 
social policies is 3.1262, whilst in economic policies it is 2.6667. Public officials in the 
field of social policy apparently feel that there is more competition between 
departments in the expenditure decisions of local government. This is an indication that 
the expenditure programmes of individual social policy sectors are more vulnerable to 
threats from other spending demands than are economic policies. Here, it should be 
borne in mind that the social services are an exception here. The output analysis in the 
previous chapter showed that local authorities have very little room for manoeuvre in 
the field of social services. The provision of social services is relatively standardised 
across the localities and the policy initiatives in these services rest with the central 
government. 
Central-Local Relationship 
At the introduction of this chapter, Table 8-1 demonstrated that the central 
government exerted a great deal of influence on policy-making in Korean local 
government. Table 8-8 presents data on the relationship between central control and 
local policy-making. 
The analysis shows no significant difference in cross-sectional nor in cross- 
policy comparisons. The general implication is that policy initiative rests with the 
central government. Mean values for central influence mark slightly higher than 3.4. 
This is a clear indication that policy-making in local government is largely influenced 
by the central government no matter what the locality or policy area. It seems 
premature to conclude that the central influence which prevailed in the sphere of 
economic development during the last few decades should be curtailed by local 
government reform in 1991. No sweeping changes have appeared in so far as central 
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influence is concerned. As with the comparison of interdepartmental competition, a T- 
Test sin-dlarly shows that central influence is not different between the two localities. 
<Table 8-8> T-Test Analysisfor Influence Level of Central Govermnent 
(Pooled Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.09 1.19 
2-tailed 0.644 0.368 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
T-Value -0.52 0.01 
2-tailed 0.607 0.994 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
D. F. 218 218 
Mean 3.4035 3.4717 3.4369 3.4359 
StD. 1.002 0.958 1.026 0.941 
StE 0.094 0.093 0.101 0.087 
N. 114 106 103 117 
Interest Mediation 
Local Departments 
At the beginning of this chapter, the policy orientation of local departments 
could be characterised somewhere between target group and local council. The next 
analysis compares the policy orientation of local departments in Seoul and Kyonggi. A 
glance at the T-Test results suggests there is no significant difference between the 
policy orientations of the departments in Seoul and Kyonggi (p= 0.157). Mean values 
record a slightly higher point than 3.4 in both localities (3.4035 and 3.4717 
respectively) where 3 is the mid-point between social policy (5) and economic policy 
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(1). Therefore, it should be concluded that local departments tend to focus on social 
policies rather than on economic policies both in Seoul and Kyonggi. 
On the other hand, not unexpectedly, a striking difference appears between 
policy areas (p= 0.000). A much higher mean value was recorded by public officials in 
the social policy area (4.2136) than by those in economic policy area (2.9316). 
Needless to say, the public officials of social policy departments are much more 
oriented towards welfare issues than those of economic policy departments. However, 
one interesting point is that the mean value pointed to by the public officials working at 
the department of economic policies is close to the mid-point. Officials working at the 
department of economic policies also tend to see themselves working for the local 
residents' welfare. 
<Table 8-9> T-Test Analysisfor Interest Mediation of 'My Department' 
(Separate Variance Estimate) (Pooled Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.51 1.01 
2-tailed 0.032 0.965 
Prob. (P < 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
T-Value 1.59 9.14 
2-tailed 0.114 0.000 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p < 0.05) 
D. F. 202.75 218 
Mean 3.6579 3.3962 4.2136 2.9316 
StD. 1.088 1.336 1.035 1.040 
StE 0.102 0.130 0.102 0.096 
N. 114 106 103 117 
Central Government 
The position of central government appears very much directed towards 
economic policy. Mean scores for the policy orientation of central government remain 
at 2.3772 in Seoul and 2.1415 in Kyonggi. Table 8-10 shows that the difference 
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between the two localities is not statistically significant (p--0.054). A lower mean value 
indicates that a policy actor's stance is oriented more towards econon-dc policy. 
Therefore, it should be concluded that central government was the policy actor whose 
action orientation is most skewed to econon-dc policy. This result of the survey is 
consistent with the argument of the dual state theory. At least at the dimension of 
interest mediation, the dual state theme appears acceptable according to the empirical 
findings of this survey although its explanation of the mode of local policy-making was 
questioned in the analysis of local decision-making. 
<Table 8-10> T-TestAnalysisfor Interest Mediation of Central Government 
(Pooled Variance Estimate) (Separate Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.08 1.54 
2-tailed 0.696 0.025 
Prob. (P > 0.05) (p < 0.05) 
T-Value 1.93 - 1.94 
2-tailed 0.054 0.053 
Prob. (P > 0.05) (P > 0.05) 
D. F. 218 195.75 
Mean 2.3772 2.1415 2.1359 2.3761 
StD. 0.886 0.920 1.000 0.807 
StE 0.083 0.089 0.099 0.075 
N. 114 106 103 117 
Resources and Strategy 
The main policy resource which local departments draw on to influence 
expenditure decisions is professional expertise. An absolute majority (56.6 %) of 
respondents indicated that their department was the largest share holder of professional 
expertise. Infon-nation is another policy resource which is largely possessed by local 
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departments. The local department (31.2 %) ranks second only to central government 
(36.2) in the case of information resource. These results are confirmation by public 
officials themselves of the conventional assumption that bureaucrats monopolise 
professional expertise (Jones et al., 1985,63). Release of policy information can be 
another powerful resource for local departments to use in mobilising target groups to 
support their policy programmes. Midwinter (1984,476) gives the example of a police 
chief taking the extraordinary step of publishing his annual report three months early 
just before the budget to make members aware of rising crime and the dangers of 
reducing resources. It is extremely difficult to tell whether the political use of 
professional expertise and information serves organisational interests or the public 
interest. Officials are usually expected to ensure technical rationality under the pressure 
of political rationality. Needless to say, the political use of expertise and information 
remains beyond scrutiny. Here officials can decide policy-making, and councillors may 
merely endorse them. 
The main policy resources through which central government translates 
influence into action are two; political and information resource. Central government 
has the lion's share of both these two policy resources. 
As for political resource, 48.4 percent of public officials saw that the central 
government possessed the largest amount of political resources. The central 
government was also seen by 36.2 percent of respondents as commanding the lion's 
share of information resource. This is another indication that local government in 
Korea suffers both from a lack of political autonomy and from a shortage of 
professional experts in local level. Concerning financial resources, it is interesting to 
see central government be assessed differently by public officials between Seoul and 
Kyonggi. Whilst only 21.1 percent of respondents in Seoul replied that central 
government had the largest amount of financial resources, 34.6 percent did so in 
Kyonggi. This fact is consistent with the result of the output analysis in the previous 
chapter. Apparently Seoul seems to be enjoying a greater degree of financial autonomy. 
An official in Seoul (December 14,1991) said 'Seoul local authorities often provide 
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additional services to local residents as compared with other local governments. We 
often develop policy programmes which cannot attract the central government's 
concern. ' 
8.4 INPUTS FROM SOCIAL GROUPS 
Although local authorities are taken as 'policy-shapers' (Dearlove, 1973), the 
impact of the social environment cannot be underestimated in public policy-making. It 
is clearly important for any analysis of related groups outside government as sources of 
demand and support (Hill and Bramley, 1986,150). In theory, related groups are 
supposed to participate in local authority policy-making in various ways. The most 
popular way might be to elect councillors to pursue their own policy interests. For 
instance, any target group can choose goods and services (policies) as a voter 
(consumer) which are offered by candidates (suppliers) in a political market (election). 
The effects of this sort of participation, i. e. the implications of elections, have been 
discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter now considers the involvement of target 
groups in routinised policy process in-between elections. 
It seems that a paramount concern has been given to Tiebout's view in 
explaining the influence of the general public for a long time. 'Voting with their feet', 
is unquestionably a decisive way for target groups to influence policy-making in local 
government. However, many of its central planks are less realistic (Sharpe and Newton, 
1984) than its literal attractiveness. Target groups more often struggle to make their 
presence felt in the policy process, by raising the tempo of their participation in the 
policy-making of local government (Newton and Karran, 1985,80). The exploration of 
these normal practices may be of importance in an attempt to understand the patterns of 
interaction in the local policy network. In this study, the involvement of related groups 
Chapter Eight 203 
is exan-dned using the results of a questionnaire survey like in the other parts of the 
process approach. The notion of target groups encompasses related local groups, 
particularly beneficiary groups of related public services in this study. Public officials 
were asked to evaluate the part played in policy-making by the target groups of their 
services. 
Influence Level 
Table 8-11 surnmarises the results regarding the influence of target groups in 
policy-making as assessed by public officials. Surprisingly, low scores were assigned 
to the target groups by respondents, contrary to general expectation. Public officials in 
local government do not feel that target groups are influential in local policy-making 
despite the local government reform of 1991. Mean score remains at 2.2895 in Seoul 
and 2.4857 in Kyonggi respectively. This survey does not provide any information for 
international or central-local comparison. Nonetheless, the majority of respondents 
gave negative answers to the question on target groups both in Seoul and Kyonggi. 
In fact, in much of the literature, local residents are assumed to be influential on 
policy-making in local government which is often labelled democratic. Especially 
during the last few years in Korea, it has been assumed that the local residents would 
come to play decisive roles as a result of the new local government system. However, 
there is no evidence that local policy-making is more democratic in general, or that 
local government reform in Korea has facilitated more citizen involvement than before. 
The survey results suggest that the so-called 'revolution of the popular will' still 
revolves around nationwide political affairs rather than policy-making in local 
authorities. 
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<Table 8-11 > T-Test Analysisfor Influence Level of Target Groups 
(Pooled Variance Estimate) (Separate Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.11 1.88 
2-tailed 0.582 0.001 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p < 0.05) 
T-Value -1.40 0.09 
2-tailed 0.162 0.930 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
D. F. 218 184.43 
Mean 2.2895 2.4623 2.3786 2.3675 
StD. 0.890 0.938 1.058 0.772 
StE 0.083 0.091 0.104 0.071 
N. 114 106 103 117 
Interest Mediation 
Target groups differ significantly in the articulation of their policy interests 
between Seoul and Kyonggi. The target groups in Seoul appear more vigorous than 
those of Kyonggi in the priority they give to social policies. Whilst the mean value 
assigned to target groups' policy orientation is 3.3962 in Kyonggi it is 3.8860 in Seoul. 
The null hypothesis, which assumes no differences between the two localities, can be 
convincingly rejected at the probability of 0.001. The results in Table 8-12 indicate that 
the target groups in Seoul are more likely to pressure local authorities for more 
spending on social policies. 
Chapter Eight 
<Table 8-12> T-Test Analysisfor Interest Mediation of Target Groups 
(Separate Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.63 1.57 
2-tailed 0.012 0.019 
Prob. (p < 0.05) p<0.05) 
T-Value 3.26 - 0.70 
2-tailed 0.001 0.483 
Prob. (p < 0.05) (P > 0.05) 
D. F. 198.99 194.64 
Mean 3.8860 3.3962 3.5922 3.7009 
StD. 0.966 1.232 1.256 1.002 
StE 0.091 0.120 0.124 0.093 
N. 114 106 103 117 
Resource and Strategy 
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Target groups command the least amount of the policy resource. Public officials 
feel that the target group ranks sixth among six policy actors when ranked in ternis of 
the possession of policy resource. An extremely low percentage of respondents ticked 
the local respondent as the holder of such resources as professional expertise (0.9%), 
formal authority (1.4%), finance (1.8%), political resource (3.6%) and information 
(7.7%). The lack of policy resource is consistent with the low degree of influence of 
target groups on local policy-making. As mentioned previously, target groups were 
ranked sixth also in the assessment of influence level in local policy-making. These two 
results together suggest that the target group is not an influential policy actor in the 
expenditure decisions of Korean local government. 
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8.5. INCREMENTALISM AS A PROCESS 
The procedural variables have been explored based on a three dimensional 
framework so far. Another method which has been employed to explain policy 
variation is incrementalism. Incrementalism itself is not a part of the three dimensional 
framework used for the analysis of political context in this chapter. Nonetheless, when 
the distinction between output and process approaches is kept in mind, incrementalism 
appears to be important to a great extent. It is a good example which shows how local 
policy-making is differently approached by output and process approaches. Chapter 
Seven has already examined the incrementalist features of local expenditure on social 
policies using the output analysis method. This chapter now considers incrementalism 
as a process. The process approach in this chapter is now used to explore different 
facets of the incrementalist nature of local policy-making. A comparison of research 
findings will be made in the last concluding chapter to clarify methodological issues in 
analysing policy variation in local government. 
In the preliminary discussion, two procedural spheres of incrementalism were 
explained: incrementalism as politics and incrementalism as a method of analysis 11. As 
explained in chapter Three, the focus is placed on the two procedural spheres of 
incrementalism as a decision-making mode in these two notions of incrementalism. 
Unlike in the output analysis where the incrementalist nature of local policy-making 
was exan-dned by analysing policy outputs, this chapter uses the results of the 
questionnaire surveys. It is virtually impossible to read off the procedural spheres of 
incrementalism from the policy outputs. Therefore, local officials were given five-point 
continua to indicate the above two procedural aspects of incrementalism in local 
expenditure decisions on social policies <Q 5 and 6 in Appendix 6>. 
11. The notion of 'incrementalism as a process' was discussed in chapter Three. For 
more details see the section <3.4. Incrementalism> in chapter Three. 
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Firstly, as explained in chapter Three, the notion of 'incrementalism as politics' 
refers to the 'mutual adjustment' between policy actors in expenditure decisions. Local 
officials were asked to assess their policy-making on a five-point scale. On the five- 
point continuum the top anchor (5) refers to 'political rationality' and the bottom (1) 
means 'economic rationality'. 3 occurs in the middle between the two extremes. Table 
8-13 shows the results for incrementalism as politics, i. e. policy actors' mutual 
adjustment for political rationality. It should be concluded that incrementalist features 
prevail in the process of local policy-making in Korea. The table indicates that political 
rationality is seen as being more important than the means-end rationality of the 
economic sense by policy-makers. The mean value appears certainly skewed towards 
'political adjustment' beyond the mid-point 3. Public officials feel that mutual 
adjustment between policy actors is considered more seriously than the means-end 
rationality in social policy sectors. No notable difference is found in cross-sectional 
comparison between Seoul and Kyonggi nor in cross-policy areas. 
<Table 8-13> T-TestAnalysisforIncrementalism as Political Adjustment 
(Pooled Variance Estimate) (Separate Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.43 1.57 
2-tailed 0.061 0.018 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p < 0.05) 
T-Value -1.52 - 0.25 
2-tailed 0.129 0.801 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (P > 0.05) 
D. F. 218 194.49 
Mean 3.2807 3.4811 3.3592 3.3932 
StD. 0.888 1.062 1.092 0.871 
StE 0.083 0.103 0.108 0.080 
N. 114 106 103 117 
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Incrementalism as Analysis 
The second procedural sphere of incrementalism. is as a technique of analysis in 
policy-making. In this case, incrementalism is the contrasting notion of a new, synoptic 
analysis of all the policy programmes. Policy-making often relies upon past experience 
not only because of cognitive limits of policy-makers but also because of the pressure of 
time and money. The core of the past experience can be used while leaving the existing 
base unreviewed. 
The incrementalist feature of expenditure decisions on social policies was 
detected by analysing the results of the questionnaire surveys. For the sake of 
simplicity, in the survey question, incrementalism as a technique of analysis was 
defined as a dependence upon past experience and contrasted to a new, synoptic 
analysis in policy-making. Local officials were asked to characterise their expenditure 
decision on a continuum which lay between two extremes; one being dependence upon 
past experience and the other new synoptic analysis. 'Ibis continuum consisted of five- 
points where the top (5) meant 'new synoptic analysis' and the bottom (1) refered to the 
4past experience'. 
Table 8-14 summarises the results of the surveys. In short, if incrementalism. is 
taken as a technique of policy analysis in which policy makers depend heavily on their 
past experience, local policy-making is don-iinated by incrementalist features. In other 
words, existing practices are often used as a frame of reference in Korean local 
authorities. Mean scores record 2.7456 in Seoul and 2.7264 in Kyonggi suggesting that 
officials in both local governments rely upon past experience in policy-making. Public 
officials both in social and economic policy departments feel that their expenditure 
decisions do not rely upon rational-synoptic analysis. Rather they understand that local 
decisions on spending are made largely by referring to past practices. 
An interviewee (Dec. 14,1991 in Seoul) made the point that 'if the last year's 
decision does not cause any problem within or outside a local government, it can be 
seen as ensuring feasibility as policy planning'. His further statement made it clear that 
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his focus was on the importance of past experience. "Mere is no reason to undermine 
this accumulated idea which is fundamental to developing a new idea'. 
-ýTable 8-14> T-Test Analysisfor Incrementalism as an Analysis Method (Pooled 
Variance Estimate) 
Locality Policy Area 
Seoul Kyonggi Soc. Pol. Eco. Pol. 
F Value 1.27 1.25 
2-tailed 0.215 0.245 
Prob. (p > 0.05) p>0.05) 
T-Value 0.14 - 0.39 
2-tailed 0.886 0.697 
Prob. (p > 0.05) (p > 0.05) 
D. F. 218 218 
Mean 2.7456 2.7264 2.7087 2.7607 
StD. 0.929 1.047 1.044 0.934 
StE 0.087 0.102 0.103 0.086 
N. 114 106 103 117 
8.6. CONCLUSION 
The process of policy-making has been explored so far with particular emphasis 
on the difference between Seoul and Kyonggi. The results of comparison of the policy 
processes in Seoul and Kyonggi suggest that several factors of policy process account 
for the policy variance between the two local authorities. Overall, four spheres of 
policy process are found statistically significant here: 
A. Influence Level of Mayor and Local Minister (p--0.036, Mean 3.3070 in 
Seoul and 3.5849 in Kyonggi) 
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B. Interest Mediation of Mayor and Local Minister (p=0.000, Mean 3.4123 in 
Seoul and 2.7926 in Kyonggi) 
C. Interest Mediation of Local Council (p--0.000, Mean 3.8509 in Seoul and 
3.3491 in Kyonggi) 
D. Interest Mediation of Target Group (p---0.001, Mean 3.8860 in Seoul and 
3.3962 in Kyonggi). 
More than anything else, the most striking difference is found on the dimension 
of political leadership. The local council in Seoul is clearly more willing to improve 
social services than that of Kyonggi. The Mayor of Seoul also shows a lot more 
emphasis on social policy than the local minister of Kyonggi. In addition, the results 
suggest that target groups in Seoul and Kyonggi differ significantly in the articulation 
of their policy interests. The target groups in Seoul appear to be more vigorous than 
those of Kyonggi in the priority they give to social policies. Whilst the mean value of 
the target groups' policy orientation is 3.3962 in Kyonggi it is 3.8860 in Seoul. 
However, of the above four sources of variance, the first factor (A) may be of 
little significance to explaining policy variation between Seoul and Kyonggi. This is 
not to say that the factor (A) is not one of the few important findings of this survey. 
Apparently the local ri-iinister in Kyonggi appears to exert a stronger influence on the 
expenditure decision on social policy than the Mayor in Seoul (Table 8-4). Despite this 
higher level of influence, the policy orientation of the local minister in Kyonggi is more 
skewed towards economic policies than social policies. Therefore, the absolute degree 
of local n-dnister's influence in Kyonggi is not mobilised to increase social policy 
spending in Kyonggi. It should be concluded that B, C and D contribute to the higher 
spending on social policies in Seoul. Several implications can be drawn from these 
findings for theoretical and methodological discussion of the studies of policy variation 
in local government. The details of these implications will be discussed in the final 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE: MAPPING OUT THE POLICY NETWORK 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter presented the results of a process approach to the politics 
of policy-making in local authorities. It attempted to 'read off (Wright, 1988,595) the 
results of policy-making by correlating policy outputs with the characteristics of 
procedural factors. The possible sources of variance in policy outputs were traced back 
to the so-called 'black box' in Korean local social policies. Most attention was given to 
identifying the ultimate effects of procedural factors on policy outputs. As a result, 
chapter Eight was able to provide several answers to questions about 'how' and 'why' 
variations in policy arise in Korean local authorities. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the previous chapter was devoted 
mostly to identifying the relationship between outputs and process. Starting from policy 
variance in Korean local authorities, the process approach examined the impact of the 
black box in order to find the sources of policy variance. But what was lacking in the 
previous analysis was any explanation of the linkages between procedural variables. 
There was little investigation of the interaction between policy actors within the so- 
called 'black box'. 
This chapter now attempts to illuminate the patterns of interaction between 
policy actors which appear in the process of policy-making. It is concerned with the 
inter-policy actor network rather than with policy actor/policy output relationship. 
Since the ultimate impact of procedural factors was examined in the previous chapter, 
the approach here needs to be directed towards the interaction between policy actorsl 
themselves. In other words, the focus will be on which actors play what roles in the 
1. In fact, the notion of process approach is used to denote this form of research in the 
study of policy-making. 
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policy process and how they relate to each other (Wright, 1988,605). This is expected 
to provide additional infonnation on the differences between Seoul and Kyonggi. 
Since this section is a continuation of the process approach outlined in the 
previous chapter, the research methods remain virtually the same. Particular emphasis 
is placed on the comparison of Seoul and Kyonggi and the dynamics of the interaction 
between policy actors are detected using questionnaire data Q 11 in Appendix). The 
only thing that deserves special mention is the adoption of the concept of a 'policy 
network' in describing the relationships between policy actors. This chapter starts by 
reviewing briefly the concept of a policy network. 
9.2. MAPPING OUT THE POLICY NETWORK 
In a broad sense, the notion of a policy network can be found in two different 
traditions. On the one hand, it is employed as a technique of analysis for examining 'a 
specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects or events' (Knoke and 
Kuklinski, 1982,12). On the other hand, it has been developed as a metaphor for a set 
of interests in the policy process (Schmitter, 1970; Grant et al., 1987; Wright, 1988; 
Marsh and Rhodes, 1992)2 rather than as a tool for detailed analysis. The second 
school is related to theoretical developments in policy studies arising from the 
inadequacies of the pluralist and corporatist models3 which stressed the state-business- 
2. The policy network is taken, in this case, as a 'complex of organization connected to 
each other by resource dependencies(Wright, 1988,606). Richardson and Jordan 
(1979,74) argue that a series of vertical compartments or segments of those actors is 
generally impenetrable by 'unrecognised groups'. The existence of this network has 
both an influence on policy outcomes and reflects the relative status, or even power, of 
the particular interests in a policy area (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992,2). 
3. In the study of policy-making, the policy network approach has several advantages 
over pluralism and corporatism. Since pluralism and corporatism are specific 
perspectives which confer ideological views on policy-making, they offer a rather rigid 
approach in the analysis of empirical cases. Secondly, for the same reason, pluralism 
and corporatism do not easily explain the differences between policy areas. Also, the 
state is invariably described as a unified and coherent entity in pluralism and 
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labour relations in the 1970s and early 1980s4. Although it cannot itself convey the 
nature of the relationship between the elements that comprise the system of policy 
community5' the concept of a network is used to describe an arrangement of policy 
interests. 
In this study, policy network is taken as an analytic tool without losing sight of 
the theoretical notion. That is, the concept of policy network is adopted to identify the 
patterns of interaction between policy actors in Seoul and Kyonggi local authorities. 
For this purpose, local officials were provided with an array of policy actors to check 
off interaction patterns in the 1992 budget process Q 11 in Appendix). A nine-point 
scale was given where 1 referred to 'weak' and 9 meant 'strong'. The two tables below 
depict various links or interactions between policy actors. 
Firstly, it seems useful to express information embedded in the policy network 
with an algebraic matrix. The policy actors arrayed in rows (down the side) are 
initiators of the specified relation and the actors arrayed across columns (across the top) 
are the recipients of the relation. Irc means the interaction occurring in the rth row and 
cth column of the matrix. For example, 15,1 means the influence of CENT on DEPA, 
that is, 4.44 in Table 9-1. The figures are the mean scores assigned to each specified 
pair of policy actors by local officials. 
Secondly, the patterns of interaction between policy actors are represented in a 
visual display in Figures 9-1 and 9-2. As generally recognised, a visual display of the 
policy network can convey an intuitive feel for the patterns of interaction. Here the 
number of relationships needs to be reduced for the sake of clarity. In the above 
influence matrix, the number of possible ties is 30 (n = N2 -N= 36 - 6). It seems that 
corporatism. By contrast, the policy network is a flexible and neutral concept that can 
be employed in a variety of settings for the study of policy-making. 
4. -In Britain, the concept of policy network has been initiated by CLR (central-local 
relationships) (Sharpe, 1985,361; Stoker, 1988,129) and GH (government-interest 
group intermediation) (Schmitter, 1970; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). 
5. The powerful interests closely concerned with a policy forrn cooperative alliances 
with one another to compress their mutual interests into the governmental process. 
These collectivities of interests are frequently termed policy community (Wright, 1988, 
605). Wright argues that membership of each community is defined by a common 
identity or interest. Policy network is the linking process, the outcome of those 
exchanges, within a policy community. 
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each policy actor has one or more paths to every other policy actor. Thus, the 
relationships whose influence levels are not significant need to be excluded from the 
visual expression. 
<Table 9-1> Interaction Matrix in Decisions of Social Policies, Seoul 
DEPA PLAN MAYO COUN CENT TAGR 
DEPA 5.49 5.20 5.24 5.20 5.64 
PLAN 5.35 4.47 4.58 4.65 4.47 
MAYO 5.16 4.87 4.40 4.15 5.05 
COUN 4.58 4.36 4.25 4.18 5.09 
CENT 4.44 5.13 4.69 4.51 5.20 
TAGR 4.47 4.36 4.18 4.11 4.55 
<Table 9-2> Interaction Matrix in Decisions of Social Policies, Kyonggi 
DEPA PLAN LOMI COUN CENT TAGR 
DEPA 5.37 6.37 5.08 6.58 5.13 
PLAN 5.13 4.67 4.38 4.29 4.75 
LOMI 4.63 4.83 4.88 4.79 5.21 
COUN 4.88 5.08 4.79 3.67 5.33 
CENT 6.25 4.58 3.79 3.79 4.58 
TAGR 4.96 4.50 4.29 5.25 3.96 
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Figure 9-1 presents 10 linkages of the policy network, which amounts to a 
density of 0.336. A solid line means a relatively high degree of influence (above 5.0 in 
mean value), and the others are excluded. The direction of influence is demonstrated by 
the arrowheads. Two-headed arrows refer to cases in which two related policy actors 
mutually influence each other. Numbers in the figure are the average point of influence 
level displayed in Table 9- 1. 
An inspection of Figures 9-1 and 9-2 indicates that the potential for 
countervailing power prevents the don-dnance of any single policy actor in local policy- 
making both in Seoul and Kyonggi. The figures illustrate the complex interdependence 
in the policy-making of Seoul and Kyonggi local authorities. They portray policy 
networks which provide fruitful findings on sin-dlarities and differences between the two 
local authorities. 
To begin with the similarities, target groups (TAGR) seem to remain cut off 
from policy-making, having the lowest mean value of influence in both localities. The 
figures show no significant interactions initiated by TAGR, which instead appear mainly 
as recipients of influence from all the other policy actors both in Seoul and Kyonggi. 
Not unexpectedly, the local council (COUN) shows strong linkages with TAGR in both 
figures. Second, it is confirmed that the main route of central intervention is via local 
departments: either the Department of Social Welfare (DEPA) or the Department of 
Local Planning Board (PLAN). On the other hand, central government (CENT) does 
not show any notable interactions with Mayor (MAYO), Local Minister (LOMI), or 
COUN. Third, COUN does not exert strong influence in the policy network, and is 
vulnerable to influence from DEPA or TAGR. Last, MAYO and LOMI exert a direct 
influence on TAGR in both localities. 
6. Density is a proportion that is calculated as the number of linkages in the display divided by the 
number of possible ties between policy actors. When the variable Irct is the value of influence from the 
rth actor directed to the cth actor in the tth network, 
NN 
111'a 
Dem., ,-N2N- (r # c). 
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<Figure 9-1ý Policy Network in Social Policies, Seoul 
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At the same time, the two policy networks exhibit three differences. First, it is 
interesting to see the different linkages of COUN. The local council in Kyonggi seems 
more vulnerable to influence from pressure groups in the local community, and 
councillors turned to the Department of the Local Planning Board (PLAN). In the 
previous part of the process analysis in this chapter, TAGR and COUN in Kyonggi 
seemed less welfare-oriented than their counterparts in Seoul. Moreover, the PLAN 
deals with regional development affairs mostly in terms of their econon-dc and industrial 
aspects. So it should be concluded that the local council in Kyonggi is relatively more 
open to the economic interests of the local community. The second difference is found 
in the route of central intervention. CENT approaches PLAN in Seoul whilst it uses 
DEPA in Kyonggi. Looking at DEPA itself, Seoul enjoys relative autonomy from 
CENT in policy-making. Third, it is worth noting that CENT keeps more or less direct 
interaction with TAGR in Seoul Special City. 
9.3. TAKING ACCOUNT OF INDIRECT CONNECTIONS 
What cannot be fully seen from a uni-dimensional matrix are the indirect effects 
between policy actors. Adequate attention has rarely been given to the indirect impact 
between related variables (Lewis-Beck, 1977,565; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982,46, 
Boyne, 1985a, 495) in most statistical models of policy-making. In fact, various indices 
can be computed from matrices without difficulty in order to sunimarise characteristics 
for both individual actors and entire networks. 
It is not difficult to identify the number of indirect connections between policy 
actors. It can be calculated by multiplying the matrix by itself T times. If Irc (t) refers 
to the number of t-step indirect connections existing between the rth row and cth 
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column, I(l)(6) (2) means the number of two-step indirect connections between DEPA 
and TAGR. Again, the policy actors arrayed in the rows are initiators of the specified 
relation and the actors arrayed across the columns are the recipients of the relation. 
Therefore, l(l)(6) (2) means the number of two-step indirect connections initiated by 
DEPA towards TAGR. Irc means the influence occurring in the rth row and cth column 
of the matrix. The number of I(l)(6) (2) can be obtained easily by multiplying matrix I 
by itself 2 times. The first thing to do is to change the data in the original matrices. 
Tables 9-1 and 9-2 in this chapter should be transformed into binary values, with a '1' 
standing for the occurrence of a tie and a '0' standing for the absence of such a tie 
between the pair (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982,43). In multiplying matrix I by itself, the 
value of the element in row 1, column 6 of 12 is made by multiplying the corresponding 
six elements in the first row and the sixth column of matrix L then sumn-dng these six 
products. As an example, in Seoul, three two-step connections are found between 
DEPA and TAGR by (0)(1) + (1)(0) + (1)(1) + (1)(1) + (1)(1) + (1)(0) = 3. Three two- 
step connections are uncovered by M2 between DEPA and TAGR, through CENT, 
MAYO and COUN (This can be seen from the data from Figure 9-1). Several examples 
of the process calculating the number of two-step indirect connections are presented 
below. 
l(depa, depa)(2) = (0)(0) + (1)(1) + (1)(1) + (1)(0) 
+ (1)(0) + (1)(0) =2 
, (plan, depa)(2) = (1)(0) + (0)(1) + (0)(1) + (0)(0) 
(0)(0) + (0)(0) =0 
j(mayo, depa)(2) = (1)(0) + (0)(1) + (0)(1) + 
+(0)(0) 
+ (0)(0) + (1)(0) 0 
j(coun, depa)(2) = (0)(0) + (0)(1) + (0)(1) + (0)(0) 
(0)(0) + (1)(0) 0 
j(cent, depa)(2) = (0)(0) + (1)(1) + (0)(1) + (0+)(0) 
(0)(0) + (1)(0) =1 
l(tagr, depa)(2) = (0)(0) + (0)(1) + (0)(1) + (0)(0) 
+ (0)(0) + (0)(0) =0 
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<Table 9-3> M2 in Seoul: Number ofIndirect Connections 
DEPA PLAN MAYO COUN CENT TAGR 
DEPA 2 1 0 0 0 3 
PLAN 0 1 1 1 1 1 
MAYO 0 1 1 1 1 1 
COUN 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CENT 1 0 0 0 0 0 
TAGR 0 0 0 0 0 0 
It is remarkable that DEPA has the largest number of indirect effects (6) on 
other policy actors. The complete matrix of indirect effects in Seoul indicates that 
PLAN and MAYO also have a relatively large number of indirect effects on the other 
policy actors (5 each). In contrast, TAGR and COUN appear to have no indirect effect 
at all (0). 
As in Seoul, DEPA in Kyonggi has the largest number of indirect effects on the 
other policy actors (6). It exerts indirect influence on all the other policy actors except 
for MAYO and CENT. The next largest number of indirect influences is shown by 
PLAN and CENT. The complete matrix of indirect effects shows that PLAN and 
CENT each have 5 indirect impacts. In contrast, LOMI has only one indirect effect on 
COUN. 
l(depa, depa) (2) (0)(0) + (1)(1) + (1)(0) + 
(1)(0) + (1)(1) + (1)(0) =2 
l(depa, plan) (2) (0)(1) + (1)(0) + (1)(0) + 
MM + (1)(0) + (1)(0) =1 l(depa, lomi) (2) = (0)(1) + (1)(0) + (1)(0) + 
(1)(0) + (1)(0) + (1)(0) =0 l(depa, coun) (2) (0)(1) + (1)(0) + (1)(0) + 
(1)(0) + (1)(0) + (1)(1) 1 
l(depa, cent) (2) (0)(1) + (1)(0) + (1) (0) + 
(1)(0) + (1)(0) + (1)(0) 0 
l(depa, tagr) (2) = (0)(1) + (1)(0) + (1)(1) 4 
(1)(1) + (1)(0) + (1)(0) =2 
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<Table 9-4> M2 in Kyonggi: Number ofIndirect Connections 
DEPA PLAN LOMI COUN CENT TAGR 
DEPA 2 1 0 1 0 2 
PLAN 0 1 1 1 1 1 
LOMI 0 0 0 1 0 0 
COUN 1 0 0 1 0 0 
CENT 0 1 1 1 1 1 
TAGR 0 1 0 0 0 1 
9.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter aimed at illuminating the interaction patterns between policy actors 
which appear in the process of policy-making. It portrayed the linkages between policy 
actors using the concept of a policy network. Since chapter Eight exan-dned the 
ultimate impact of procedural factors on policy outputs, the main focus of this chapter 
has been on the interaction between policy actors themselves. In this sense, this chapter 
provides another process approach to the politics of policy-making in Korean local 
authorities. 
The next steps are to clarify the major findings of this study and to revisit 
methodological issues discussed earlier in this volume. The major findings of the 
empirical work will be summarised and their implications will be linked to 
methodological issues in the study of policy variation in local government. 
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION 
10.1. NATURE OF THE STUDY 
The aim of this study has been twofold: to exan-dne the methodological issues in 
the analysis of policy variation in local government; and to further our understanding of 
Korean local government which has been undergoing sweeping changes in recent years. 
The main reason for the study is the current debate about local government both in 
general theories and in actual Korean practice. 
The underlying nature of local government is a matter of great political debate in 
European industrial democracies, and fundamental reforrns are being carried out in 
Korea. From the point of view of theoretical debate, a better approach is desperately 
needed since quite a number of questions have been raised regarding the orthodox 
methods of studying policy variation in local government (Nardulle and Stonecash, 
1982,45; Boyne, 1989). 
A wide range of literature was critically reviewed in the first half of this thesis, 
with particular emphasis on understanding the methodological aspects of existing 
studies. As a result, the study of policy variation in local government was characterised 
in terms of the distinction between output and process approaches and existing studies 
were grouped into these two approaches. Firstly, in output analysis, this study 
confirmed that the 'orthodox' research question about the relative importance of 
socioeconon-dc and political factors was a false issue. Instead of the traditional 
dichotomy between socioeconomic and political factors, four groups of variables were 
used to categorise output analysis in the studies of policy variation in local government: 
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financial resources, socioeconomic variables, urban hierarchy theory and 
incrementalism. This classification was based on the nature of each variable and 
therefore seemed to constitute a more appropriate conceptual framework than had 
conventionally been used to analyse policy variation. In the case of the process 
approach, a general framework was developed based mainly on British literature. This 
theoretical model consisted of three dimensions: political leadership, administrative 
process and social inputs. 
In the second half of the thesis, an empirical analysis was conducted of policy- 
making in local government of Korea. This empirical study aimed to assess the 
working of the newly-launched Korean local government system and also to refine 
methodological strategy for future studies. To achieve this a two-staged method was 
developed in the research design. In the first stage, output analysis was carried out 
using the four forms of output variable which were developed in the theoretical 
discussion: financial sources, socioeconomic variables, urban hierarchy theory and 
incrementalism. This classification was more appropriate than that conventionally used 
in output analysis of policy variation in local government. In the second stage, the 
dynamics of the policy process were explored using a case study approach. Two 
extreme cases were selected based on the results of the output analysis, and their 
characteristics were compared in order to clarify their contrasting features which would 
otherwise be obscured. 
This chapter is devoted to surnmarising the major findings of the research and to 
drawing out their implications for theory, method and substantive practice. It is, of 
course, impossible to exan-dne the whole corpus of detailed results presented in the 
study. The chapter therefore will revisit the methodological issues raised at the 
beginning using the findings of the empirical analysis. This will help to clarify the 
methodological contribution which this thesis makes to the study of policy variation in 
local authorities. Basically, the conclusions of the remaining chapter fall into four main 
parts: 1) theoretical implications; 2) methodological implications; 3) substantive 
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implications; and 4) further studies. The chapter first starts by reviewing briefly the 
theoretical implications of the results drawn from this study. 
10.2. MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Theoretical Implications 
As noted above, this study set out to examine the theoretical and methodological 
basis of the studies on policy variation in local government. Some theoretical 
conclusions can be drawn, and these are better discussed under the heading 'theoretical 
implications'. The empirical findings support three conclusions as these relate to the 
literature reported in the first half of the thesis. All three points seem to be meaningful 
not only in the Korean context but also in general theory. In addition, this study 
generates another two implications: about the general relationship between theory and 
method, and about the relevance of British and Western literature for the analysis of 
Korean local government. 
The first conclusion to be noted concerns the dual state theory (Saunders, 1982; 
1984; Cawson and Saunders, 1983). As noted in chapter Two, the dual state theory 
explains local government as being responsible for the social consumption function 
within the mode of pluralist decision-making. However, this research found no 
empirical evidence in support of this argument but did find plenty of evidence 
pertaining to the huge proportion of social production functions carried out by local 
government. Indeed, the more a service is geared towards social consumption 
functions, the more central intervention tends to be exercised. Participation of local 
groups seems also to remain at the lowest level in this area. Social services, for 
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instance, are an example of social consumption policies in which local authorities have 
the least room for manoeuvre in policy-making. It should be concluded that there is no 
decisive evidence in favour of the view that social policies at local level are made in a 
more pluralist way. To see such a feature, it is necessary to examine the functional 
sphere of governmental activities. It is in terms of 'interest mediation' that policy- 
making appears to be more pluralist, especially in social consumption areas. From the 
point of view of interest mediation, local authorities appeared very much directed 
towards social policies (Table 8-5 and 8-8). In contrast, central government is the 
policy actor whose policy orientation is most skewed to econon-dc policy (Table 8-9). It 
follows that the aspect of local policy-making which is pluralist as suggested by the 
dual state theory is not its policy-making mode but its function of interest mediation. 
The second implication relates to the theories which were discussed under the 
heading of output analysis. The main concern here is with incrementalism and urban 
hierarchy theory: other points more relevant to methodological concerns will be 
discussed later. It seems that both incrementalism and urban hierarchy theory give 
inadequate attention to the question of 'variation' and the 'intentions' of policy actors. 
Clearly incrementalism. has been a most widely propagated theory in the decades since 
the 1950s (Leach, 1982,6; Rubin, 1989,78; Lessmann, 1989,453). A key reason for its 
appeal is its emphasis on politics, with its inward-looking explanation of organisation 
(Dempster and Wildavsky, 1979,374). Its emphasis on extra-rational politics seems to 
have been an 'oasis' in the dessert of socioeconomic determinism. However, in fact, 
incrementalism pays little attention to the question of variation in local policies. It 
presents a perspective which is don-driated by behavioural determinism and does not try 
to explain variations in policy-making. Urban hierarchy theory (Aiken and Depre, 
1981; Paddison, 1983,160; King, 1984,30; Sorensen, 1987,50) also rules out 
immediate concern with policy variation. It offers a systematic and unitary view by 
simplifying the related variables into an ordinal rank-order. Despite its appeal, 
however, little is explained about policy variation by the urban hierarchy theory. In this 
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sense, paradoxically enough, incrementalisml and urban hierarchy theory2 seem to 
explain all, but at the same time nothing, about policy variation. 
Thirdly, the studies of policy variation in local government are, implicitly or 
explicitly, based upon the Eastonian systems theory. Most literature on policy variation 
in local authorities, especially in output analysis, adopts a set of pivotal concepts from 
systems theory (Easton, 1953,1965). Among widely adopted concepts are inputs, 
process, outputs, environment and system. Such concepts provide a common language 
and frame of reference for much research. Certainly each concept is differently 
elaborated by different writers, but usually traces its origins to the ideas developed in 
Eastonian systems theory. Here, most writers seem to have difficulty in elaborating the 
specific contents of 'inputs' and 'environment'. 
Fourthly, the interrelationships of theories, methods and fact also deserve 
mention. This study shows how the findings of empirical research can be 
predetermined by the choice of theory. Especially in the field of 'output analysis', the 
orthodox research question has concerned the relative importance of socioeconomic and 
political variables. This research question itself has predetermined not only the methods 
but also the findings of empirical studies over the last decades. As has been explained 
throughout this thesis, this research question was destined to show the primacy of 
socioeconomic variables over political factors3. And it has now been proved a false 
issue by the acaden-dc community (Nardulle and Stonewalls, 1982,45; Boyne, 1989)4 
1. In addition, this study confirmed enormous difficulties in the empirical application of 
incrementalism. There can be no objective criteria with which incrementalist features 
can be differentiated from non-incrementalist ones. The difficulty in setting up 
standards of judgement seems to be inherent in any output analysis of incrementalism. 
It may be that the incrementalist theme is more relevant for a process approach at least 
in empirical analysis. 
2. The adherents of this theory can be seen as sceptics of the other output analyses 
which compare the relative importance of ad hoc variables in a fragmented way. 
Nevertheless, urban hierarchy theory seems to be another version of output analysis on 
socio-econon-dc variables. At the basis of urban hierarchy theory is placed the idea of 
socioeconon-dc approach. The term 'urban' reflects the socio-econon-dc factors 
surrounding a certain locality and the term 'hierarchy' refers to the transformation of 
selected variables into rank-orders in a holistic context. 
3. Looking at the tradition of output analysis alone, what does seem clear is that 
socioeconomic variables outweigh political factors (Klein, 1976,402; Boyne, 1985a, 
473; Buchanan et al., 1991,69). The merely secondary impact of party variables on 
performance has been re-confirmed by a number of output analysts (Alt, 1977,88; 
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One conclusion to be drawn from this experience is that theorising preceded the 
collection and interpretation of facts. Data collection is not independent of theories, and 
interpretations of it are therefore not infallible (Valentine, 1992,90)5. During the last 
decades, output analysts in this field were sharing models that directed their observation 
and interpretation. Their empirical works were guided by the model behind which a 
scientific community (Shipman, 1988,12) shared a conceptual paradigm. The job of 
the paradigm was to set puzzles and also to set the methods for their solution (Ryan, 
1990,80). Under this orthodox paradigm most studies were inescapably destined to 
give too much weight to the impact of socioeconon-dc variables and too little weight to 
the influence of politics (Boyne, 1989,124). An output analyst, not as an individual but 
as a member of a scientific community, had difficulty in developing any anomaly, just 
as a novice would do. At best, within the dominant paradigm, it was sometimes argued 
that the socioeconon-dc environment was not much more important than political 
factors. 
Finally, it is worth considering the relevance of British and Western theories for 
the analysis of Korean local government. The results of this study show that British 
literature is of value in explaining Korean situations to a large extent. However, at the 
same time, a remarkable difficulty is found in analysing the impact of political parties. 
In the output analysis of chapter Seven, party control in Korean local government 
appeared to have no significant impact on local policy-making. It had no significant 
effect on spending variations between localities. This finding contrasts sharply with the 
case in Britain, where different party policies have a systematic impact on local 
spending (Alt, 1971; Sharpe and Newton, 1984; Hoggart, 1987; 1989). Almost all 
Fried, 1975,337; Boyne, 1985b; Hoggart, 1989,77; Barnett et al, 1990,218; Buchanan 
et al., 1991,71). Therefore, the so-called environment versus politics dispute caused 
near panic in political sciences and a continuing embarrassment to political scientists. 
4. The impact of this false issue has also been current in Korea until recently (Hwang, 
1987, Kim, 1986). 
5. In fact, the relationship between theory and facts has long been a contested topic in 
epistemology. For instance, the problem of empiricism versus a priori explanation 
remains contentious (MacPherson and Midgley, 1987,111; Shipman, 1988,11). 
However, this study suggests that a number of inadequacies exist in the view that facts 
are prior to theories. Probably the social factist (Bryman, 1988,124) is in a defensive 
position in relation to the social definitionist in the modem social sciences. 
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studies of budgetary outputs in the U. K. have found local expenditure on service 
provision to be related to party control. 
This may be attributable to the lack of ideological differentiation between 
political parties in Korea. Political parties are rarely distinguished in terms of their 
political doctrine in Korea which is considered a typical example of a Confucian 
democracy. A high level of autonomy is credited to political parties virtually reliant on 
an altruistic elitism which lies at the core of Confucian democracy. Therefore, despite 
the absence of any differentiation in terms of ideological doctrine, political parties 
conduct the role of interest aggregation in public policy-making ( as seen in the process 
approach of chapter Eight). However, a problem is that the policy orientation of the 
local council may be unstable and unpredictable in this case. Policy-making is likely to 
be hampered by its lack of institutionalisation. It can be shaped largely by changeable 
'events'. Furthermore, what if the political elites stop being benevolent? This is a 
paradox of Confucian democracy in modem Asian countries. 
Methodological Implications 
Discrepancies between Output and Process Approaches in this Research 
Several discrepancies were found between the results of the output analysis and 
those of the process approach in this study. On investigation these discrepancies 
provide a useful starting point for examining the relationship between output and 
process approaches in the methodological sphere. The discrepancies were found in three 
aspects: 
- Existence of incrementalism 
- Impact of local council 
- Extent of central intervention 
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Firstly, the existence of incrementalism in local government in Korea was 
confirmed by the process approach but not by the output analysis. In chapter Eight 
incrementalism was approached as a method of analysis and as a mutual adjustment 
between policy actors. The existence of incrementalism was convincingly supported by 
the results of the process approach here (Table 8-12 and 8-13). In contrast, chapter 
Seven conducted the output analysis in order to see incrementalism as an output; that is 
incrementalism as a measure of change and as regularity of change. Ile existence of 
incrementalism was apparently disproved by the results of the output analysis (Table 7- 
10 and 7-11). This fact indicates how incrementalism was defined and described 
differently by the output and process approaches. 
Secondly, the impact of the local council also appeared differently in the output 
and process approaches. The output analysis demonstrated that no consistent impact 
was exerted by local councils in terms of political doctrine (Table 7-6). In contrast, 
considerable variation was found in the analysis of the political orientation of local 
councils by the process approach. The local council was found to be a major source of 
policy variation between localities using the process approach in chapter Eight (Table 8- 
5). In short, despite having no apparent impact in the output analysis, where the party 
flagship was an independent variable, the local council was shown by the process 
approach to be a notable source of policy variation between localities. 
Tbirdly, the results relating to the extent of central intervention also varied 
between the output analysis and the process approach. Output analysis showed central 
intervention to be considerable only in the social service sector (Table 7-3 and 7-4) 
whereas it appeared to be strong in all policy areas including econon-dc policies in the 
process approach (Table 8-1 and 8-7). In other words, central intervention was rarely 
detected by the output analysis but often found using the process approach. 
The first and foremost answer to the question 'Why do these different findings 
ariseT is that a theory or concept is differently defined and used in the output and 
process approaches. This is exemplified by the investigation of incrementalism. It is 
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defined as a method of analysis or as a mutual adjustment between policy actors in the 
process approach whereas it is used to refer to the size of change or the regularity of 
change in the output analysis. This difference in definition leads to a great difference in 
the results of analysis. The second answer seems to be more relevant to the main theme 
of this study. The process and output approaches focus on different targets in collecting 
research information and data. The process approach stresses the procedures of policy- 
making and the output analysis emphasises the results of policy-making. A good 
example is the investigation of the extent of central intervention. Though different 
conceptions were not adopted, unlike in incrementalism, a different data set was 
collected which produced different research findings. This indicates that explanation of 
the results of policy-making should not be confused with an explanation of the event or 
process of that policy. As Lieberson (1985,115) makes clear, we cannot learn the 
fundamental cause of an event by exan-dning the variation in policy outputs. It may be a 
fallacious assumption commonly made by the output analysts. The third possibility is 
that measurement in the process approach is highly inaccurate and, therefore, can distort 
the reality. Usually qualitative methods are used in the process approach based heavily 
on subjective judgement either of the researcher or of the respondents. There is a 
danger that not only the respondents but also the reseacher may hold n-dsconceptions 
about policy phenomena regardless of the reality. 
As mentioned above, the discrepancies between the two approaches are 
important indications of the methodological differences between output and process 
analyses6. They can be a useful starting point for the examination of methodological 
problems in the study of policy variation in local government. The three points 
explained above are only about the reasons why different findings arise in the empirical 
part of this study. More general points will be elaborated in the remaining section of 
this chapter. They fall into six categories: 
6. A glance at the results of the process approach suggests a different parallel from that 
of output analysis. Political factors almost always appear to be decisively significant 
(Dearlove, 1973; Hampton, 1978,1987; Greewood, 1987; Barnett et al., 1990) when 
dealt with in the process approach. 
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(1) The conception of the environment-system relationship 
(2) The focus on different stages of the policy process 
(3) The relationship between theory and research 
(4) The direction of inference 
(5)"he nature of data 
(6) The number of cases 
The next three figures illustrate the main features of the two approaches. The 
first two figures picture the assumptions about the primacy of the socioeconomic 
environment which inform the output approach. Environment appears to shape policy 
outputs directly and independently in the figures. The political system is seen to be 
affected by the environment as well (Figure 10-1), but not necessarily (Figure 10-2). 
These points were exemplified in chapter Three. Attention here needs to be drawn to 
the comparison of the output and process approaches. The development of the second 
model deserves a brief explanation. This model has sometimes been used because of 
the enormous difficulty in drawing boundaries between the socioeconon-dc environment 
and the political system and between political variables and the official policy-making 
system. If the environmental and political determInants of policies are to be identified 
and their relative importance evaluated then it is necessary to distinguish properly 
between the two categories of variable (Boyne, 1985a, 480). Two uneasy questions are 
raised here. What is the criterion for drawing a line between socioeconomic and 
political variables? Does the terrn 'political' refer only to environmental variables 
which are political in nature or does it include official policy-making mechanisms? 
These dilemmas are exemplified by the categorisation of turn out ratio in elections and 
administrative factors. The turn out ratio, for instance, is sometimes classified as a 
socioeconon-dc variable and sometimes as a political variable. Even party control is 
taken as an environmental variable in examining the autonomy of the policy-making 
system in output analysis (Boyne, 1989,127). Administrative factors are also switched 
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across the boundary between political and governmental systerns. The second model 
(Figure 10-2) has been developed by output analysts who recognised these problems. 
<Figure 10-1, Basic Model I in Output Analysis 
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Turning to the comparison of output and process approaches, the next figure 
(Figure 10-3) gives succinct information. The two approaches embody different 
conceptions of the policy-making system and the environment relationship. Output 
analysis attributes relative primacy to the environment based on a pluralist image of 
society (Hoggart, 1989,8). There has thus been a tendency towards environmental 
determinism in which the policy-making procedure is viewed as an automatic 
transmission belt (Sharpe and Newton, 1984). In the comparison of socioeconon-dc 
inputs and political systems, policy makers are usually said to have little room for 
manoeuvre here. By contrast, the process approach assumes that policies are made by 
political procedures. A considerable degree of autonomy is attributed to political actors 
who participate in the policy-making process. 
Different starting points lead the two approaches to focus on different stages of 
the policy process. A majority of output analysts have been content merely to correlate 
policy-making with environmental variables. In doing so, their focus is limited to the 
end-products of policies, and backward inference is made from policy outputs to 
environment. When associations are found between policy outputs and environment, 
possible linkages are assumed between these environmental constraints and policy 
outputs. As a result, policy-making is considered largely as the product of geographic, 
demographic and economic constraints. In terms of the nature of the collected data, this 
form of analysis is characterised by a quantitative approach to a huge number of cases. 
These data are often used to test theoretical propositions. 
In contrast, the process approach focuses on the so-called 'black box' in which 
interactions take place between policy actors. Forward inferences are made towards the 
interactions of policy actors during policy-making. These inferences are used to 
describe the interaction itself but are very rarely used to correlate the possible impacts 
of the interaction on policy outputs. This form of approach is characterised by a 
concern to generate (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Bryman, 1988,83) theoretical insights 
into the politics of the policy process. The need for in-depth investigation usually leads 
to a focus on a limited number of cases using qualitative methods. 
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Wigure 10-3:, Process and Output Approaches In Pollcy Studles 
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Pay-off Relationships between Output and Process Approaches 
The output and process approaches have diverged so much that one is forced to 
deny the other. There have been vehement attacks and counter-attacks between the two 
streams competing for support. It has not been expected that the conclusions of one 
approach would necessarily be interesting to those who are concerned with the other 
approach. The next section compares the two approaches in more detail, particularly in 
terms of the strength and weakness of output and process approaches. To begin with 
output analysis, harsh criticisms have been made by the adherents of the process 
approach along the following lines: 
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(1) Output analysis neglects the distinctive character of the social world. The 
subjective side of political affairs (Carley, 1981,90) is squeezed and seldom 
referred to by output indicators. lbough output analysis is well-suited to 
analysing existing objective indicators, it is less effective in discovering 
meanings in the political sphere. 'If we are to understand the social world, we 
must attune out methods of inquiry to its nature' (Hammersley, 1990,1 and 
94). 
(2) Output analysis consciously de-emphasises the importance of unveiling the 
'black box' and therefore gives little explanation of 'HOW'. The dynamics of 
policy-making are underestimated since possible associations are sought 
between policy outputs and the environment apart from the process of policy- 
making. It is highly questionable whether we picture the dynamic interaction 
of policy-making by looking at the variation in policy outputs. 
(3) As is generally recognised, the quantitative sophistication seems to have 
run ahead of the theoretical and substantive developments that could take 
advantage of the methods. Output analysts scarcely recognise the poverty of 
quantification. Causal relationships are often confused with the general trends 
in statistical aggregates. The simple fact that there is a statistical relationship 
does not by itself offer strong evidence that there is a causal relationship (Page 
et al., 1990,5 1). 
(4) A large number of cases can be analysed only at the cost of detailed 
information. Abstracted data from many cases hardly provides any 
fundamental insight into policy phenomena. In output analysis, therefore, the 
term generalisation should sometimes be interpreted as 'superficial' and 
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objective as 'systematic bias'7. Unquestionably, in-depth understanding is 
often of importance and interest to related researchers in many cases. 
(5) Output analysis suffers from an underestimation of the non-budgetary and 
structural aspects of policy-making in the modern state (Wildavsky, 1974; 
Fried, 1975,306; Hoggart, 1989,37)8. Budgets mostly reflect either 
redistributive or distributive policies; they are not a true outcome but a 
measure of the cost of achieving output (Hill and Bramley, 1986,154). 
(6) The atheoretical attitudes prevalent in output analysis have contributed to 
the underdevelopment of conceptual and theoretical discussion. Little has been 
done to link the results of analysis with other, more exploratory theories 
(Hoggart, 1989,8). The wasteful proliferation of statistical elaboration has 
produced nothing comparable to the insights of classical theories. 
These criticisms come from the protagonists of process studies. In comparison 
with those of other disciplines, the identity of policy science itself can be found in the 
study of policy process. Accordingly, many voices have been raised against the neglect 
of process by the barefoot empiricism of output analysis. This process approach has 
also been subjected to attacks from its own critics: 
(1) It is often atypical cases that make the writers of the process approach feel 
the need for in-depth investigation. These atypical cases appear to be 
7. Setting a causal linkage is of vital importance in any analytic framework of output 
analysis. The results of analysis can show huge differences in accordance with this 
framework and linkage. Boyne (1985a, 495) gives a good example by showing a 
different degree of effects resulted from different settings of linkages between variables. 
8. An example is provided by Hoggart (1989,37) about school education. Studies have 
identified biases in the distribution of municipal expenditure in favour of higher income 
neighbourhoods. Yet these expenditure disparities are in fact poor representations of 
actual inequalities. 
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exceptional in their nature. Theoretical criteria are rarely referred to for the 
choice of the cases. Although an atypical feature has a great deal of appeal, it 
poses a problem of generalisation. 
(2) The process approach is criticised because it only allows for the study of a 
limited number of cases (mostly a single case). In-depth analysis can only be 
accomplished by forfeiting a large number of cases. It is not enough, output 
analysts argue, to generalise the findings from a single case (Bryman, 1988, 
88). 
(3) A third deficiency of the process approach relates to its way of organising 
data. The process approach relies heavily on researchers' subjective 
judgement, and data are rarely presented in a sufficiently systematic way 
(Parker, 1975,13; Silven-nan, 1985,140)9. It is not easy to ensure consistency 
in their way of asking and answering questions (Drew, 1975,4) with a less 
standardized technique. As a consequence, interpretation tends to be 'isolated, 
episodic' (Heclo, 1972,90; Ribbins and Brown, 1979,189) and 
impressionistic. 
(4) The results of analysis may be more or less decontextualised without 
comparable information. Even where detailed studies of specific 
developments in a policy area are available they tend to be detached from a 
broader context for comparative understanding. 
(5) The process approach sometimes makes it less likely that policy outcomes 
can be 'read off' (Wright, 1988,595) or predicted from the results of study. 
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9. Silverman (1985,140) makes the point that a critical reader ponders 'whether the 
researcher has selected only those fragments of data which support his argument'. The 
same point arises in the case of output analysis. However, compared with those of 
process approach, the writers of output analysis tend to make their premises and bias 
explicit. 
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Frequently perceptual assessment and description are provided about the 
activities of policy actors in the process approach. Inadequate attention is 
often given to the ultimate effects of procedural factors on policy outputs. The 
process approach is likely to exaggerate the significance of a procedural 
variable rather than to provide the actual portrayal of influence. In this case, to 
discuss the importance of a procedural variable can be to discuss the illusions 
of policy-makers (Klein, 1978,402) or researchers (Allan, 1991,180). There 
is a need to distinguish between the subjective style of the policy-makers, the 
style they prefer and try to achieve, and the objective style that they actually 
exhibit. 
Methodological Triangulation 
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As can be observed from the above comparison, the weakness of one approach 
is the strength of the other and vice versa. It may be that one approach cannot tackle the 
question of policy variation without acknowledging an aspect of the other. Output 
analysis can be supplemented by the process approach in the study of policy variation in 
local government. The process approach also ought not to be regarded as an end in 
itself. The reconciliation of the two approaches holds great promise for a more 
balanced picture of policy-making. This study suggests that methodological 
triangulation is desirable between the two contending approaches for reaping their 
respective strengths. The term 'triangulation' is viewed as entailing more than one 
method of investigation (Bryman, 1988,131). Its main message is that the validity of 
empirical study in social science can be increased by using more than one method. The 
benefits of triangulation were canvassed by Webb et al. (1966) and Denzin (1970) after 
being presented by Campbell and Fiske in 1959. At the core of this idea is the belief 
that the choice of research method is not a matter of principle but a matter of 
appropriateness and adequacy. Bulmer (1992,32) makes the point that there is no best 
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method either in general or for a particular problem. All methods have their strengths 
and weaknesses. The point is which combination of strategies will be most adequate 
and most fruitfullO. 
Clearly, methodological triangulationll leads to complex research designs 
(Fielding and Fielding, 1986,26). The point here is not the simple combination of 
different kinds of data, but the attempt to relate them so as to counteract the threats to 
validity identified in each. In this sense, there seem to be two forms of triangulation 
between output and process approaches. Firstly, output analysis may come first and the 
background details be further investigated by a process approach (Figure 10-4): that is, 
correlational patterns of policy variation are portrayed first and then interpreted through 
a process approach to display the sources of variation in the mechanisms of policy- 
making. The value of output analysis here lies in contextualising research targets not 
only with comparative information but also in terms of the ultimate impact of 
procedural factors. These constitute the basis for subsequent generalisation of findings 
and for the identification of special cases to be studied in more detail. Once the 
ultimate variation is identified with comparative information, the working practices of 
policy-making need to be explored in greater depth. The process approach is used at the 
second stage either to explain the impact of procedural factors on outputs or merely to 
describe the patterns of interaction within the process. Since the main aim is to get 
insights into policy-making rather than to generalise the findings, the choice of case 
does not have to be based on random sampling. Rather the basis of case selection is 
better grounded on the results of output analysis. Choice is made on the basis of the 
results of output analysis; those that are high or low on a criterion variable or those that 
display significant characteristics. 
10. The belief that a single method is enough to "plain policy-making has been 
increasingly doubted in recent policy studies. In a sense, this trend seems to be a 
reflection of methodological relativism or pragmatism, but certainly not nihilism. 
11. In general, potential triangulation have been systematized into four types: data 
triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological 
triangulation (Fielding and Fielding, 1986,25). It is with the methodological 
triangulation that this study is mainly interested. 
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(Figure 10-4) The First Strategy for Triangulation 
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(Figure 10-5> The Second Strategy for Triangulation 
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Secondly, the process approach can be used as a precursor to the formulation of 
detailed issues under question (Figure 10-5). At the first stage, the use of the process 
approach provides insights into the ways in which policy outputs come about by 
illuminating the interactions between related factors. This may provide a conceptual 
orientation which facilitates the construction of linkages and, indeed, the generation of 
hypotheses in empirical studies. At the second stage, procedural views of policy- 
making are tested in a wider context of policy variation by output analysis. Hunches or 
hypotheses have to be confirmed by the hard findings (Bryman, 1988,136) of output 
analysis. Throughout this stage, related data can be examined in a more standardized 
way, and insights acquired by process approach can be exan-iined with the data of a 
large number of cases. 
In short, triangulation of process and output approaches is expected to show how 
the weakness of one is supplemented by the strength of the other. The above two 
strategies basically have the same values and effects. 
Substantive Implications for Korean Local Government 
Variation in Social Policies 
A number of implications may be drawn from the results of this research for the 
practice of policy-making in local government. The chapter now concludes by 
summarising the distinctive features of local policy-making in Korea and the ways in 
which local service provision might be improved. They are discussed in the remaining 
section of this chapter. 
First of all, the results of analysis show that local spending differs not only 
between policy areas but also between localities in Korea. Noticeable variations are 
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observed from locality to locality with, for instance, a 2.909 percent variation 
coefficient in environment. Four distinctive features deserve mentioning. First, the 
coefficients of variation in social policy areas range from 0.237 to 2.909 (Table 7-1). 
This spread is wider than other policy areas such as regional development and general 
administration expenditure. While the regional development expenditure records a 
coefficient of variation of 0.305, most social policy areas show higher coefficients. 
This implies that policy-making on social policy spending clearly varies within local 
government in Korea. 
Second, within the social policy area, the variations in divisible services (social 
services) are far narrower than in indivisible social policy sectors. The c. v. in social 
services is 0.348 indicating that all the local authorities spend a similar percentage of 
their budgets on divisible social policy. No significant variation is found in the 
spending on social services between local governments. An almost identical level of 
policy priority is given to the beneficiaries of social services by each local government. 
The reason may well be that the central government influences the distribution of 
divisible social services by imposing general standards of provision. 
Third, a huge difference is found between the highest (environment) and the 
lowest spenders (fire) within the indivisible social policy area. This implies that the 
ratio of local spending differs greatly between social policy sectors even within the 
indivisible social policy area. One plausible explanation is that local authorities have 
little room for manoeuvre under the pressure of environmental constraints in some 
indivisible social policies. The fire service which has the strongest tendency to cluster 
around the average spending level with the smallest inter-local disparities is an example 
here (at c. v. of 0.237). By contrast, local authorities enjoy more autonomy in other 
indivisible social policies like the environment service. The environment service is less 
standardised (at c. v. of 2.909) across localities being financed by the local tax (Table 7- 
1). 
Finally, the social services sector accounts for more than 10 percent of the local 
budget. This means nearly half of the social policy budget goes towards the social 
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services which are provided basically for people in physical and financial hardship. 
This is an indication that little attention is paid to other welfare issues in Korean local 
government. 
Explaining Variations in Social Policies 
More than anything else, policy variation in Korean local government is best 
explained by socioeconomic variables in the output analysis of this study, as in other 
countries. R2 in the regression analysis records much higher values on socioeconomic 
variables than either financial sources or urban hierarchy theory. For example, more 
than 95 percent of variance in health, environment and education can be accounted for 
by socioeconomic factors. In the social services sector, more than 83 percent of 
spending variance between localities can also be explained by socioeconon-dc variables. 
A glance at the independent variable gives several clues here. To begin with 
social service, variations are negatively correlated with three variables to indicate 
income level in Korea: the percentage of car-ownership, the population density and the 
relative proportion of council seats occupied by DLP. This comes, more than anything 
else, from the fact that social services in Korean local government are the only divisible 
services provided for those in physical and financial hardship. Social services are less 
needed in better-off localities and in highly populated areas (Table 7-6) which have 
benefited from urbanisation in the context of Korea. This inference is again supported 
by the fact that a highly positive correlation appears between social services and the 
proportion of elderly people. Elderly people are the main beneficiaries of the divisible 
social services in local authorities of Korea. In contrast, health and environment 
spending exhibit positive correlations with population density, per capita saving and the 
proportion of car-ownership. This means that the more affluent the residents of an 
authority, the more they are likely to spend on such services as health and environment. 
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On the other hand, the results of the process approach illuminate several 
distinctive features of the policy process in Seoul and Kyonggi. These points can be 
taken as the source of policy variation in the two extreme cases. The most striking 
difference is found on the dimension of political leadership. Both the local council and 
the Mayor in Seoul are clearly more willing to improve social services than in Kyonggi. 
Also, the target groups in Seoul appear to be more vigorous than those of Kyonggi in 
the priority they give to social policies. Whilst the mean value of the target groups' 
policy orientation is 3.3962 in Kyonggi it is 3.8860 in Seoul (Table 8-12). 
Main Policy Actors in Local Government after the 1991 Reform 
The local minister (Mayor in six Cities) and the central government are the most 
influential policy actors in the Korean local government after the 1991 reform (Table 8- 
1). These two policy actors show the same degree of influence. The main policy 
resource through which the local n-dnister exerts influence is 'formal authority' whilst 
that of central government is 'political measures' and 'information'. Contrary to 
general expectations, the part played by local councils (which were established in 1991) 
is not notable. Local councils appear to have access to the fewest policy resources 
defined in terms of information and professional expertise. Likewise, the local groups 
do not exercise any notable degree of influence on local policy-making either. They 
record the lowest influence among policy actors presented to respondents. The low 
extent of the local groups' influence is in line with the lack of policy resources. They 
are assessed to have very limited policy resources. 
From the point of view of interest mediation, it is interesting to see a 'division of 
work' between policy actors. The target groups and the local councils are apparently 
social-policy oriented whilst the central government appears to be concerned mostly 
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with economic policyl2 (Table 8-1). This result is consistent with the explanation 
suggested by the dual state theory in the ideological and functional dimensions. 
According to Saunders and Cawson, there are tensions between local and central 
governments over the primacy of economic versus social policy priorities and over the 
rights of citizenship versus the rights of private property. This explanation proves the 
case in the process of local policy-making. 
Role of Local Councillors 
In assessing the reconstructed local government system, it is important to 
exan-dne the roles of the local councillors who emerged with the launch of local 
government reforms in 1991. Their activities will be the signpost for local reform at 
least in the short term. Accordingly, more light needs to be shed on the roles of 
councillors in shaping local policies by looking at various aspects of their activities. 
From the perspective of interest mediation, the advocates of local reform may have 
proved their case. There are indications (Table 6-4 and Table 8-5) that the councillors 
are very markedly more inclined than other policy actors to regard social welfare issues 
as important. The local councils both in Seoul and Kyonggi are highly committed to 
social policies. In this sense, the council itself can be seen as an institutional setting 
which is more sensitive to social policy issues than to others. Table 8-5 and two figures 
(9-1 and 9-2) all imply that councillors are working closely with the local residents and 
departments. They are relatively aloof from the intervention of central government and 
the formal authority of the Mayor (local minister). 
12. Relatively, central government's inclination was not properly captured by the five- 
point scale in this survey. A more contrasting mean value would have been recorded 
for central government on the ten-point rather than on the five-point scale. However, 
this does little damage to the interpretation of central government's orientation towards 
economic policy. 
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However, the general policy orientation of local councils should not be allowed 
to disguise the fact that they are deplored by sceptics. Public officials stressed their 
own autonomy of action from councillors and, furthermore, sometimes expressed 
grievances against councillors (Table 6-4). Much of the criticism was about 
councillors' 'trivial' and 'selfish' involvement in local policy-making and their lack of 
management responsibility. 
In fact, this problem was already evidenced by the analysis of influence level in 
chapter Eight (Table 8-3). The influence of local councils was not noteworthy in local 
policy-making either in Seoul or in Kyonggi. 
In sum, local councillors seem to be praised in terms of political 
representativeness whilst they are criticised from the perspective of local government 
management. It seems that the political position of councillors does not warrant their 
influence in the local policy process where they suffer from a lack of policy resources 
such as information and professional expertise. Needless to say, professional expertise 
and information are the means by which councillors take part in the management of 
modern local government. Unless these policy resources are supplemented for 
councillors, they will continue to have these same troubles. 
Distribution of Financial Sources 
As of 1992, the largest part of the local budget in Korea comes from local 
taxation, which accounts for 42 percent of the total local budget on average. There is an 
extravagant difference (21 %) in the cross-regional distribution of local tax. The non- 
tax revenue is second only to the local tax, showing a mean score of 20 percent. The 
subsidies which are specified for a certain policy programme by central government 
rank as the third most important financial source for local government (20 %). 
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Several features emerge from a more detailed analysis of relationships between 
financial resources and social policies. First of all, within the social policy area, the 
expenditure variations in divisible social policy are slightly better explained by the 
variation in financial resources than in the case of indivisible social policies. The 
explanatory power of financial sources comes mainly from the effects of subsidies in 
the case of divisible social policy sectors. Subsidies have a noticeable association with 
social services which is the only divisible social policy in Korean local government. 
Secondly, no statistical correlation is found between expenditure and source of 
finance in three services: fire, environment and culture. The variability in these three 
services is not linked to the differential incidence of the financial sources. One 
plausible explanation is that fire, environment and culture are very much standardised 
across the localities and provided by public authorities regardless of the different 
composition of financial resources. 
It is worth summarising several relationships between financial resources and 
local service provision in Korea (Figure 7-3). The overall finding of the study is that 
there is an inverse relationship between central subsidies and local taxation. An 
increase in local taxation is negatively related to an increase in subsidies. Central 
subsidies are mostly distributed to the localities which do not have financial resources 
for nationally imposed policy programmes. Whilst these subsidies appear to be the 
main financial resource of the social service sector, locally raised finance is distributed 
to such indivisible social policies as education, environment and health. 
Reform for the Management Side of Local Government 
A final point to be noted is the need of innovation in the management side of 
local government. Since the 1991 reform, local authorities have undoubtedly been in a 
transition, with a shift of concern from the institutional aspect to the management side 
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of local affairs. The role of local government itself is changing: from being the agent of 
the centre to being a separate entity. Whilst in the past the notion of efficiency referred 
to the successful implementation of central policies, it now means successful 
management of local affairs taking account of local needs. It is a crucial issue for a 
local government to consider its activities as a whole in relation to the problems of the 
area it controls. The extent to which local government can assess and meet local needs 
is being placed at the focal point of concern today. 
However, the general implication of this study is that local authorities have still 
a lot to do to adapt to changed circumstances. Partial support for this implication is 
found in the analysis of local policy-making (Table 8-13), and in the responses to open- 
ended questioning (Q 8 in Appendix 6). Policy processes are characterised by 'creeping 
incrementalism' while the diffusion of traditional power often leads to inter- 
organisational fragmentation between council, department and central authorities. The 
institutional re-arrangement in 1991 has brought a great deal of confusion about the new 
roles of each organisation and the problems of co-ordination have not been adequately 
solved since the establishment of local councils. This fragmentation is compounded by 
the lack of an innovative and rational approach on the management side. 
The future of the local reforms in Korea depends on translating the ideas of 
reform into processes and procedures of local government. Incrementalism needs to be 
supplemented by a rational approach and the traditional inertia needs to be replaced by 
innovative flexibility. To these ends, several policies can be suggested such as the 
development of 'corporate management'13, the recruitment of professional policy 
analysts, and functional reallocation between the centre and the locality and between the 
council and its departments. These alternatives will be useful as means of shaping the 
political environment for efficient management and, in the end, of enhancing local 
authorities' ability to assess and meet local needs. Finally, it is worth noting that citizen 
involvement is vital for improving the management of local government. At the bottom 
13. The notion of corporate management has often been mentioned in British local 
authorities during the last decades (Dearlove, 1979,118; Elcock et al., 1989,139). 
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of past unease with the deficiencies of traditional administration lay a criticism of 
unresponsive and nonparticipant management of local government. Nevertheless, this 
research does not provide comfort for the advocates of citizen involvement. Local 
residents remain in a very weak position in shaping local policy-making (Table 8-10 
and Table 9-1 and 9-2). Their inputs frequently have little impact on local policy- 
decisions. It would be fundamentally impossible to take account of local circumstances 
without the encouragement of citizen involvement in the future. The dissen-tination of 
information for example, which is related to local policy-making, can be a significant 
step towards encouraging citizen involvement in the future. 
10.3. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has explored methodological issues in analysing policy variations in 
local government and assessed the working practices of Korean local government. The 
methodological issues which have been under discussion in this volume could certainly 
be the starting point for further studies. In addition, several choices which have been 
made in this research could also serve as potential starting points for future studies. As 
noted earlier, some choices were inevitably made under the pay-off relationships 
between alternative methods (Bulmer, 1983,14). Other choices were determined by the 
need to strike a balance between the demands of methodological adequacy on the one 
hand and practical feasibility on the other (Booth, 1990,21). This last section offers a 
few signposts for the direction of future studies. 
First and foremost, further work to refine methodological triangulation would 
certainly be worthwhile. This study has showed throughout how the appropriate use of 
methods is important, especially concerning output and process approaches. 
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Methodological issues should be treated as a decisive element in policy studies. This 
work would be a starting point for the development of methodological triangulation in 
the field of policy science. 
Second, this study could be strengthened by a time-series analysis of policy 
variation in local government. The empirical research in this study was constrained by 
the need to explore local policies after the 1991 reform. This dictated a cross-sectional 
perspective. A time-series analysis would give additional information on, for example, 
the impact of situational contingencies like inflation and econon-dc growth. 
Third, the choices which have been made in this research provide a starting 
point for possible future studies. As noted in the first chapter, this study limited its 
scope to the analysis of budgetary outputs and processes. Although the budget is the 
most readily quantifiable measure of government policy-making, it is not the only 
measure of governmental activities. There are other important governmental activities 
such as regulation and admission policies. The budget, as Hill and Bran-dey (1986,154) 
pointed out, is not a true output measure but just a measure of the cost of achieving an 
output. Therefore, the focus on budgetary records excludes the non-budgetary and 
structural aspects which are rarely recorded in the budgetary data. These aspects might 
be examined in a more detailed analysis of the process of policy-making, such as non- 
decision making. Future studies will be able to yield fruitful results by starting where 
this thesis leaves off. 
Finally, there are still a number of further questions that need to be answered 
concerning the newly-constructed local government in Korea. Other possible work 
n-dght involve a fuller examination of inter-governmental relationships, officer- 
councillor relationships, and the initiatives of regional development and unions within 
local authorities. These topics deserve more attention in the context of the development 
of local government in Korea. 
251 
APPENDICES 
<Appendix 1> Statistical Data 
<Appendix 1> Measurement of Urbanity 
<Appendix 3> Regression Equations for Chapter Seven 
<Appendix 4> Local Government Examined in Research 
Articles 
<Appendix 5> Schedule of Interviews 
<Appendix 6> Questionnaire (Translation) 
<APPENDIX 1> STATISTICAL DATA 
<Table 11-1> Share of Local Expenditure in National Budget, Korean Won (100 
million) 
Year 
. 
Gov't Budget(A) Local Budget(B) B/A(%) 
1951 6 1 16.7 
1952 22 3 13.6 
1953 32 8 25.0 
1954 67 29 43.3 
1955 140 79 56.4 
1957 146 85 58.2 
1958 280 106 37.9 
1959 319 127 39.8 
1960 370 137 37.0 
1961 520 161 31.0 
1962 756 118 15.6 
1963 608 160 26.3 
1964 632 180 28.5 
1965 844 233 27.6 
1966 1,314 347 26.4 
1967 1,789 464 25.9 
1968 2,513 663 26.4 
1969 3,289 1,027 31.2 
1970 4,051 1,261 31.1 
1971 4,945 1,568 31.7 
1972 6,053 1,764 29.1 
1973 6,062 2,155 35.5 
1974 9,427 2,718 28.8 
1975 14,469 4,304 29.7 
1976 22,194 5,680 25.6 
1977 29,908 8,165 27.3 
1978 40,405 10,856 26.9 
1979 55,075 15,936 28.9 
1980 66,352 19,454 29.3 
1981 81,744 24,576 30.1 
1982 95,260 29,021 30.5 
1983 107,533 35,167 32.7 
1984 118,289 40,951 34.6 
1985 130,089 42,173 32.4 
1986 146,993 47,571 32.4 
1987 178,839 60,421 33.8 
Source: Hanguk Chaejong 40 Nyonsa (Forty Years of Korean Fiscal Policy), vol. 4, 
Seoul: KDI, 1991,666. 
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<Table 11 -2> Changes in the Number of Employees in Local Government 
Year TGE (A) LGE (B) B/A 
1958 245,691 37,206 15.1 
1959 246,857 36,884 14.9 
1960 248,747 40,837 16.4 
1961 235,458 31,417 13.3 
1962 266,821 43,120 16.2 
1963 287,988 43,168 15.0 
1964 294,992 51,179 17.3 
1965 314,991 50,308 16.0 
1966 329,752 54,021 16.4 
1967 355,931 54,298 15.3 
1968 383,461 57,668 15.0 
1969 393,419 61,194 15.6 
1970 428,305 68,728 16.0 
1971 461,999 90,625 19.6 
1972 478,355 92,627 19.4 
1973 452,054 95,360 21.1 
1974 466,444 101,030 21.7 
1975 478,562 107,385 22.4 
1976 502,702 118,642 23.6 
1977 519,110 123,363 23.8 
1978 540,658 131,862 24.4 
1979 564,058 143,161 25.4 
1980 596,431 150,566 25.2 
1981 665,895 185,729 27.9 
1982 647,851 189,091 29.2 
1983 650,914 190,138 29.2 
1984 657,214 192,820 29.3 
1985 670,637 198,087 29.5 
1986 691,670 205,858 29.8 
1987 705,053 216,451 30.7 
1988 737,225 232,094 31.5 
1989 781,346 252,123 32.2 
Note) TGE: Total Government Employees, LGE: Local Government Employees. 
Source: Hanguk Tongkye Yonkam (Statistical Yearbook of Korea), Economic 
Planning Board (EPB), Korea, 1968,1973,1990. 
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<Table 11-3> The Share of Policy Areas in Total Local Budget(%), 1992 
SOPO COUN GENE INDUS REGI OTHER 
Seoul 28.16 4.17 3.16 0.46 24.60 43.20 
Pusan 25.69 1.56 5.43 4.81 40.25 23.66 
Taegu 19.56 1.75 9.38 23.91 24.37 22.60 
Inchon 26.22 2.64 8.01 6.28 36.45 22.78 
Kwangju 24.29 3.31 17.65 3.40 24.09 30.25 
Taejon 27.61 3.32 7.90 5.85 35.89 22.42 
Kyonggi 16.79 3.06 7.04 13.27 38.58 24.02 
Kangwon 20.34 5.22 16.26 34.35 16.37 12.17 
Chungbuk 24.49 6.42 9.95 25.31 24.23 15.39 
Chungnam 22.43 4.39 9.38 35.74 21.75 10.27 
Chonbuk 26.03 5.33 8.08 35.55 17.89 11.93 
Chonnam 23.35 5.37 8.35 38.99 20.19 8.58 
Kyongbuk 18.93 5.80 4.27 23.92 20.63 31.67 
Kyongnam 17.58 3.95 5.26 28.01 19.87 28.88 
Cheju 24.81 9.82 14.84 23.94 22.50 12.92 
Note) SOPO: Expenditure on Social Policy, COUN: Expenditure on Council, GENE: 
Expenditure on General, INDUS: Expenditure on Industry, REGI: Expenditure on 
Regional Development, OTHER- Expenditure on Other Policies 
Source: Chibang Yesan Kaeyo (Summary of Local Government Budgets), Ministry of 
Home Affairs (MHA), Korea, 1992. 
<Table 11-4> The Share of Each Social Policy Sector in Total Local Budget(%), 1992 
SOSE HEAL CULT ENVI EDUC FIRE SPOR 
Seoul 4.30 9.00 0.83 0.92 9.11 3.02 0.81 
Pusan 8.14 3.85 0.25 0.00 7.98 2.44 0.76 
Taegu 6.02 3.58 1.05 0.00 4.55 2.05 2.31 
Inchon 7.25 4.24 3.57 0.00 5.22 3.98 1.96 
Kwangju 8.61 3.64 3.49 0.00 3.76 2.26 2.54 
Taejon 9.36 0.75 2.31 6.55 5.09 2.48 1.08 
Kyonggi 8.00 1.57 2.42 0.00 0.37 2.57 1.86 
Kangwon 10.37 2.45 1.99 0.00 0.09 3.79 1.64 
Chungbuk 14.73 2.65 3.21 0.00 0.03 3.00 0.87 
Chungnam 13.79 1.14 2.25 1.28 0.19 2.14 1.64 
Chonbuk 16.67 2.23 3.65 0.00 0.20 2.55 0.73 
Chonnam 15.42 1.87 1.84 0.00 0.16 3.16 0.90 
Kyongbuk 10.13 2.86 1.37 0.00 0.71 3.14 0.74 
Kyongnam 9.64 2.13 0.93 0.00 0.62 3.83 0.43 
Cheju 12.10 2.70 4.09 0.00 0.52 4.21 1.19 
Note) SOSE: Expenditure on Social Service, HEAL: Expenditure on Health, CULT: 
Expenditure on Culture, ENVI: Expenditure on Environment, EDUC: Expenditure on 
Education, SPOR: Expenditure on Sports. 
Source: Chibang Yesan Kaeyo (Summary of Local Government Budgets), Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Korea, 1992. 
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<Table 11-5> Local Expenditure on Social Policies '91 and'92 (Million Won) 
1991 1992 
Seoul 760,913 890,819 
Pusan 194,615 231,105 
Taegu 133,585 137,441 
Inchon 116,877 122,773 
Kwangju 81,390 84,080 
Taejon 61,939 90,578 
Kyonggi 142,280 163,227 
Kangwon 60,790 62,510 
Chungbuk 56,728 61,027 
Chungnam 77,604 79,350 
Chonbuk 99,059 99,906 
Chonnam 93,258 103,517 
Kyongbuk 115,305 111,579 
Kyongnam 103,407 110,847 
Cheju 21,960 31,467 
Source: Chibang Yesan Kaeyo (Summary of Local Government Budgets), Ministry of 
Home Affairs, Korea, 1992. 
<Table 11-6> Local Expenditure on Social Policies '85289 
(Million Won) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Seoul 130,027 152,651 175,838 208,314 323,132 
Pusan 35,776 44,687 58,449 92,469 124,957 
Taegu 19,603 30,380 43,440 59,701 85,191 
Inchon 12,110 20,593 25,009 36,849 52,759 
Kwangju 10,628 15,210 26,017 40,954 
Taejon 42 267 
Kyonggi 63,513 88,691 125,406 160,632 , 184,417 
Kangwon 40,578 43,409 63,338 78,183 84,191 
Chungbuk 27,929 36,572 52,352 62,424 71,738 
Chungnam 55,652 67,809 106,724 131,322 112,548 
Chonbuk 46,051 62,046 93,899 110,010 138,389 
Chonnam 69,283 73,849 113,302 130,127 155,652 
Kyongbuk 51,735 72,248 111,307 132,074 147,848 
Kyongnam 49,354 66,784 110,158 140,446 166,958 
Cheju 7,773 12,662 14,897 20,427 22,823 
Source: Kyongie TongAye Yonbo (Econon-dc Statistical Yearbook), EPB, Korea, 1991. 
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<Table 11 -7> Correlation Coefficients between Financial Sources 
LOTX NTR CSTX TRAN SUBS 
LOTX 1.000 
NTR . 5516 1.000 CSTX -. 8931** -. 6942** 1.000 TRAN . 3141 -. 0188 -. 3206 1.000 SUBS -. 8838** -. 7056* . 7173* -. 2229 1.000 
<Table 11-8> Correlation Coefficients between Socioeconomic Variables 
POPDEN % ELDERLY % SCHOOL % CAR SAVING 
POPDEN 1.0000 -. 6833 -. 2472 . 8854** . 9372** % ELDERLY -. 6833 1.0000 . 4651 -. 8570** -. 5112 % SCHOOL -. 2472 . 4651 1.0000 -. 4708 -. 1647 % CAR . 8854** -. 8570** -. 4708 1.0000 . 8051* SAVING . 9372** -. 5112 -. 1647 . 8051* 1.0000 % TURN -. 6713 . 7731* . 5175 -. 7997* -. 4673 % DLP . 3611 -. 4947 -. 6188 . 4590 . 2369 %D -. 0574 . 3005 . 5218 -. 2099 -. 0414 %INDEPEN -. 5119 . 3046 . 1156 -. 4021 -. 3283 
* at. 01 and ** at. 001 
(continued) 
% TURN % DLP %D %INDEPEN 
POPDEN -. 6713 . 3611 -. 0574 -. 5119 % ELDERLY . 7731* -. 4947 . 3005 . 3046 % SCHOOL . 5175 -. 6188 . 5218 . 1156 % CAR -. 7997* . 4590 -. 2099 -. 4021 SAVING -. 4673 . 2369 -. 0414 -. 3283 % TURN 1.0000 -. 4271 -. 0196 . 7623* % DLP -. 4271 1.0000 -. 8368** -. 2072 %D -. 0196 -. 8368** 1.0000 -. 3619 %INDEPEN . 7623* -. 2072 -. 3619 1.0000 
* at. 01 and ** at. 001 
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<Table 11-9> Total Population (Persons), 1990 
Locality Population 
Seoul 10,627,790 
Pusan 3,797,566 
Taegu 2,228,834 
Inchon 1,818,293 
Kwangju 1,144,695 
Taejon 1,062,084 
Kyonggi 6,154,321 
Kangwon 1,592,512 
Chungbuk 1,414,295 
Chungnam 2,027,766 
Chonbuk 2,069,848 
Chonnam 2,522,515 
Kyongbuk 2,865,676 
Kyongnam 3,679,396 
Cheju 514,608 
Source: Chiyok Tongkye Yonbo (Regional Statistics Yearbook), 
Bureau of Statistics, Korea, 1992. 
<Table 11-10> Population Density in Each Locality, 1990 
Locality POP Densi , 
Rank 
(persons/ i92) 
Seoul 17,558 1 
Pusan 7,173 2 
Taegu 4,891 4 
Inchon 5,732 3 
Kwangju 2,285 5 
Taejon 1,977 6 
Kyonggi 571 7 
Kangwon 94 15 
Chungbuk 190 12 
Chungnam 244 11 
Chonbuk 257 10 
Chonnam 214 13 
Kyongbuk 147 14 
Kyongnam 313 8 
Cheju 282 9 
Source: Chiyok Tongkye Yonbo (Regional Statistics Yearbook), 
Bureau of Statistics, Korea, 1992, p. 27. 
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<APPENDIX 2> MEASUREMENT OF URBANITY 
The concept of urbanity is variously defined based on several concepts such as: 
(1) inhabitants (Bibby and Shepherd, 1990) (2) industrial structure (Ronnas, 1984,9) 
and (3) social and cultural characteristics with an emphasis on the mode of living 
(Johnson, 1990,5). These differing notions on urbanization create tremendous 
difficulties in attempting to make comparisons of urbanization either from country to 
country or within a given country. 
In this study, the notion of urbanity was conceptualised in Chapter three as 
referring to 'the relative degree of internal service needs generated in highly populated 
cities'. Therefore, this study focuses on the implication of the urbanity which takes 
place in an agglomeration of people. Habitational features are likely to characterise the 
relative degree of internal service needs. A consistent ordinal classification is made and 
its relevance is tested in chapter Seven. 
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<APPENDIX 3> REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR CHAPTER SEVEN 
Financial Sources 
<Equation 11-1> SOSE = 6.01328 +. 21539 SUBS +u 
<Equation 11-2> HEAL =. 622177 +. 056175 LOTX +u 
<Equation 11-3> EDUC = -2.96568 +. 13212 LOTX +u 
<Equation 11-4> SPOR =. 29062 +. 04937 EXTR +u 
Socioeconomic Variables 
<Equation 11-5> SOSE 18.673841 -. 204852 * CAR -. 057528 * DLP +u 
<Equation 11-6> HEAL -. 54422 +. 16784 * Elderly + 4.61525 * E-04 +u 
<Equation 11-7> ENVI -. 42668 +. 01475 Elderly + 7.125596 
10-5 SAVING +u 
<Equation 11-8> CULT = 4.44432 -. 0328 DLP +U 
<Equation 11-9> EDUC = 2.38069 +. 001145 POPDEN - 7.77409 
10-4 SAVING +u 
<Equation 11-10> FIRE = 2.65994 +. 031465 INDEPEN +u 
Urban Hierarchy 
I 
<Equation 11-11> PARK 14.485714 -. 810714 * URBANITY 
<Equation 11-12> HEAL -3.046512 + 4.360465 ADHI +u 
<Equation 11-13> EDUC 1.085714 +. 864286 URBAN +u 
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<APPENDIX 4> LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXAMINED IN RESEARCH 
ARTICLES 
This section sets out to explore how far the changes and developments in Korean 
local government are mirrored in the research literature on the subject and how far the 
trends in research over the period provide an insight into changes in the perception of 
local government as a field of study. For this purpose, an analysis of the contents of the 
Korean Public Adn-dnistration Review (KPAR) was selected covering the years 1970 - 
1990. This is the professional journal published by the principal organisation in the 
public adn-dnistration and policy field. KPAR provides data for the analysis of research 
trends in terms of subject content and of research method in local government studies. 
Frequency of Local Government Articles 
Table 11-11 shows the changing proportion of local government articles in 
KPAR from 1971 to 1990. Except for the year 1979 when there was a special issue on 
the promotion of local commerce and industry, local government topics had been 
underrepresented during the 1970s. Indeed they were totally neglected in five separate 
years (1974,1976,1977,1978 and 1980). 
In contrast, the second half of the 1980s brought increased awareness of local 
government issues. On the eve of the local self-governing era, writers in the field of 
public adn-dnistration shifted their concern to local affairs (particularly in 1985,1989 
and 1990). 
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<Table 11-1 1> Ratio ofLocal Government Articles (1971-90) 
Year A B B/A Year A B B/A 
1971 9 1 11.1 1981 10 1 10 
1972 9 1 11.1 1982 18 1 5.6 
1973 10 1 10 1983 17 2 11.8 
1974 12 0 0 1984 36 6 16.7 
1975 10 1 10 1985 32 7 21.9 
1976 11 0 0 1986 30 1 3.2 
1977 13 0 0 1987 26 3 11.5 
1978 17 0 0 1988 28 1 3.6 
1979 21 8 38.1 1989 43 8 18.6 
1980 12 0 0 1990 44 10 22.7 
A: N of All Articles of the Year 
B: N of Local Government Articles 
Topics of Local Government Research 
Table 11-12 illustrates the changes of subject content within the field of local 
government studies. Some articles fit more than one research topic (for instance, rural 
development can be categorised both into unequal development and into economic 
development) and these were recorded under each heading in order to avoid any 
problems of arbitrariness. For this reason, the number of articles recorded in the total 
(Table 11- 12) is larger than the number of articles analysed (Table II- 11). 
In general, the relative proportion of research topics in the 'management' and 
'administrative environment' categories seems to have fluctuated up and down. Most 
studies have accepted the view that local government was a peripheral agent of the 
central government. 
More specifically, the table indicates that a heavy emphasis had been put on the 
administrative environment (especially econon-dc development) until 1978. In 1979, 
there appeared a sudden and rapid increase of research interest in managerial issues. 
The number of articles on internal management topics increased to a peak in 1979 when 
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55.6 percent of local government articles dealt with this area. It may be that more 
writers in the field of public administration did feel the necessity to enhance local 
official's capabilities for the continuous achievement of economic growth which were 
initiated by the central government. Of the management topics, personnel and financial 
issues received most attention at this time. 
<Table 11 - 12> Local Government Topics examined in KPAR 
71-4 75-8 79-82 83-6 87-90 Total 
LMANAGEMENT 
Organisation 
Personnel 
Finance 
Administrative 
Practice 
Council 
2. ADMINISTRATIVE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Urbanisation 2 
Economic 2 
Development 
Transportation 
Privatisation 
Unequal 
Development 2 
Citizen 
Involvement 
3. INTER-GOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
Central-Local 
Local-Local 
4. RESEARCH/ 
EDUCATION 
5. FOREIGN CASE 
37 
1 6 
10 
8 
2 
34 
2 3 7 
7 12 
1 
2 2 
3 5 
3 4 7 
12 
2 4 4 10 
1 1 2 
2 1 3 
4 5 
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During the first half of the 1980s, the emphasis shifted to new research questions 
within the subject of the administrative environment. In particular, citizen participation 
became more popular as a topic while subjects like economic development and 
urbanisation experienced a steady decrease until 1987. Meanwhile, unequal 
development appears to have received constant research attention over the years 
examined, albeit at a low level. 
Since the year of 1984 onwards managerial factors have attracted research 
interest again from a different perspective. A growing concern was the managerial 
aspects of local government such as finance, organisation and adn-dnistrative 
management. Such a trend seems to have been nurtured by the emerging need to 
restructure local government itself for a self-governing era. Local finance especially 
was being referred to by most writers who accepted the conventional wisdom that 
increasing dependence by local government on central grants leads to increased central 
control of localities. 
Research Methods in Local Government Studies 
Finally, the articles were analysed in terms of the research methods used. Table 
11-13 presents the numbers and percentages of articles by research method for different 
time periods. The table indicates that most of the studies have used empirical methods 
over the years. On the other hand, theoretical approaches have been overlooked in local 
government articles over the past twenty years. This suggests that local government 
studies are conducted mostly to meet the immediate needs of the public or private 
sectors of the time. As pointed out by Stalling and Terris (1988,585), public 
adn-dnistration writers have clung self-consciously to their emphasis on practice. 1989 
appears to be exceptional in that relatively more articles were published on theoretical 
issues. The articles in this year anticipated the launch of the local self-governing system 
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in 1991. Several theoretical approaches were employed to cover such issues as local 
government theory. 
Of the empirical studies conducted since 1979, quantitative methods have been 
increasingly adopted, reaching a high point in 1990 (when three of the eight quantitative 
studies were conducted using questionnaire survey methods). This is an indication that 
increased emphasis is being given to the general public. This trend is expected to 
continue over the next few years. 
<Fable 11-13> Research Methods ofLocal Government Articles 
71-75 76-79 81-84 85-88 89-90 Total 
THEORETICAL 34125 15 
QuaL 
EMPIRICAL 
Quan. 
19 
779 
(1)<2> (1)<3> <3> 
Note) Qual: Qualitative Study, Quan: Quantitative Study. 
(): N of Case Study in the Year. 
< >: N of Questionnaire Survey in the Year. 
265 
<APPENDIX 5> SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS 
<Table 11- 14> Schedule ofInterviews 
Lim, Kyung-Ho 
Director General, October, 25,1991 
Local Tax Bureau & 
Ministry of Home Affairs November 17,1991 
Cho, Young-Taek 
Chief Officer, December, 17,1991 
Department of Planning Board 
Kyonggi Local Government 
Unnamed Manager December 14,1991 
Department of Social Welfare 
Kyonggi Local Government 
Shin, Hyun-Soo 
Manager, December 14,1991 
Department of Family Welfare 
Seoul City Government 
Six Officers in Kyonggi 
Department of Planning December, 19,1991 
Kyonggi Local Government 
The material collected in interviews is used extensively throughout the thesis. 
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<APPENDIX 6> QUESTIONNAIRE (TRANSLATION) 
Dear Respondent: 
This questionnaire survey is conducted for the launch and development of the local self- 
government system in Korea. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and win be 
used only for the purpose of academic research. It would be appreciated if you find 
time to answer these questions. 
*** Please answer the questions thinking of the budgetary process for 1992 *** 
1. Please indicate which policy actor approached you most frequently during the period 
of expenditure decision-making? 
(1) Planning Board (2) Mayor (Local Governor) 
(3) Local Council (4) Central Government 
(5) Target Groups (6) Others specify ( 
2. Please indicate which policy actor you approached most frequently during the period 
of expenditure decision-making? 
(1) Planning Board (2) Mayor (Local Governor) 
(3) Local Council (4) Central Government 
(5) Target Groups (6) Others specify ( 
3. Please circle the relevant number indicating your level of agreement with the 
statement below. 
1) "There is much competition between the departments in local government. " 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
2 3 4 5 
2) "Central government exercises noticeable control on local government. " 
Strongly Disagree 
234 
Strongly Agree 
5 
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3) "The Mayor (Local Minister) has considerable autonomy in policy-making. " 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
4) "Local council has much influence on policy-making. " 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
5) "Target groups participate in policy-making to a great extent. " 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree 
12345 
4. If the functions of local government are simplified into economic and social policies, 
how would you say the following policy actors distribute their emphasis towards each 
of policy area? 
1) Mayor (Local Governor) 
Econon-dc Policy Social Policy 
12345 
2) Planning Board 
Economic Policy Social Policy 
1245 
3) Local Council 
Economic Policy Social Policy 
1 5 
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4) Central Government 
Economic Policy Social Policy 
12345 
5) Target Groups 
Economic Policy Social Policy 
1 
6) Your Department 
Econon-dc Policy Social Policy 
1245 
5. "In general, expenditure decision depends both on past experiences and on new 
analysis. " Please indicate the relative importance of the two in your case. 
Past Experience New Analysis 
12345 
6. "It seems that policy-making needs both scientific analysis and political adjustment. " 
Please indicate the relative importance of the two in your case. 
Scientific Analysis Political Adjustment 
12345 
7. Various resources are utilized by policy actors in the policy-making process. Which 
policy actor do you feel possesses the largest portion of each of the following 
resources? Please circle the appropriate number. 
1) Political Legitimacy 
(1) Mayor(Local Minister) (2) Your Department 
(3) Planning Board (4) Central Government 
(5) Local Council (6) Target Groups 
(7) Others specify 
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2) Formal Authority 
(1) Mayor(Local Minister) 
(3) Planning Board 
(5) Local Council 
(7) Others specify 
3) Finance 
(1) Mayor(Local Minister) 
(3) Planning Board 
(5) Local Council 
(7) Others specify 
4) Information 
(1) Mayor(Local Minister) 
(3) Planning Board 
(5) Local Council 
(7) Others specify 
5) Professionalism 
(1) Mayor(Local Minister) 
(3) Planning Board 
(5) Local Council 
(7) Others specify 
(2) Your Department 
(4) Central Government 
(6) Target Groups 
(2) Your Department 
(4) Central Government 
(6) Target Groups 
(2) Your Department 
(4) Central Government 
(6) Target Groups 
(2) Your Department 
(4) Central Government 
(6) Target Groups 
8. What would you think of the local government reforms? What do you think is the 
most notable change during the last year? Please write down any changes that you have 
you found in local government affairs ? 
() 
9. Your department: 
1) Social Policy 2) Econon-dc Policy 3) Others 
10. Your position: 
1) 9 2) 8 3) 7 4) 6 5) 5 6) 4 7) 3& under 
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11. Please write a number showing the level of influence you think each policy actor 
exerts on the others listed above the rectangle. 1 refers to a weak influence and 9 means 
a strong influence. 
Example) 
If the local council has the amount of influence 3,5,1,2,3 on your department, Planning 
Board, Mayor, Local Council, Central Government and Target Groups respectively you 
should write: 
YODE PLAN MAYO COUN CENT TAGR 
1) Your Department 
2) Planning Board 
3) Mayor 
4) Local Council 35123 
5) Central Government 
6) Target Groups 
YODE PLAN MAYO COUN CENT TAGR 
1) Your Department 
2) Planning Board 
3) Mayor 
4) Local Council 
5) Central Government 
6) Target Groups 
Note) YODE: Your Department, PLAN: Planning Board, MAYO: Mayor, COUN: 
Local Council, CENT: Central Government, TAGR: Target Group. 
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